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ABSTRACT
The following is a chronologically ordered internal intellectual history of
Michel Foucault. The objective of this analysis is to determine whether or not
Foucault provides a viable critical social theory of bourgeois society. In order to
examine this topic, I trace the development of Foucault’s thought during his early,
pre-archaeological stage, his archaeological stage, and his genealogical stage. I
frame Foucault’s stages as attempts to overcome Kant’s subject/object division—
or the paradox that man operates as both a meaning-giving subject and an
empirical object—that one encounters in discourses pertaining to the social
sciences. Foucault’s pre-archaeological stage is characterized by two humanistic
modes of thought: hermeneutics and phenomenology. Hermeneutics involves the
interpretation of historical events in pursuit of existential meaning. By contrast,
phenomenology seeks to uncover meaning in subjective experience. After the
publication of Mental Illness and Psychology, Foucault rejects hermeneutics and
phenomenology on the grounds that the search for meaning through
interpretation will inevitably obscure truth under endlessly multiplying
interpretations. Neither method offers a coherent resolution to the subject/object
division.
Foucault’s archaeological method attempts to overcome the subject/object
division by studying the relationships—or patterns appearing in language—
between empirical observations. Archaeology does not account for the truthvalue associated with codified empirical observations (or statements). In other

iii

words, archaeology studies the language patterns comprising claims to objective
truth. Archaeology consequently assumes a relativistic and objective position that
escapes the subject/object division. However, this method suffers from internal
instabilities; the rules governing language pertaining to empirical observation are
objective, yet the analysts are themselves a product of these rules. This
contradiction casts doubt up archaeology’s claim to objectivity.
Foucault’s genealogical method does not seek to resolve Kant’s
subject/object division; rather, genealogy embraces the notion that the interaction
between subject and object remains unknowable. Genealogy, therefore, retains
archaeology’s relativistic stance regarding claims to truth while forgoing the
former method’s pursuit of objective analysis. During his genealogical stage,
Foucault directs his attention away from language patterns and toward the
interaction between power and knowledge. Foucault conceptualizes power as a
multidirectional, decentralized, and self-perpetuating force that manifests itself as
the material result of interpersonal, institutional, and society-level conflicts.
Knowledge complements power by defining normal and abnormal behavior. In
doing so, knowledge establishes the cognitive field comprising the individual’s
self-concept. Genealogy is an analytic of the power/knowledge interaction; the
method provides a relativistic means of conceptualizing the reciprocal influence
between force relations and discourses. While genealogy does not constitute an
objective critical theory, the method has a concrete basis in the form of the
positive manifestations of the power/knowledge interaction.

iv

Based on my assessment of the above methods, I conclude that
genealogy is a viable social theory. Moreover, Foucault consistently deconstructs
narratives comprising bourgeois society. From this recurrence it is apparent that
Foucault is a para-Marxist; he provides a critique of bourgeois society and
attempts to test the limits of individual experience within that society. This
conclusion supports the continued relevance of Foucauldian analysis in the
social sciences.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Background and Statement of the Problem
There is a wealth of secondary literature on Michel Foucault (1926-1984).
Secondary sources tend to examine Foucault’s life and work from well-worn
perspectives: biographical accounts relate Foucault’s theories to surrounding
political, social, historical and personal context; methodological surveys metaanalyze Foucault’s methods; and academic fields examine his relevance within
their respective disciplines. Despite the wide coverage Foucault receives, there is
no universally accepted consensus with regard to his legacy. What, if anything,
does Foucault leave us with in terms of methodology? Does Foucault provide a
viable critical social theory?
James Miller, author of Foucault’s biography, The Passion of Michel
Foucault, argues that Foucault’s relativism undermines the utility of his theories:
“Hostile to the encyclopedic ideal in the human sciences and to transcendental
claims in philosophy, Foucault left behind no synoptic critique of society. No
system of ethics, no comprehensive theory of power, not even … a generally
useful historical method.”1 Certainly, Foucault’s insistence on avoiding
persuasive arguments with definitive applications makes it difficult to situate him

1

James Miller, The Passion of Michel Foucault. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 19.
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within the confines of a modern utilitarian narrative. To assess Foucault from
within that narrative, however, would contradict Foucault’s intention to remain
undefined by the boundaries of persuasive discourse. This begs the question:
can one assess Foucault—and by what standard—when his theories defy and
identify potential distortions brought about by assessment?
Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, professors at the University of
California, Berkeley and coauthors of the analysis of Foucault’s work, Michel
Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, do not dispute the notion that
Foucault’s theories are unapologetically relativistic: “We have no recourse to
objective laws, no recourse to pure subjectivity, no recourse to totalizations of
theory. We have only the cultural practices which have made us what we are. To
know what that is, we have to grapple with the history of the present.”2 Despite
Foucault’s avoidance of definitive arguments, Dreyfus and Rabinow interpret
Foucault as having provided a unique social theory that can be used to critique
institutions: “The job to be done is not to free truth from power … The job is
rather to make this pragmatic account function differently within a field of power.”3
There are numerous other views regarding the usefulness of Foucault’s
work. I cite the above two arguments in order to establish a dichotomous
problem: can Foucault’s theories be judged as useful under their internal logic?

2

Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics,
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 204.
3
Ibid., 204.
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Purpose of Study
The purpose of the following study is to assess Foucault’s theories in
order to determine whether or not Foucault provides a viable critical social theory
of bourgeois society. If Foucault’s theories can be shown to have real-world
applications, it would lend credibility and significance to relativistic perspectives
in societal analysis. The Foucauldian theme of testing intellectual limits would, if
translated into formalized methodologies, open novel research venues in the
social sciences.
This is by no means an original topic; Foucault’s work has been subjected
to extensive analyses by scores of researchers. I differentiate the following study
as an internal intellectual history of Foucault. That is, I conduct an interpretive
reading of Foucault without reference to social, political, economic and individual
context. An internal analysis differentiates itself from other forms of
investigation—or, analyses that address surrounding contexts—by focusing the
study entirely on a close reading of pertinent literature. Where other analyses
attempt to situate Foucault by referencing the external factors that influence his
work, I review and make reference only to Foucault’s body of literature. That
being said, there are studies that take a similar approach to investigating
Foucault—Dreyfus and Rabinow’s interpretive reading, for instance.
Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics analyzes
Foucault’s work from 1961 up through the late 1970s. Dreyfus and Rabinow
3

argue that Foucault has developed a “sustained and largely successful” method
that they term “interpretive analytics.”4 The following study is intended to support
Dreyfus and Rabinow’s with a close reading of Foucault’s work from 1954 to
1976. I begin my study at an earlier date in order to demonstrate how Foucault’s
early, undeveloped theories influenced his later intellectual development. I build
on Dreyfus and Rabinow’s study by arguing that Foucault’s genealogical method
comprises a para-Marxist critical theory of bourgeois society. Foucault
establishes a method for conceptualizing the reciprocal relationship between
discourses and power. This conclusion supports the continued relevance of
Foucauldian analysis in the social sciences.

Review of Literature
While a comprehensive review of the secondary literature on Foucault
would be a worthwhile topic for future research, it is beyond the scope of this
analysis. A brief listing of prominent texts on Foucault will suffice for our
purposes: Foucault’s friend and contemporary philosopher Gilles Deleuze
provides an account of Foucault’s thought as it pertains to knowledge, power,
and subjectivism in Foucault (1986); Béatrice Han examines a recurrent
Foucauldian dichotomy in Foucault’s Critical Project: Between The
Transcendental and the Historical (1998); Clare O’Farrell situates and analyzes

4

Ibid., xii.
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Foucault in Foucault: Historian or Philosopher? (1989) and Michel Foucault
(2005); in Michel Foucault: The Will to Truth (1980), Alan Sheridan conducts a
chronological analysis of Foucault’s works (several of which Sheridan himself
translated into English); and Barry Smart offers an extensive, seven-volume
study of Foucault’s theories and critical responses to said theories in Michel
Foucault: Critical Assessments (1995).5 Foucault has also been the subject of
numerous biographies—including Didier Eribon’s Michel Foucault (1989) and
David Macey’s The Lives of Michel Foucault: A Biography (1994)—and academic
articles such as Amy Allen’s “The Anti-Subjective Hypothesis: Michel Foucault
and the Death of the Subject” (2000), and Hubert L. Dreyfus’ “Foucault's Critique
of Psychiatric Medicine” (1987). Countless studies across academic disciplines
cite Foucault.
Of the sources outlined above, only two were written during Foucault’s
lifetime: Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics and Michel
Foucault: The Will to Truth. In other words, the majority of analyses on Foucault
have been written in the past thirty years. It may be that researchers delayed
analyzing Foucault’s theories until it was certain that he would not develop them
any further. Given this timeframe, Foucault is a young topic of analysis relative to

5

Other secondary texts include: The Cambridge Companion to Foucault (2003), by Gary Gutting;
The Philosophy of Foucault (2006), by Todd May; Foucault Beyond Foucault: Power and Its
Intensifications Since 1984 (2008), by Jeffrey Thomas Nealon; and Foucault 2.0: Beyond Power
and Knowledge (2006), by Eric Paras.
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other prominent intellectuals. It stands to reason, then, that analysts have yet to
fully exhaust the possible interpretations and uses of Foucault’s work.
The volume of secondary literature on Foucault reinforces my argument
that Foucault’s theories continue to be relevant within academic discourses.
Furthermore, I justify the following study on the grounds that the possibility of
developing new interpretations and uses for Foucault’s theories warrants a return
to his original works.

Organization and Method
The following study is a chronologically ordered internal intellectual history
of Foucault’s works from 1954 to 1976. I divide the analysis into three chapters,
excluding this introduction and the conclusion. The chapters consist of
methodological analyses and readings of corresponding works. The second
chapter, titled “Origin of Method,” includes an analysis of Foucault’s earliest
methods and their influence on his later work and methodology. I also conduct a
supporting investigation of Mental Illness and Psychology, Madness and
Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, and The Birth of the
Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception. These works represent Foucault’s
progression from a hermeneutic form of analysis to a semi-structural method.
Chapter three is titled “The Promise of Archaeology.” In this chapter, I
examine the foundations, strengths, and weaknesses of Foucault’s
6

archaeological method. Supplementing this analysis is a reading of The Order of
Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. The fourth chapter, “The
Narrative from Within: Genealogy,” describes Foucault’s genealogical method. I
also include a reading of Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison and make
brief reference to The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction.
The reasoning behind this organization is two-fold: firstly, the
chronological analysis of Foucault’s methods allows us to see which aspects of
Foucault’s thought remain constant and which change over the twenty-two year
span covered. Secondly, coupling methodological analyses with interpretive
readings serves to illustrate how Foucault applies his abstract methods in the
form of historical analyses. In other words, the readings function as examples of
the concepts outlined in the methodological analyses.
I analyzed Foucault’s English-translated works before delving into
secondary sources. This was in order to avoid developing preliminary biases.
The majority of sources cited in this study are primary sources readings, though I
reference Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics and Miller’s
biography of Foucault as prominent interpretations of Foucault’s work.

Limitations of Study
There are three notable limitations to my study: comprehensiveness,
secondary sources, and the fact that it is an internal intellectual history. The
7

study is not a comprehensive review of Foucault’s works. I do not reference
Foucault’s earliest work—his introduction to Ludwig Binswanger’s 1952 text,
Dream and Existence. This omission is due to the fact that Foucault’s early
theories lack the cohesion and originality of his later ones, thus it was necessary
to include only one text—Mental Illness and Psychology—as representative of
this period in the analysis. The Archaeology of Knowledge, several essays, and
Foucault’s published lectures are excluded for purposes of brevity.
Further, I do not reference the second and third volumes of The History of
Sexuality. These texts represent the final phase in Foucault’s intellectual career,
which is characterized by the analysis of subjective experience.6 I trace the
development of Foucault’s thought up through his genealogical phase in order to
demonstrate that genealogy is the only phase in which Foucault provides a viable
critical social theory. Consequently, it is unnecessary to continue the analysis
beyond this point.
Of the innumerable volumes of secondary literature on Foucault, this study
references only two. I neglect secondary materials in the interest of providing an
original and unbiased interpretation of Foucault’s works. That this is an internal
intellectual history also assures some degree of objectivity. On the other hand,
the lack of surrounding context also limits the study’s scope, as this precludes
deriving conclusions from factors outside of Foucault’s words. I would argue,

6

In his article on misconceptions surrounding Foucault’s intellectual development, Bryan Smyth
refers to Foucault’s final phase as “the return of the subject” (94). Bryan Smyth, “Foucault and
Binswanger: Beyond the Dream,” Philosophy Today, 55, Issue Supplement (2011): 92-101.
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however, that my approach produces a thorough and focused analysis that would
not have been possible without omitting surrounding contexts. Moreover, this
omission may yield topics for future research.

9

CHAPTER TWO
ORIGIN OF METHOD

Kant, Phenomenology and Hermeneutics
Foucault’s intellectual development can be divided into three phases. The
first phase consists of several divergent methodologies and social theories used
in Foucault’s earliest book, Mental Illness and Psychology. He sought to distance
himself from his pre-Madness and Civilization methodology, and therefore
neglected to name—or even differentiate—this first phase. Foucault refers to his
middle phase as the “archaeological method”—employed from 1961, with the
publication of Madness and Civilization, up through The Archaeology of
Knowledge & The Discourse on Language’s publication in 1969. The third phase,
which Foucault christened the “genealogical method” was used from 1969
onwards. This chapter examines the philosophical background underlying
Foucault’s methodology, as well as the shift in his thinking from his first phase
through his early archaeological phase.
Foucault historicizes each of his major works (exempting, to an extent,
Mental Illness and Psychology) in the context of a reorganization of knowledge
that took place during the European Enlightenment in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. This event entailed a significant increase in Western
European society’s interest in objectivity, positivism, rationality, and humanistic
10

ideals. Foucault regularly refers to the development of the social sciences during
this period. Dreyfus and Rabinow outline the significance of this reorganization
as it pertains to the social sciences: “Foucault thinks that the study of human
beings took a decisive turn at the end of the eighteenth century when human
beings came to be interpreted as knowing subjects, and, at the same time,
objects of their own knowledge. This Kantian interpretation defines ‘man.’”7 The
term ‘Kantian’ refers to Immanuel Kant, the famous eighteenth century Prussian
philosopher.
The centrality of Kant’s subject/object division—or the reciprocal
relationship between the perceiver and the perceived—to the examination human
activity warrants a brief digression. In The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant
attempts to transcend the rationalist and empiricist traditions’ common
assumption that knowledge is subject-independent; that is, human
understanding, which is the basis for knowledge, must reflect an objective reality
which exists independently of the perceiver: “It has hitherto been assumed that
our cognition must conform to the objects.”8 This notion implies that objective
reality preexists the perceiver’s understanding, which is a problematic
assumption from the standpoint that it is impossible to intuit objects a priori, or
without experience of an object, yet empirical knowledge of an object is also
limited due to the spatial and temporal restrictions inherent in perception. Hence,
7

Dreyfus and Rabinow, xix.
Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn. Cited from “The Great
Books of the Western World” compilation, The Critique of Pure Reason; The Critique of Practical
Reason and Other Ethical Treatises; The Critique of Judgment, ed. Robert Maynard Hutchins,
Executors of the translator Thomas Kingsmill Abott. (Chicago: Encyclopœdia Britannica, 1990), 7.
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subject-independent knowledge does not have the capacity to ascertain truth.
Kant concludes, “if the intuition must conform to the nature of objects, I do not
see how we can know anything of them a priori.”9 In response to this impasse,
Kant introduces his theory of transcendental idealism, or the notion that
knowledge does not conform exclusively to the object being perceived: rather,
one’s cognition and experience of objective reality interact to form knowledge.
Knowledge is both objective and subjective in that one’s perception of an object
is dependent upon a set of cognitive rules. Kant elaborates on these concepts in
his preface to the second edition of The Critique of Pure Reason:
I may assume that objects, or, which is the same thing, that experience,
in which alone as given objects they are cognized, conform to my
conceptions—and then I am at no loss as to how to proceed. For
experience itself is a mode of cognition which requires understanding.
Before objects are given to me, that is, a priori, I must presuppose in
myself laws of the understanding which are expressed in conceptions a
priori. To these conceptions, then, all the objects of experience must
necessarily conform. Now there are objects which reason thinks, and that
necessarily, but which cannot be given in experience, or, at least, cannot
be given so as reason thinks them.10

The ‘laws of understanding’ that Kant mentions in this passage signify
time and space, or synthetic a priori forms of intuition that allow humans to
conceive of, differentiate, and represent objects. However, Kant’s transcendental
idealism maintains that these forms of intuition can only provide one with
knowledge of appearances; humans cannot conceive of objective knowledge
outside of our perception. In Kant’s words, “we can have no cognition of an
object, as a thing in itself, but only as an object of sensible intuition, that is, as
9

Ibid., 7.
Ibid., 7. Kant’s italics.
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phenomenon.” Although this conclusion postulates an insurmountable roadblock
for human cognition and our ability to establish objective truth, Kant offers the
optimistic view that “while we surrender the power of cognizing, we still reserve
the power of thinking objects, as things in themselves.”11 According to Kant, our
cognitive limitations serve a constructive purpose; humans must attribute
meaning and structure to objects in order to overcome this inability to conceive of
objects in themselves. Hubert Dreyfus provides a useful interpretation of Kant’s
transcendental idealism in his foreword to Mental Illness and Psychology: “Kant
accepted the finitude of human reason and sought to make this very finitude the
basis of man’s positive powers … Thus man, as defined by Kant, became both
the source of all meaning in the universe and a meaningless object in it. Indeed,
it is precisely as a finite system of representations that he is the source of all
order.”12
As constructive as transcendental idealism sounds, Kant’s conception of
man as subject and object (or the purveyor and recipient of meaning) becomes
problematic when attempting to ascertain determinate truth. If reality varies, at
least in part, according to the subject’s perception, then how can one establish
an objective foundation of knowledge? While this issue is not so prevalent for
11

Ibid., 9. Kant’s italics.
Hubert Dreyfus, cited from Michel Foucault, Mental Illness and Psychology, trans. Alan
Sheridan. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), xvii. In the interest of avoiding
confusion, it should be noted that the current English edition of this book is published under the
title Madness: The Invention of an Idea, trans. Alan Sheridan. (New York: Harper Perennial,
2011). This analysis cites the older edition for its inclusion of Hubert Dreyfus’ foreword, which is
omitted from the 2011 edition. The initial 1954 edition of Mental Illness and Psychology was titled
Maladie Mentale et Personnalité, or Mental Illness and Personality. Mental Illness and Personality
has not been translated into English, and its second section—which Foucault rewrote in 1962—is
not considered in this analysis.
12
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determining the truth-value of knowledge derived from empirical experience,
Kant’s subject/object division remains pervasive in more abstract discourses,
such as the social sciences. Dreyfus and Rabinow clarify this point by stating:
“Kant introduced the idea that man is that unique being who is totally involved in
nature (his body), society (historical, economic and political relations), language
(his mother tongue), and who at the same time finds a firm foundation for all of
these involvements in his meaning-giving, organizing activity.”13 Miller argues
that Kant’s philosophy carries important social implications, hence its
aforementioned pervasiveness; “human beings are both able and obliged to
construct a moral and political world for themselves.”14 When taken to its logical
conclusion, Kant’s philosophy advocates either—as Miller’s statement
suggests—a somewhat relativistic view of human activity (insofar as humans
construct truth pertaining to themselves), or an appeal to some transcendental
factor that makes this construction possible. As human activity consists of
psychic machinations that are not easily reduced to concrete and empirically
observable elements, any study thereof must contend with this issue of truth.
Foucault was acutely aware of the uncertainties that Kant’s subject/object
division creates in the social sciences. Indeed, his work is characterized by
picking fields of supposedly objective discourse apart, eventually revealing the
discourses’ hidden subjective foundations—thus reducing these sciences to a
complex network of social constructs. Miller argues that Foucault’s methodology
13
14

Dreyfus and Rabinow, xix.
Miller, 139.
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“has the curious effect of causing the object under investigation to crumble
before our eyes.”15 This should not be viewed as a purely deconstructive effort,
however. Foucault’s methodology—particularly during his archaeological and
genealogical phases—rests on the aforementioned relativistic interpretation of
Kant’s subject/object division; hence Miller’s claim that Foucault “never ceased to
regard himself as a kind of Kantian.”16 And as a Kantian, Foucault analyzes how
subjects and objects construct and interact with each other. Based on this
analysis, Foucault is able to narrate the processes by which knowledge bases
are formed.
In Mental Illness and Psychology, Foucault employs a phenomenological
and existential/hermeneutic analysis of mental illness alongside historical,
Freudian and—though only in the first edition—Marxist interpretations. Each of
these constitutes a different method of analyzing the subject/object relationship.
This discussion will be restricted to phenomenology and hermeneutics, as
Foucault later developed his own methodology as an alternative to these
systems of thought. Phenomenology is the exploration of subjective experience.
Founded by Edmund Husserl in the early twentieth century, the
phenomenological tradition maintains that the subject, which gives meaning to
itself and external objects, is an autonomous and transcendental existence.
Dreyfus and Rabinow summarize phenomenology as a philosophy which
15

Ibid., 152. Miller is referring to Foucault’s analysis of the social sciences, The Order of Things:
An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, though this passage can be applied to any of Foucault’s
major works.
16
Ibid., 138.
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“accepts the view that man is totally object and totally subject, and investigates
the meaning-giving activity of the transcendental ego which gives meaning to all
objects including its own body, its own empirical personality, and the culture and
history which it ‘constitutes’ as conditioning its empirical self.”17 While the
phenomenological subject is formed in part by external circumstances (family,
society, etc.), all meaning is internal, or created by the subject.
Foucault’s use of phenomenology in Mental Illness and Psychology is
evident in his existential terminology and advocation of understanding mental
illness from the patient’s subjective perspective. That said, Foucault does not
utilize phenomenology for constructive purposes, such as formulating a
phenomenological pathology of mental illness; rather, he seeks to disprove the
possibility of establishing an autonomous science of the mind. In order to
accomplish this, he employs a hermeneutic approach. Martin Heidegger
developed hermeneutics as a “rethinking” of phenomenology with the publication
of Being and Time in 1927.18 Hermeneutics rests on the phenomenological notion
that the subject is a product of its environment. However, hermeneutics does not
claim that all meaning derives from the transcendental subject. Instead,
hermeneutics studies and interprets the meaning underlying cultural practices.
Cultural practices constitute the reification of a deep meaning that must be
uncovered in order to understand human nature. Dreyfus and Rabinow offer a
succinct explanation of this school of thought:
17
18

Dreyfus and Rabinow, xx.
Ibid., xxi.
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Heidegger’s phenomenology stresses the idea that human subjects are
formed by the historical cultural practices in which they develop. These
practices form a background which can never be made completely
explicit, and so cannot be understood in terms of the beliefs of a
meaning-giving subject. The background practices do, however, contain a
meaning. They embody a way of understanding and coping with things,
people, and institutions. Heidegger calls this meaning in the practices an
interpretation, and proposes to make manifest certain general features of
this interpretation.19

Dreyfus and Rabinow conclude that hermeneutics “amounts to giving an
interpretation embodied in everyday practices.”20 In Mental Illness and
Psychology, Foucault displays an “unquestioning acceptance” of Heidegger’s
hermeneutics of suspicion, or what Dreyfus describes as “the repression of a
deep, nonobjectifiable truth.”21 According to this skeptical variant of
hermeneutics, the task of the analyst is to interpret and offer commentary on
social practices in order to uncover, beneath the “groundlessness” of these
practices, some form of concealed truth. Once the individual becomes
enlightened to said truth—generally via a bodhisattva-like intellectual authority—
a “liberation” occurs, freeing the individual from repressive forces.22 As Dreyfus
and Rabinow point out, this liberation can be seen in Marxism in the form of “the
power released by the realization that one’s class is exploited,” and in
Freudianism in “the maturity gained by facing the deep secrets of one’s
sexuality.”23 In Mental Illness and Psychology, Foucault employs the
hermeneutics of suspicion in order to show, historically, how the notion of
19

Ibid., xxi.
Ibid., xxi.
21
Dreyfus, cited from Mental Illness and Psychology, xxxii.
22
Dreyfus and Rabinow, xxii.
23
Ibid., xxii-xxiii.
20
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madness is an attempt made by society to obscure the groundlessness of human
nature. Uncovering the deep truth surrounding madness—which lies in the
historical relationship “of man to the madman and to the true man”—will free
individuals from the “alienation” brought about by psychology’s attempts to
ascribe a scientific language to madness.24
There were numerous problems inherent in Foucault’s early methodology.
To begin with, Foucault incorporates several methods and analytic lenses into
Mental Illness and Psychology—such as the abovementioned existential
methods. The expansiveness of the 1954 work proves to be problematic,
however, as some of the theories he postulates conflict with others. As Miller
observes, “part of the book’s problem is simply the amount of ground it tries to
cover.”25 There are other related, yet more fundamental, issues with this work. In
its first half, Foucault examines psychology from Freudian and existential
viewpoints in an effort to provide “a description of the structure of self-interpreting
beings and its variations—a philosophical anthropology.”26 Dissatisfied with the
Marxian social history covered in the second half of the original edition, Foucault
rewrote the second half in 1962 to include “a history of the experience of
madness, i.e., of the series of self interpretations embodied in our cultural
practices that determine how the most extreme variations are to be
understood.”27 In other words, Foucault attempts to combine a description of
24
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madness as a baseless (that is, reflecting the groundlessness of existence, or
lack of human nature) and phenomenological experience with a historical
analysis of madness as a perspective that is constructed by early and modern
psychological theories. The result of this combination is a study whose
methodology abruptly shifts away from an abstract analysis of humans as selfinterpreting subjects toward a historical/hermeneutic analysis of madness as a
societal construct. Taking the conflicting nature of these analyses into account,
there is little reason to contest Dreyfus’ critique of the work as “an unstable
combination of Heideggerian existential anthropology” and “a history of forms of
experience.”28
Foucault was most certainly conscious of the flaws outlined above. That
he would trouble himself to revise the work, in 1962, indicates that he saw
problems with the first edition. According to Dreyfus, Foucault rejected “all reprint
rights to the first version, published in 1954,” presumably as a result of these
problems. He did not favor the second edition either, as evidenced by the fact
that he “tried unsuccessfully to prevent the translation of the radically revised
1963 version.”29 Foucault even refers to his Psychiatric Power lecture series as
the “second volume” in his analysis of mental illness, with the first being Madness
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and Civilization.30 Mental Illness and Psychology is cheerfully omitted from this
count. As Dreyfus bluntly surmises, “clearly, Foucault did not like the book.”31
Foucault provides the reasoning behind his overwhelming dissatisfaction with
both versions of the 1954 text in the original preface to The History of Sexuality,
Volume 2: The Use of Pleasure:
To study forms of experience in this way—in their history—is an idea that
originated with an earlier project in which I made use of the methods of
existential analysis in the field of psychiatry and in the domain of “mental
illness.” For two reasons, not unrelated to each other, this project left me
unsatisfied: its theoretical weakness in elaborating the notion of
experience, and its ambiguous link with a psychiatric practice which it
simultaneously ignored and took for granted.32

Regarding the two reasons Foucault gives for rejecting Mental Illness and
Psychology in this esoteric passage: The first reason focuses on the work’s
attempt to analyze the experience of madness from an existential perspective.
Foucault disapproved of his early acceptance of Heidegger’s hermeneutic
assumption that madness concealed truth. The second reason refers to
Foucault’s acceptance of certain aspects of Freudian theory, though he critiqued
the Freudian hermeneutics of suspicion in the second half of the revised edition.
The commonality between these two reasons is clearly Foucault’s dislike of
hermeneutics. Foucault rejected hermeneutics as early as one year prior to
30

Michel Foucault, Psychiatric Power, Lectures at the Collège de France, 1973-74, ed. Jacques
Langrange, trans. Graham Burchell, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 13.
31
Dreyfus, cited from Mental Illness and Psychology, viii.
32
Michel Foucault, “Preface to the History of Sexuality, Volume II,” trans. William Smock, in The
Foucault Reader. ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984) 334. Cited from
Foucault, Mental Illness and Psychology, vii-viii. As Dreyfus points out, Foucault disliked Mental
Illness and Psychology to such an extent that he did not even name the work in this passage.
Also, a point of clarification: Foucault is referring to his technique of examining the history of
discourses within the social sciences and how these discourses influence the individual’s selfconcept—or the history of how the individual experiences itself.

20

revising Mental Illness and Psychology, with the publication of Madness and
Civilization, in 1961. Moreover, in the preface to his 1963 archaeology of medical
science, The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault vehemently rejects hermeneutics’
meaning-centric approach—which he refers to as ‘commentary’ and ‘exegesis’—
arguing that it can obscure and fabricate truth during the interpretive process.
Moreover, truth can only be found in the origin of the object of analysis; yet it is
impossible to replicate origins due to spatial and temporal limitations, thus
hermeneutic analysis can only search for truth by interpreting discourses in an
effort to uncover meaning reflecting the object’s origins: “Commentary questions
discourse as to what it says and intended to say; it tries to uncover that deeper
meaning of speech that enables it to achieve an identity with itself, supposedly
nearer to its essential truth; in other words, in stating what has already been said,
one has to re-state what has never been said.”33 Foucault argues that this
interpretive process can only result in endlessly multiplying discourses, as there
are an infinite number of meanings one can attach to an object of discourse, and
truth will never reveal itself through any given meaning. A lucid explanation of
Foucault’s rejection of hermeneutics can be found in his preface to The Birth of
the Clinic:
Commentary rests on the postulate that speech (parole) is an act of
‘translation’, that it has the dangerous privilege images have of showing
while concealing, and that it can be substituted for itself indefinitely in the
open series of discursive repetitions; in short, it rests on a psychologistic
interpretation of language that shows the stigmatas of its historical origin.
This is an exegesis, which listens, through the prohibitions, the symbols,
33
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the concrete images, through the whole apparatus of Revelation, to the
Word of God, ever secret, ever beyond itself. For years we have been
commenting on the language of our culture from the very point where for
centuries we had awaited in vain for the decision of the Word.34

For all the methodological differences between Foucault’s early and later
work—his views regarding hermeneutic analysis, for instance—certain
commonalities remain. As Dreyfus notes, Foucault consistently doubts any
theory claiming, “to provide a science of the human subject.” Moreover, Foucault
dissects conventional narratives in the social sciences even in Mental Illness and
Psychology, leading Dreyfus to refer to the work as “the opening salvo in
Foucault’s lifelong use of the interpretation of practices against the claims of the
human sciences.”35 Foucault also uses historical analysis in each of his works,
and he begins his persistent effort to overcome—albeit using unoriginal
methods—Kant’s subject/object division in Mental Illness and Psychology.
From these consistencies it becomes apparent that the 1954 book
occupies a significant developmental phase in the progression of Foucault’s
thought. Yet it is an obscure work; indeed, Miller devotes a single paragraph to
Mental Illness and Personality in his 500-page biography of Foucault, and he
only mentions the revised edition in an endnote.36 The reasons behind Mental
Illness and Psychology’s lack of prestige are clear enough; it is a work renounced
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by its own author; it lacks the cohesiveness, originality, and linguistic flair of
Foucault’s future works; and overall, it suffers from the methodological problems
outlined above. On the other hand, as Miller aptly writes: “The work reflects the
variety and heterogeneous character of Foucault’s formative interests, and also
the ambiguity (if not confusion) of his own emerging convictions.”37 Taking the
aforementioned methodological commonalities into account, it is reasonable to
argue that Foucault’s later methods constitute either reactions against or
constructive reassessments of the early methods employed in Mental Illness and
Psychology.
Madness and Civilization marks a transitional period in Foucault’s thought.
His lingering usage of hermeneutic and phenomenological ideas suggests that
the work was a re-evaluation of Foucault’s early methodology. Jean Khalfa,
editor and co-translator of History of Madness, argues that while the 1961 work
marks the point at which “Foucault’s thought starts to look beyond
phenomenology and toward structuralism,” Foucault has not completely
discarded his existential roots, as “most of [the book’s] vocabulary is
phenomenological and its avowed object is a particular experience, that of the
other as mad.”38 Beyond this borrowed terminology, Madness and Civilization
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also—according to Dreyfus and Rabinow—borders on adopting the hermeneutics
of suspicion as an approach for examining madness: “It is only a slight distortion
of the text to substitute ‘madness’ for ‘the Word of God’ and apply Foucault’s own
criticism of hermeneutics … to his suggestion that madness is a deep secret
experience, masked by rationality and discourse, of what it is to be human.”39
Evidence of Foucault’s closeted hermeneutics can be seen in his
assertion that madness has an “inaccessible primitive purity” which society and
rational thought “hold[s] captive”—a hidden truth, in other words. And by
analyzing the historical point at which reason separates from and represses
madness, or the “the originary confrontation that gives meaning to the opposition
of sense and senselessness,” Foucault hopes to discover something—
presumably some truth that exists beyond the rationalist narrative—that will
“allow that lightning flash decision to appear once more, heterogeneous with the
time of history, but ungraspable outside it, which separates the murmur of dark
insects from the language of reason and the promises of time.”40 Unlike
hermeneutics, phenomenology, Freudianism, Marxism, and other variants of
humanist thought, Foucault’s vision does not promise any sort of liberation as a
result of this discovery.
Remnants of humanistic thought notwithstanding, Madness and
Civilization is unarguably a historical, archaeological, and structural work—
Madness and Civilization is the first English translation of this work, and is therefore more wellknown and accessible than the more recent History of Madness.
39
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indeed, when outlining his goal to examine the language with which psychiatry
has silenced madness, Foucault argues that his intention “was not to write the
history of that language, but rather draw up the archaeology of that silence.”41
While the core facets of structuralism and the archaeological method will be
discussed in the third section, it bears mention that these both adopt a relativistic
perspective. Hermeneutics and phenomenology both overcome Kant’s
subject/object division by positing a transcendental meaning within societal
practices or the subject. This meaning presupposes the existence of definitive
truth, and the interpretation of which inevitably leads to the moral valuation of all
actions and objects. In contrast, structuralism and archaeology avoid the notion
of transcendental meaning altogether—that is, these methods assume that truth
and meaning are constructed by humans—and instead analyze an object’s truth
through a purely materialistic lens. Despite his aforementioned implication that
madness contains some hidden truth, Foucault rejects hermeneutics and the
possibility of discovering truth within psychology, opting instead for the
archaeological approach: “I remained in a sort of relativity without recourse,
never looking for a way out in any psychological coup de force, which might have
turned over the cards and denounced some unrecognised truth.”42
Foucault describes Madness and Civilization as “a structural study of the
historical ensemble” of the social institutions and concepts that constrain
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madness.43 As Jean Khalfa argues, this method does not entail analyzing
historical documents from a modern perspective that deciphers a hidden
meaning behind clinical descriptions; rather, Foucault examines documents “to
see … how those specific descriptions articulate with certain norms or principles
(in particular moral and religious) of their time.”44 Comparatively speaking,
Foucault employs historical analysis in Mental Illness and Psychology in an effort
to demonstrate flaws in dominant psychological theories and offer his own
phenomenological theory as an alternative. His historical narrative exists to
support his conclusion, in other words. In Madness and Civilization, his approach
allows for a more autonomous historical narrative, at least insofar as he draws
significance from events based on temporal and social context. This being said,
Foucault still interprets historical sources with the intent to advance his
conclusion.
Foucault’s methodology in Mental Illness and Psychology and Madness
and Civilization varies from his later works in that he advances a number of
conclusions based on definite casual connections. In the former text, for
example, he argues that alienation causes madness, and contradictions within
society cause alienation: “The social relations that determine a culture, in the
form of competition, exploitation, group rivalry, or class struggle, offer man an
experience of his human environment that is permanently haunted by
contradiction. … Only in the imaginary can he recognize the fraternal status in
43
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which his social relations find their stability and coherence.”45 And in Madness—
as Dreyfus and Rabinow argue—Foucault draws a clear-cut relationship of
oppressor and oppressed in his account of the Hôpital Général’s administrative
policies; “Foucault explicitly identifies the establishment of the Hôpital Général as
the direct policy of royal authority. … The actors are identified, the actions given
rather straightforward motivational accounting and the effects of their actions duly
noted. In his later works, Foucault will rarely be this explicit about causal
explanations of who acts and why.”46
The absence of this definitive causality in Foucault’s later work can be
attributed to developments in his methodologies. Neither the archaeological nor
the genealogical methods allow for claims to truth; while both methods ground
their analyses in historical narratives, they do not project meaning or intention
unto their object of study. In this regard, Foucault does not completely subscribe
to this core aspect of the archaeological method until his next work, The Birth of
the Clinic. Madness and Civilization is, therefore, a semi-archaeological work that
has not quite cast off the phenomenological and hermeneutic components that
characterize Foucault’s first book.
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Mental Illness and Psychology
Methodological and stylistic differences between the two works
notwithstanding, the central arguments of both Mental Illness and Psychology
and Madness and Civilization are identical: society constructs the notion of
mental illness, and this notion varies according to social and historical context.
Foucault articulates this thesis in the introduction to the second section of Mental
Illness and Psychology: “For a long time now, one fact has become
commonplace of sociology and mental pathology: mental illness has its reality
and its value qua illness only within a culture that recognizes it as such.”47 Of
course, this does not preclude the existence of individuals exhibiting abnormal
behaviors. Hence, Foucault’s goal in the 1954 work is to deconstruct commonlyheld explanations of mental illness, and to substitute these pathologies with a
phenomenological understanding of individuals which society deems ‘mad’.
The crux of the first half of Mental Illness and Psychology is that dominant
(at the time of the work’s publication) psychological theories are unable to
provide a causal model of mental illness. In Foucault’s words, “psychology has
never been able to offer psychiatry what physiology gave to medicine: a tool of
analysis that, in delimiting the disorder, makes it possible to envisage the
functional relationship of this damage to the personality as a whole.”48 Foucault
attributes psychology’s failure in implementing the “same conceptual structure as
those of organic pathology” to the disunity between two postulates upon which
47
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somatic medicine rests. The first postulate, which Foucault calls the “‘essentialist’
prejudice,” conceptualizes illness as an “essence … that can be mapped by the
symptoms that manifest it, but that is anterior to them and, to certain extent,
independent of them.”49 In this view, illness is an abstraction reified by
physiological symptoms, and symptoms are therefore assumed to be the result of
illness. Consequently, the essentialist postulate classifies illness based on
commonalities between symptoms, or using “a symtomatology in which the
constant, or merely frequent, correlations between a particular type of illness and
a particular morbid manifestation were picked out.”50
Complimenting this view is the ‘naturalist postulate,’ which attempts to
classify illness through qualitative description. Toward this end, somatic medicine
analyzes illness according to their frequency, duration, and perceived
evolutionary stages, thus establishing ‘species’ of illnesses based on descriptive
characteristics. Of this classificatory structure, Foucault states, “the unity that
was supposed to exist in each nosographical group behind the polymorphism of
the symptoms was like the unity of a species defined by its permanent
characteristics and diversified in its subgroups.”51
These postulates can certainly provide a means with which to classify
illness, whether somatic and mental; yet they cannot establish a concrete
connection between illness and symptoms. By viewing the body’s function in
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mechanistic terms, physiology is able to overcome this limitation by regarding
illness as a deviation from normal functioning in response to physical harm. In
Foucault’s words, illness “is the organism reacting in an ordered manner to
pathological damage and with a view to repairing the damage.”52 It follows that
physiology has achieved relative autonomy as a science owing to its ability to link
symptoms with somatic function via a concrete causal relationship. Foucault
refers to this link as “organic totality,” and argues that it reinforces both the
abstract and somatic analysis of illness, or “makes possible a more valid
abstraction and the determination of a more real causality.”53 In contrast,
psychology analyzes abstract mental processes, and thus cannot unify and
substantiate its classificatory structures using causality-based pathology. For this
reason, psychology can only describe mental illness using the two
aforementioned postulates—that is, by classifying mental illness according
symptomatic and descriptive similarities. Psychological analysis is therefore
based on the statistical fallacy of inferring causation from abstract correlation.
If mental illness is defined with the same conceptual methods as organic
illness, if psychological symptoms are isolated and assembled like
physiological symptoms, it is above all because illness, whether mental or
organic, is regarded as a natural essence manifested by specific
symptoms. Between these two forms of pathology, therefore, there is no
real unity, but only, and by means of these two postulates, an abstract
parallelism. And the problem of human unity and of psychosomatic totality
remains entirely open.54
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The final sentence of this passage is particularly important, as Foucault is
arguing that psychology’s reliance on abstract postulates in describing mental
illness has notable consequences beyond simply straying into scientifically
unverifiable territory: psychology cannot establish a theory of ‘human unity’ or
‘psychosomatic totality.’ While these are similar concepts, the latter refers to the
connection between illness and behavior in terms of pathology, while the former
refers to this connection as it pertains to individual personality, or human nature.
If psychology cannot achieve psychosomatic totality (essentially overcoming the
mind/body problem), then mental pathologies are only supported by selfreferential and abstract analysis—or ‘metapathology’—and are therefore complex
fabrications. Foucault argues that “mental pathology must shake off all the
postulates of a ‘metapathology’: the unity that such a metapathology provides
between the various forms of illness is never more than factitious.”55
The questionable accuracy of metapathologies applies even to theories
with an allegedly biological basis, such as psychological evolutionism. A popular
theory of human nature during the 1950s, psychological evolutionism holds that
mental illness entails the patient’s regressing back to earlier stages of
psychological evolution. Foucault describes this regression as “the process
throughout which the web of evolution is unraveled, suppressed first, in its most
benign forms, the most recent structures, then attaining, at its culmination and
55
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supreme point of gravity, the most archaic levels.” Psychological evolutionism
imitates physiology in its use of a mechanistic model to explain mental illness.
This model proposes that illness is a natural phenomenon insofar as it represents
a predetermined biological process. Yet this is “an inverted process; the natural
history of the illness has merely to flow back against the current of the natural
history of the healthy organism.”56 Foucault is quick to point out a critical flaw in
this theory: “The regressive analysis describes the orientation of the illness
without revealing its point of origin.” While physiology is able to determine causes
of illness based on empirically observable causal connections, psychological
evolutionism has no such recourse owing to the abstract nature of mental
regression. As such, psychological evolutionism cannot explain mental illness’
causes on an individualized level; “why this or that person is ill, and is ill at this or
that moment, why his obsessions have this or that theme, why his delusion
involves these demands rather than others, or why his hallucinations are riveted
to these visual forms rather than others, the abstract notion of regression is
unable to explain.”57 Psychological evolutionism, therefore, cannot establish
psychosomatic totality, and instead degenerates into metapathology.
Foucault’s critique of psychological evolutionism can be generalized to
apply to psychology’s inability to provide a unified causal theory of personality.
Thus far Foucault has argued that psychology cannot link the individual’s
behavior and personality illness with a causal pathology without resorting to the
56
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usage of abstract postulates. Yet Foucault also attacks psychology on a more
fundamental level, arguing that the notion of an autonomous standard with which
to describe and delineate normal and abnormal behavior and personality is
inherently flawed, as such a standard would require an objective understanding
of human nature. Dreyfus accurately summarizes Foucault’s views regarding
human nature: “there are no objective answers to such questions as What is
human nature?” and consequently arrives at the conclusion that “there can be no
science of the self.”58 To Foucault, the notion of a unified understanding of
human nature is analogous to a belief that “the illness is a general reaction of the
individual taken in his psychological and physiological totality.” This totality
establishes an abstract corpus of knowledge, thus diminishing a positive
understanding of mental illness: “the more one regards the unity of the human
being as a whole, the more the reality of an illness as a specific unity disappears
and the more the description of the individual reacting to his situation in a
pathological way replaces the analysis of the natural forms of the illness.”59 The
conclusion that Foucault draws form these issues is that an abstract
understanding of mental illness can be neither unified nor objective, as it ignores
the fact that illness can vary according to the individual’s perspective. “In mental
pathology, the reality of the patient does not permit such an abstraction and each
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morbid individuality must be understood through the practices of the environment
to him.”60
The focus thus far has been on Foucault’s argument that any attempt to
develop an objective science of the mind is doomed to abstraction. He offers an
alternative form of analysis that, as the above quotation suggests, emphasizes
the relationship between the patient and his or her environment. In this instance
the term ‘environment’ refers to psychology’s influence within society. As such,
this solution reflects Foucault’s continual interest in examining the social
sciences; he turns the analysis inward, toward psychology and its role in creating
mental illness. In order to understand madness, “we must analyze the specificity
of mental illness, seek the concrete forms that psychology has managed to
attribute to it.” Madness can be described not through the manifestation of
symptoms (which leads to the aforementioned issues with abstraction), but rather
by examining specific conditions within the individual and society (in this instance
within psychology) that “have made possible this strange status of madness, a
mental illness that cannot be reduced to any illness.”61 In short, Foucault
advocates for the removal of scientific analysis from the study of mental illness,
and proposes a phenomenological analysis of madness as an alternative.
To clarify, Foucault outlines his phenomenological method in the first half
of Mental Illness and Psychology. It bears mention that Foucault adopts this
approach in reaction against objective pathology. Regarding psychological
60
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evolutionism, for example, Foucault argues that “the causality that makes [illness]
necessary is not yet disengaged [presumably from subjective factors], no more
than that which gives each clinical picture its particular coloring. This necessity,
with its individual forms, is to be found not in an always specific development, but
in the patient’s personal history.”62
In order to analyze the patient’s personal history, Foucault argues for the
use of Freudian psychoanalysis alongside phenomenology. Granted,
Freudianism carries with it several deterministic components—for example, the
uniform interpretation of the unconscious, the libido’s influence over behavior,
and the death instinct—that fall under the umbrella of objective pathology which
Foucault so vehemently rejects. Yet Foucault maintains that while these causal
elements are certainly ingrained in psychoanalysis, Freudianism has grown less
deterministic and more phenomenological, and “is tending more and more to turn
its attention to the defense mechanisms and finally to admit that the subject
reproduces his history only because he responds to a present situation.”63 It is
clear that Foucault is interested in the meaning-centered elements of
psychoanalysis, or methods strongly tied to phenomenology. Accordingly,
Foucault describes his objective as follows: “The understanding of the sick
consciousness and the reconstitution of its pathological world, these are the two
tasks of a phenomenology of mental illness.”64 To sum up, Foucault borrows the
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method of analyzing the patient’s history from Freudianism, and he borrows the
notion of the self-interpreting subject from existentialism in order to create his
analysis.
Dreyfus offers a concise summary of Foucault’s phenomenological
explanation of mental illness: “social contradictions cause alienation, alienation
causes defenses, defenses cause brain malfunction, and brain malfunction
causes abnormal behavior.”65 Foucault’s account of social contradictions and
alienation consists mainly of Freudian case studies, resulting in a somewhat
fragmentary explanation. Social contradictions are actions reflecting conflicting
desires or expectations. As an example, Foucault recounts how a child attempts
to receive affection by stealing candy, but does so with the intention of getting
caught, thus assuaging the child’s guilt. The theft is therefore a defense
mechanism intended to protect the child from anxiety stemming from her social
circumstances. In Foucault’s words, defense mechanisms are “a protection
against a conflict, a defense in face of the contradiction that arouses it.”66
Individuals employ defense mechanisms in response to anxiety, which Foucault
defines as, “a psychological experience of internal contradiction.”67 Anxiety
generally results from discordance between the patient’s perspective and what
the patient perceives others’ perspectives to be with regard to a past event. In
other words, anxiety stems from feelings of alienation. It follows that anxiety is
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closely tied to the patient’s interpretation of his or her personal history; “by uniting
past and present, [anxiety] situates them in relation to one another and confers
on them a community of meanings.”68 In this regard, a patient’s perception of his
or her anxiety (and resultant defense mechanisms) plays an integral role in
determining the patient’s overall self-interpretation.
The phenomenological aspect of defense mechanisms derives from the
notion that the form mental illness takes depends on how a patient interprets a
past event and its relation to the present: “beneath all the protective mechanisms
that particularize the illness, anxiety reveals itself and each type of illness defines
a specific way of reacting to it.”69 The meaning behind defense mechanisms,
then, can be traced to the patient’s interpretation of his or her anxieties. Thus,
defense mechanisms, or the neurotic behavioral manifestations of mental illness,
derive from a series of significations leading back to the transcendental subject,
whose anxiety “serves as a common denominator and that gives a single
signification to the psychological development of the individual.”70
The fact that an individual has anxiety or employs defense mechanisms as
a result does not mean the individual is mentally ill. Mental illness emerges
alongside a temporally circular relationship between anxiety and its resultant
defense mechanisms; “the patient protects himself by his present defense
mechanisms against a past whose secret presence arouses anxiety; but, on the
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other hand, against the possibility of a present anxiety, the subject protects
himself by appealing to protections that were set up in earlier, similar
situations.”71 In this view, anxiety, although born from a specific prior experience,
can develop the unsettling ability to metastasize its way throughout the subject’s
entire history, multiplying and attaching itself to other experiences in the past and
present. According to Foucault, anxiety, “defines, from the outset, a certain style
of experience that marks the traumas, the psychological mechanisms, that
triggers it off, the forms of repetitions that it affects in the course of pathological
episodes: it is a sort of a priori existence.”72 In short, anxiety pervades all aspects
of the patient’s personal history. As such, the patient exhibits a hyperattentiveness to their condition—hence “nothing could be more false than the
myth of madness as an illness that is unaware of itself as such.”73 This
awareness is skewed, however, toward a detached viewpoint, or “an allusive
recognition”; patients regard their condition as “an accidental, organic process,”
whose progression and manifestations are consequently inevitable, such that
“they see their illness as a destiny.”74 In other words, patients tend to view mental
illness as a physiological ailment over which their cognition holds no influence. At
the same time, patients do not regard themselves as the passive vehicle in the
illness’ development; patients exhibit a vague understanding of their cognitive
role in perpetuating the illness. Ironically, this understanding contributes to the
71
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malady’s progression. Foucault clarifies this point by arguing that patients’
awareness (or self-interpretation) of their illness shares a causal link with the
illness’ manifestations (actions taken based on this interpretation); “[the patient’s]
consciousness of the illness arises from within the illness; it is anchored in it, and
at the moment the consciousness perceives the illness, it expresses it.”75
When patients’ self-interpretation becomes completely detached from their
illness—Foucault does not go into great depth as to how and why this occurs—a
rift will appear between patients’ consciousness, or inner world, and the real
world. Both of these are perceived as objectively real by patients. “The most
consistent delusion appears to the patient just as real as reality itself; and in this
interplay of two realities … awareness of the illness reveals itself as awareness
of another reality.”76 This other reality serves as a defense mechanism that
allows patients to isolate themselves from the real world, thus distancing
themselves from the burden of bearing responsibility for their actions. There are
several consequences to this dissociation from the real world. For one, patients
no longer experience the real world as having spatial and temporal continuity;
“objects have lost their cohesion and space has lost its coherence.”77 In some
instances, patients lose all sense of material existence. Moreover, they come to
regard other people as meaningless objects, rather than self-interpreting and
meaning-giving subjects, thus they no longer have external meaning-giving
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subjects with which to help situate themselves in reality. Without external
substantiation, their inner world is without meaningful foundation. These factors
ultimately result in both realities becoming meaningless. In Foucault’s words:
By losing the significations of the world, by losing its fundamental
temporality, the subject alienates that existence in the world in which his
freedom burst forth; being unable to possess its meaning, he abandons
himself to events; in this fragmented, futureless time, in that incoherent
space, one sees the mark of a disintegration that abandons the subject to
the world as to an external fate. … The nucleus of the illness is to be
found in this contradictory unity of a private world and an abandonment to
the inauthenticity of the world. Or, to use another vocabulary, the illness is
both a retreat into the worst of subjectivities and a fall into the worst of
objectivities.78

Having provided this description of mental illness as a state of being,
Foucault does not take the next step—pursued by existential psychologists such
as R. D. Laing—of creating a causal pathology linking events with resultant
mental states. This is to be expected, as such an effort would contradict
Foucault’s rejection of a uniform meaning and causality behind events leading to
mental illness. Instead, Foucault reflects on the mode of analysis, arguing that,
“the morbid world is not explained by historical causality (I am referring, of
course, to psychological history), but historical causality is possible only because
this world exists: it is this world that forges the link between cause and effect, the
anterior and the ulterior.”79 The meaning of this passage changes entirely
depending on whether one interprets Foucault’s use of the phrase ‘this world’ as
referring to the patient’s morbid world or to external reality. In the former
interpretation—whose accuracy is more probable assuming ‘morbid world’ and
78
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‘this world’ represent the same subject—the reality of mental illness can only be
grasped from the patient’s phenomenological perspective, as this perspective
encompasses the only level of analysis in which the illness is real. The latter
interpretation, however, corresponds with Foucault’s conclusion to the first half of
Mental Illness and Psychology, where he argues that the various meanings
attached to mental illness owe their existence to psychology itself, rather than
existing as objective fact.
But here we may have touched on one of the paradoxes of mental illness
that demand new forms of analysis: if this subjectivity of the insane is
both a call to and an abandonment of the world, is it not of the world itself
that we should ask the secret of its enigmatic status? Is there not in
mental illness a whole nucleus of significations that belongs to the domain
in which it appeared—and, to begin with, the simple fact that it is in that
domain that it is circumscribed as an illness?80

In referencing both psychology and ‘the world,’ Foucault is suggesting that
society also plays a role in constructing mental illness. This passage, therefore,
foreshadows Foucault’s theses in the second half of Mental Illness and
Psychology—which, as Dreyfus notes, “is a summary of Foucault’s Madness and
Civilization”—and, concordantly, in Madness and Civilization.81 In Foucault’
estimation, the first half of his 1954 work “fixed the coordinates by which
psychologies can situate the pathological fact” and identified mental illness’s
“forms of appearance,” yet it neglects to explain why mental illness exists as it
does.82 Behavioral science, in both its organic and phenomenological forms, can
demonstrate how mental illness operates; yet psychologists “have been unable
80
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to show its conditions of appearance.”83 In the second half of Mental Illness and
Psychology, Foucault attempts to correct this oversight and locate the origins of
mental illness. As previously mentioned, these origins lie within psychology and
society.
A substantial amount of the material in the second half of Mental Illness
and Psychology is covered in greater detail in Madness and Civilization, thus the
following reading of the former text will only cover the more salient arguments,
with emphasis given to those which do not appear in the latter text. Foucault’s
assertion that mental illness is a social construct seems an appropriate place to
begin this reading. In support of this view, Foucault makes the bold statement: “a
society expresses itself positively in the mental illnesses manifested by its
members; and this is so whatever status it gives to these morbid forms.”84 In
other words, society determines what constitutes mental illness, and mental
illness’s manifestations vary according to societal conditions. Hence, Foucault
refers to social and behavioral research as “a projection of cultural themes.”85
And in this argument Foucault’s adherence to Heideggerian hermeneutics of
suspicion becomes apparent: “our society does not wish to recognize itself in the
ill individual whom it rejects or locks up; as it diagnoses the illness, it excludes
the patient.”86 Confinement therefore serves as a means to conceal the hidden
nature of madness that is inherent in society. Building on this argument,
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psychology constructs mental illness in an effort to obscure madness’s hidden
meaning.
It is at this point relevant to note that Foucault does not use the terms
‘madness’ and ‘mental illness’ in an interchangeable manner in any of his works.
Madness, in Foucault’s 1954 and 1961 works, constitutes an aspect of human
nature that is obscured by the language of science and rationality. In “Madness,
The Absence of an Œuvre,” a 1964 essay Foucault wrote in order to clarify his
arguments in Madness and Civilization, he describes madness as “everything …
that characterises the spoken and forbidden world of unreason; madness is the
excluded language.”87 Madness remains unknowable in terms of the concealed
meaning it may carry, rather like the contents of a sealed tomb. At the same time,
however, madness contains an infinitely vast “reserve of meaning.”88 Phrased
differently, madness is a blank slate upon which interested parties might inscribe
any number of potential meanings; madness “furnishes a void where all that is
proposed is the still-unaccomplished possibility that a certain meaning might
appear there, or a second, or a third, and so on to infinity.”89 In the modern world,
madness does not possess a language of its own, but rather is spoken for
through psychology: “Since Freud, Western madness has become a non-
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language because it has become a double language (a language which only
exists in this speech, a speech that says nothing but its language).”90
Mental illness, then, is the codification of meaning and practices
associated with madness at a given time; it is the language of psychology and
psychiatry. As such, mental illness is the product of numerous societal factors.
Foucault portrays these factors that comprise mental illness as a matrix of
increasingly regimented disciplinary practices, such that mental illness “is set to
enter a technical region that is increasingly well controlled: in hospitals,
pharmacology has already transformed the rooms of the restless into great tepid
aquariums.”91 Given these definitions, it is clear that madness and mental illness
do not speak the same language; “the constitution of madness as a mental
illness, at the end of the eighteenth century, affords the evidence of a broken
dialogue.” Foucault’s purpose in Mental Illness and Psychology and—to a greater
extent—Madness and Civilization is to demonstrate how mental illness, or “the
language of psychiatry,” comprises “a monologue of reason about madness”
which serves to silence madness—or, in hermeneutic terms, to obscure its
meaning.92
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In his 1954 text, Foucault argues that “madness is much more historical
than is usually believed, and much younger too.”93 The definition of madness has
changed over time, hence the historical narrative that Foucault puts forth in
support of his relativistic attitude toward psychology. During the Renaissance, for
example, literature and art often depicted madness in a favorable light, as
demonstrated by Shakespeare and Cervantes. “Up to about 1650, Western
culture was strangely hospitable to these forms of experience.”94 Foucault
asserts that the modern language of madness—mental illness—does not
represent a discovery of objective truth; rather, it reflects another shift in how
madness is perceived—a dominant perspective in a given culture for a given
period of time—and psychology is not the autonomous purveyor of this truth, but
an instrument of punishment, guilt and—it follows—behavioral control.95
From these assertions, Foucault arrives at the conclusion that psychology
and mental illness share an oddly interdependent existence. Certainly, there can
be no mental illness without the study and classification thereof, yet there can be
no psychology without mental illness. Mental illness and psychology exhibit this
circular causality owing to their constructed origins. That is, factors entirely
unrelated to the objective truth of mental illness—e.g., social norms, power
relations, and the goal of behavioral control—construct and mediate the
93
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relationship between mental illness and psychology. These factors (external and
internal dimensions in the following passage) serve as the impetus for defining
madness through psychology.
Man became a “psychological species” only when his relation to madness
made a psychology possible, that is to say, when his relation to madness
was defined by the external dimension of exclusion and punishment and
by the internal dimension of moral assignation and guilt. In situating
madness in relation to these two fundamental axes, early-nineteenthcentury man made it possible to grasp madness and thus initiate a
general psychology.96

When analyzed under the hermeneutics of suspicion, the relationship
between psychology and mental illness takes on a conspiratorial tone;
psychology must obscure the constructed nature of mental illness in order to
justify its own existence. This is due to the fact that madness’s true meaning—
which psychology conceals through its language—does not derive from
psychology and the various factors defining mental illness; its meaning is instead
found in socio-historical context and in the baselessness of human nature.
Hence, Dreyfus describes the revised second half of Mental Illness and
Psychology as “an account of the constitution of mental illness as the last stage
of a historical denial of the experience of strangeness,” and “a historicized
version of early Heidegger’s claim that the truth that is covered up is
strangeness, i.e., that there is no objective truth about the nature of human
beings.”97 Psychology operates under the opposing assumption that human
nature exists and can be known through reason. Hence, psychology must
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conceal and oppress the hidden meaning of madness; to do otherwise would be
to “undermine its own conditions, that it should turn back to what made it
possible, and that it should circumvent what is for it, by definition, the
unsupersedable. Psychology can never tell the truth about madness because it is
madness that holds the truth of psychology.”98 Consequently, psychology
subordinates unreason to reason. It follows that to conduct a true study of
madness—or unreason—would inevitably cause psychology to deconstruct its
own rationalistic foundations. “If carried back to its roots, the psychology of
madness would appear to be not the mastery of mental illness and hence the
possibility of its disappearance, but the destruction of psychology itself and the
discovery of that essential, non-psychological because non-moralizable relation
that is the relation between Reason and Unreason.”99
Foucault’s purpose is not to declare the pre-ordained failure of any
attempt to conduct an objective study or treatment of madness—indeed, he
expresses the hope that “one day, an attempt must be made to study madness
as an overall structure.”100 Yet Foucault questions the validity of theories claiming
to have a unified and scientific understanding of mental illness. The 1954 text
was “intended simply to show a particular relation between psychology and
madness and a disequilibrium so fundamental that they rendered vain any
attempt to treat the whole of madness, the essence and nature of madness, in
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terms of psychology.”101 The unequal relationship between psychology and
madness also results in the ‘othering’ of the madman; that is, psychology
objectifies and reclassifies the madman as mentally ill, thereby justifying his
isolation from society. As Dreyfus accurately notes, Foucault’s acceptance of the
hermeneutics of suspicion emphasizes this relationship, “which led him to look
for a connection between scientific truth-seeking and alienation—the repression
of a deep, nonobjectifiable truth.”102 To Foucault—at least in his early intellectual
development—mental illness serves only as a set of self-referential constructs
intended to conceal madness’s truth. In this regard, mental illness, “is simply
alienated madness, alienated in the psychology that it has itself made
possible.”103
A final word regarding Foucault’s brand of the hermeneutics of suspicion.
Foucault suggests that madness can be liberated from psychology, presumably
through the acceptance of strangeness and the de-objectification of madness. In
this view, madness should be “freed and disalienated, restored in some sense to
its original language.”104 Foucault is exceedingly vague as to what this liberation
might entail, perhaps because the nature of liberation can only be known
alongside the discovery of madness’s hidden meaning. Yet his assertion that
alienation is the result of psychology’s objectifying the patient is surprisingly
harmonious with his later thought, as it coincides with Foucault’s model of
101
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knowledge and power relations. It is in this vein that Foucault describes
psychology as “obscurely directed toward the point at which its possibilities are
created … toward those regions in which man has a relation with himself and
inaugurates that form of alienation that turns him into Homo psychologicus.”105
Dreyfus is undoubtedly correct in his argument that, for Foucault, “the ultimate
form of alienation in our society is not repression and exclusion of the truth but
rather the constitution of the individual subject as the locus of pathology.”106
Having concluded that “the psychological dimensions of mental illness
cannot, without recourse to sophistry, be regarded as autonomous,” Foucault
shifts the second half of Mental Illness and Psychology away from a
phenomenological analysis of a patient’s personality and toward a sociohistorical analysis of psychology and its role in creating the experience of mental
illness.107 Foucault has discarded the humanistic notion that some objective
element unifies humanity and adopted instead a relativistic viewpoint; with the
exception of his acceptance of the hermeneutics of suspicion, Foucault no longer
attributes any inherent meaning to his objects of study. Hence, as Dreyfus states,
What counts as personality and mental illness is itself a function of
historical interpretation. The task thus changes from situating personal
existence in a concrete social situation to studying the historical and
discursive practices that define a ‘psychology’ in which the notion of
mental illness becomes thinkable as something that can be the object of
scientific study.108
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In his conclusion, Foucault makes his case for the materialistic, historical
study of psychology as a means of understanding mental illness:
Mental illness may be situated in relation to human genesis, in relation to
individual, psychological history, in relation to the forms of existence. But,
if one is to avoid resorting to such mythical explanation as the evolution of
psychological structures, the theory of instincts, or an existential
anthropology, one must not regard these various aspects of mental illness
as ontological forms. In fact, it is only in history that one can discover the
sole concrete a priori from which mental illness draws, with the empty
opening up of its possibility, its necessary figures.109

The conclusion of Mental Illness and Psychology reflects Foucault’s shift
away from viewpoints with humanistic grounding and toward a relativistic
analysis of narratives.

Madness and Civilization
The above conclusion serves as an appropriate transition point to
Foucault’s next work, Madness and Civilization. Arguably one of Foucault’s most
influential texts, Madness and Civilization is a social history of the development
of madness in Western society from the end of the Middle Ages through to
modern times. Using this historical approach, Foucault is able to analyze
madness from a relativistic perspective, or, in Jean Khalfa’s words, “as a cultural,
legal, political, philosophical and then medical construct.”110 Miller summarizes
Foucault’s thesis: “madness was … a product of social relations—and not an
independent biological reality.”111 As previously established, this argument holds
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unsettling implications for the scientific study of human behavior; that is, if mental
illness is a social construct, then the scientific study thereof has no autonomous,
objective basis in physiology. In Madness and Civilization, Foucault
demonstrates that, historically, psychology’s supposedly objective basis is rooted
in power relations and other social factors.
The second chapter of Madness and Civilization, titled “The Great
Confinement,” provides a suitable example of madness’ constructed nature.
Foucault recounts how, in seventeenth century Paris, “more than one out of
every hundred inhabitants” found themselves incarcerated in the Hôpital
Général—the first of several hospitals whose administrations were directly linked
to royal authority.112 Foucault describes the Hôpital Général as having “nothing to
do with any medical concept. It was an instance of order, of monarchical and
bourgeois order being organized in France during this period. It was directly
linked with the royal power which placed it under the authority of civil government
alone.”113 The Hôpital Général did not detain over one percent of the Parisian
population for medical reasons; rather, this confinement took place, both in
France and across Europe, by royal decree and in the larger context of social
tensions. European governments used confinement as a means to police their
populations, which simultaneously served as “an economic measure and a social
precaution.”114 The Hôpital Général (and similar medical institutions) allowed
states to curb unemployment and political opposition by confining potential
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dissidents—these included the unemployed, the ill, the infirmed, and other
disparate groups that did not fit the emerging bourgeoisie’s image of a productive
citizenry—and mandating patients to perform physical labor. These practices
coincided with the increasingly dominant view among state and religious
authorities that labor was “a general solution, an infallible panacea, a remedy to
all forms of poverty.”115 Idleness, in contrast, came to be associated with
madness. Thus, views commonly held by state and religious authorities served to
both legitimize and necessitate confining the unemployed. Foucault summarizes
this conclusion in the following passage:
In the classical age, for the first time, madness was perceived through a
condemnation of idleness and in a social immanence guaranteed by the
community of labor. This community acquired an ethical power of
segregation, which permitted it to eject, as into another world, all forms of
social uselessness. It was in this other world, encircled by the sacred
powers of labor, that madness would assume the status we now attribute
to it.116

In this redefinition of idleness as a form of mental illness we see
Foucault’s central argument that madness is a social construction; the
unemployed found themselves newly classified as mentally ill for political
reasons. Their confinement was a monarchical effort to stimulate the economy
and cure social ills associated with unemployment. Thus, state and medical
authorities constructed a meaning behind mental illness, rather than this meaning
being biologically innate. Foucault skeptically argues that the social factors which
define mental illness also call into question the humanitarian motive driving
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medical treatments: “before having the medical meaning we give it, or that at
least we like to suppose it has, confinement was required by something quite
different from any concern with curing the sick. Our philanthropy prefers to
recognize the signs of a benevolence towards sickness where there is only a
condemnation of idleness.”117
One might arrive at several conclusions based on Foucault’s 1961
analysis of madness thus far, each with its own validity: for instance, Foucault
obviously assumes that mental illness is a social construct; his argument implies
that psychology is a tool of power used to mask stratagems for controlling human
behavior; and he deconstructs commonly-held historical narratives in order to
expose society’s mistreatment of the mentally ill. Yet none of these capture
Foucault’s real purpose in Madness and Civilization, which is to demonstrate how
modernity has silenced madness (and although this point has already been
established in the second half of Mental Illness and Psychology, Foucault
provides a deeper analysis in this later work.)118 “Modern man no longer
communicates with the madman,” declares Foucault, elaborating that although a
dialogue between madness and reason existed prior to the end of the eighteenth
century, “there is no such thing any longer.” Without this dialogue, the voice of
true madness cannot be heard, and only a silent and (one supposes) suppressed
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madness remains. Modernity and behavioral science have filled this silence by
displacing the voice of madness with their own language: “The language of
psychiatry, which is a monologue of reason about madness, has been
established only on the basis of such a silence.”119 Thus, in order to understand
Foucault’s argument in Madness and Civilization, one must isolate the intellectual
and socio-historical movements comprising psychiatry, the modern language of
madness.
The unidirectional dialogue between madness and reason emerged in the
Classical Age, when madness came to be associated with unreason. Foucault
uses the term ‘unreason’ in reference to the experience of madness as described
by reason, or “all that, for reason, is closest and most remote, emptiest and most
complete; all that presents itself to reason in familiar structures—authorizing a
knowledge, and then a science, which seeks to be positive—and all that is
constantly in retreat from reason, in the inaccessible domain of nothingness.”120
In short, unreason is the opposite of reason; hence, it is a paradoxical viewpoint
that, from reason’s perspective, cannot be directly known through any capacity of
its own. In this regard, the classical era’s conception of madness as unreason is
symbolically akin to a terrestrial notion of the dark side of the moon. Foucault
elaborates on these qualities in his definition of madness:
Madness is precisely at the point of contact between the oneiric and the
erroneous; … But while error is merely non-truth, while the dream neither
affirms nor judges, madness fills the void of error with images, and links
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hallucinations by affirmation of the false. [Yet] … however vivid they are,
however rigorously established in the body, these images are
nothingness, since they represent nothing; as for erroneous judgment, it
judges only in appearance: affirming nothing true or real, it does not affirm
at all; it is ensnared in the non-being of error.121

Madness, then, is nothing; it is a blind, dream-like state without grounding
in reality or reason. “Madness begins where the relation of man to truth is
disturbed and darkened.”122 Yet the madman and the man of reason “both live in
the same brightness.”123 The term “brightness” here refers to truth as proposed
by Cartesian Dualism. In the Cartesian tradition, truth can only be divined
through reason, as reason stems from innate, God-given knowledge. Reason
therefore comprises a set of transcendent laws under which “everything must be
either waking or dream, truth or darkness … [Such] a law prescribes an
inevitable order.”124 The Cartesian tradition classifies madness as nothing insofar
as it is a perspective of “dazzled reason,” or a distorted view that cannot see
truth, and therefore cannot see anything.125 Foucault refers to the madman’s
condition as “dazzled reason,” meaning—in the classical, Cartesian view of
madness—that reason continues to exist for and apply to the madman, even if
the madman is unable to acknowledge truth in reason. Reason, therefore,
defines the experience of madness as unreason—a state of erroneous but
nonetheless existent reason.
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If madness is erroneous, it follows that whatever truth it may otherwise
contain is unverifiable. Yet, as Foucault notes, however groundless madness
may be, one cannot deny that the madman exists: “the paradox of this nothing is
to manifest itself, to explode into signs, in words, in gestures.”126 Madness cannot
be conceived of in itself and has no internal logic, yet it continues to exist; it is
“the paradoxical manifestation of non-being.”127 The aforementioned “Great
Confinement” served as a figurative and literal means of resolving this paradox
by banishing madness, the ‘thing that should not be,’ from society. “Confinement
is the practice which corresponds most exactly to madness experienced as
unreason, that is, as the empty negativity of reason; by confinement, madness is
acknowledged to be nothing.”128 Of course, if this were a purely incarcerative
effort, then confinement would only be the relocation of madness, as opposed to
a means toward its disappearance. In this regard, confinement was intended to
return madness to a state of nothingness through correction or death. This
process began at the societal level, where “madness is immediately perceived as
difference”; society (“men of good sense”) deemed an individual mad on the
grounds that he or she exhibited abnormal behavior. The obvious solution, then,
was to confine the madman and correct his or her behavior. Whether the
abnormal behavior vanished or the madman died in confinement, the result is the
same: madness disappeared; “confinement cannot have any other goal than a
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correction (that is, the suppression of the difference, or the fulfillment of this
nothingness in death).”129
The modern conception of mental illness emerged from the classical
paradox of reason and unreason and its resolution through confinement and
correction. This is most apparent in unreason’s inability to explain madness.
Unreason is a non-autonomous perspective; it is erroneous, and thus can neither
ascertain nor dictate whatever truth it may contain. Hence, madness cannot
speak its own truth. Where, then, can one find a causal explanation of madness?
“Inextricable unity of order and disorder, of the reasonable being of things and
this nothingness of madness! For madness, if it is nothing, can manifest itself
only by departing from itself, by assuming an appearance in the order of reason
and thus becoming the contrary of itself.”130 In short, madness cannot be
understood except in the language prescribed to it by its antithesis—reason.
Meaningless disorder as madness is, it reveals, when we examine it, only
ordered classifications, rigorous mechanisms in soul and body, language
articulated according to a visible logic. All that madness can say of itself is
merely reason, though it is itself the negation of reason. In short, a
rational hold over madness is always possible and necessary, to the very
degree that madness is non-reason.131

Toward the end of the classical era, the practices of confinement and
correction complemented this projection of reason unto madness. A systemic
understanding of madness was, for state and medical authorities, necessary in
order to identify and correct abnormal behaviors. “Madness had become a thing
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to look at … an animal with strange mechanisms.”132 The confined madman thus
became an object of observation; in cataloguing his or her behavioral patterns
and signs, one found a malformed but nonetheless existent rationality in
madness. Positivism, or the practice of direct observation in ascertaining truth,
thus served as the method for studying madness. Under the reductive gaze of
positivism, madness had no intrinsic meaning—it is “a phenomenon adrift,
insignificant upon the undefined surface of nature. An enigma without any truth
except that which could reduce it.” Ironically, this lack of intrinsic meaning did not
free madness from external significations; rather, it redefined madness as
“nothing more than a disease,” or an organic tabula rasa upon which reason may
carve its own meaning.133 As such, madness became meaningful only when a
psychologist observed the madman and attributes some rational significance to a
perceived abnormality in his or her behaviors. The meaning behind madness is,
therefore, not the product of empirical observation and scientific analysis, but of
language and subjective judgment. Behavior can now be judged as mad—and
therefore mistaken—under the guise of positivism. Beneath their scientific
trappings, the diagnosis and treatment of madness entail observing a behavior,
labeling it as erroneous, and correcting that behavior; as Foucault wrote, “we are
dealing with an art of discourse, and the reinstitution of truth, in which madness is
significant as unreason.”134
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This “reinstitution” of truth assumes a distinctly moral significance in the
late classical and modern eras. Cartesian Dualism deemed unreason to be a
state of continuous error, with modernity rechristening this error as immorality;
hence, the madman’s tendency toward error becomes “the psychological effect
of a moral fault.” Foucault maintains that the moralization of madness
“compromises what had been essential in the experience of unreason.”135
Whereas unreason had previously asserted the non-being of error, nothingness,
blindness, and an unknowable truth beyond madness—or “the condition of
possibility for all the manifestations of madness”—now (in the late classical and
early modern era) there is only the codification of blindness, or behavioral error;
“what had belonged to unreason, to the transcendence of its discourse, was
relegated to the psychological.”136 Madness had been indefinable when it was
perceived as unreason during the classical age. In becoming disassociated with
unreason, madness was characterized only by a lack of truth-value and the
aforementioned moral meaning that positivism has attached to it. Consequently,
madness has become inexorably linked with moral judgment; “what had been
error would become fault, and everything in madness that designated the
paradoxical manifestation of non-being would become the natural punishment of
a moral evil.”137 Melding these factors together, Foucault argues that “psychology
was born—not as the truth of madness, but as a sign that madness was now

135

Ibid., 158. Foucault’s italics.
Ibid., 158, 198.
137
Ibid., 158.
136

59

detached from its truth which was unreason.”138 This loss resulted in a bizarre
hybridization of positivist study and moral judgment, particularly at the
institutional level. Institutions of confinement came to emphasize morality in
studying madness and correcting abnormal—now immoral—behavior.
Psychology, therefore, silences madness by applying its own moral and
pathological language to abnormal behavior, thus obscuring madness’s true
language.
In a space so arranged, madness will never again be able to speak the
language of unreason, with all that in it transcends the natural
phenomena of disease. It will be entirely enclosed in a pathology. A
transformation which later periods have received as a positive acquisition,
the accession, if not of a truth, at least of what would make the
recognition of truth possible; but which in the eyes of history must appear
as what it was: that is, the reduction of the classical experience of
unreason to a strictly moral perception of madness, which would secretly
serve as a nucleus for all the concepts that the nineteenth century would
subsequently vindicate as scientific, positive and experimental.139

Foucault provides an example of moralized psychology in the ninth
chapter of Madness and Civilization, “The Birth of the Asylum.” Here Foucault
casts doubt onto the historical portrayal of Samuel Tuke and Philippe Pinel as
philanthropic pioneers who liberated the insane from the dark confines of the
conventional asylum and developed a scientific study of madness. “We know the
images,” begins Foucault, “they are familiar in all the histories of psychiatry,
where their function is to illustrate that happy age when madness was finally
recognized and treated according to a truth to which we had long remained
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blind.”140 Clearly, Foucault is skeptical of this glowing narrative, arguing that “the
legends of Pinel and Tuke transmit mythical values, which nineteenth-century
psychiatry would accept as obvious in nature.”141
A brief summary of this commonly-accepted history indicates that Tuke
established the Retreat, an asylum located in York, Britain and a humanitarian
alternative to the prison-like asylums commonly associated with the nineteenth
century. Tuke’s asylum provided a restful environment in which patients could
enjoy a familial relationship with practitioners and staff. A contemporary of
Tuke’s, Pinel famously made “the decision to remove the chains from the
prisoners in the dungeons” in 1793.142 That is, he released mental patients from
their physical constraints (though not from their “dungeons”) at the French
hospital Bicêtre. Beyond their humanitarian efforts, Tuke and Pinel also
established within their asylums an objective method of observing human
behavior. Foucault describes his perception of Tuke and Pinel in the second half
of Mental Illness and Psychology: “virtually every history of psychiatry and
medicine has seen in these figures the symbols of a double advent: that of a
humanism and that of a science that had at last achieved a positive status.” In
this narrative, Tuke and Pinel’s accomplishments represent a progression toward
an objective science and a humanitarian treatment of the mentally ill—yet
Foucault maintains that early nineteenth-century psychologists “did not relax the
140
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old practices of internment; on the contrary, they tightened them around the
madmen.”143
Tuke’s Retreat “would serve as an instrument of segregation: a moral and
religious segregation which sought to reconstruct around madness a milieu as
much as possible like that of the Community of Quakers.”144 Tuke created this
deeply religious environment owing to the fact that religion encompassed an
inviolable and universal brand of reason that existed even in the darkest depths
of madness: “In the dialect of insanity where reason hides without abolishing
itself, religion constitutes the concrete form of what cannot go mad; it bears what
is invincible in reason.” By placing reason in a transcendental position above
madness, Tuke made reason-based constraint “more immediate”—or internal—
to the madman, and allowed for the possibility of a cure for madness through
reason. “At the Retreat, religion was part of the movement which indicated in
spite of everything the presence of reason in madness, which led from insanity to
health.”145 Further, religion offers a moral causality driving madness:
experiencing immoral acts results in anguish, which will in turn produce the
various evils associated with madness. In Foucault’s words, “the sight of evil is
for every sensitive soul the cause of suffering, the origin of all those strong and
untoward passions such as horror, hate, and disgust which engender or
perpetuate madness.”146 In this way, religion inexorably links madness with
143
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immorality, casting abnormal behavior as an evil that must be vanquished
through the adherence to religion’s moral and rational principals. Tuke utilized
these facets of religion in order to control behavior. According to Foucault, “the
religious and moral milieu was imposed from without, in such a way that
madness was controlled, not cured.”147
Foucault has thus painted the Retreat as a religious enclave in which
patients were segregated from the outside world, effectively trapped in an
environment suffused with laws born of God-given reason and morality. By
segregating patients in such a way, Tuke ensured that patients could only act, be
judged, and even think in accordance with religious rules and teachings.
Segregation therefore “does not attempt to preserve the sufferers from the
profane presence of non-Quakers, but to place the insane individual with a moral
element where he will be in debate with himself and his surroundings: to
constitute for him a milieu where, far from being protected, he will be kept in a
perpetual anxiety, ceaselessly threatened by Law and Transgression.”148 Here
Foucault breaches what will become a critical subject in his 1975 analysis of the
modern prison system: surveillance. In short, the close-knit familial structure of
the Retreat ensured that staff and practitioners held patients under constant,
non-reciprocal surveillance. For instance, patients and mental health staff
engaged in social activities, such as tea parties, where the latter group had
ample opportunity to observe the former. Foucault describes these activities:
147
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This rite is not one of intimacy, of dialogue of mutual acquaintance; it is
the organization around the madman of a world where everything would
be like and near him, but in which he himself would remain a stranger, the
Stranger par excellence who is judged not only by appearances but by all
that they may betray and reveal in spite of themselves. Incessantly cast in
this empty role of unknown visitor, and challenged in everything that can
be known about him, drawn to the surface of himself by a social
personality silently imposed by observation, by form and mask, the
madman is obliged to objectify himself in the eyes of reason as the
perfect stranger, that is, as the man whose strangeness does not reveal
itself. The city of reason welcomes him only with this qualification and at
the price of this surrender to anonymity.149

As this passage indicates, surveillance influenced how patients perceived
and—it follows—conducted themselves. Patients were aware of their being
observed, and they responded to observation by monitoring their own thoughts
and behavior, thus fostering a sense of chronic guilt. Indeed, Tuke’s success in
controlling behavior derived from his emphasis on guilt in madness. Toward this
end, Tuke curtailed the practice of punishing madmen on the grounds that they
were mad, or their behavior reflected unreason; “the madman, as a human being
originally endowed with reason, is no longer guilty of being mad.” Instead, Tuke
shamed patients for deviating from the behaviors proscribed by the universal
reason that even madmen possess. Hence, “the madman, as a madman, and in
the interior of that disease of which he is no longer guilty, must feel morally
responsible for everything within that may disturb morality and society, and must
hold no one but himself responsible for the punishment he receives.”150 In
contemporary terms, Tuke humanized madness by placing the burden of
responsibility for actions entirely on the madman, rather than on that unknowable
149
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force driving the madman’s condition—unreason. The purpose behind this shift is
evident enough: “the madman became an object of punishment always
vulnerable to himself and to the Other; and, from the acknowledgement of his
status as object, from the awareness of his guilt, the madman was to return to his
awareness of himself as a free and responsible subject, and consequently to
reason.”151 Thus, continuous surveillance created feelings of guilt and selfmonitoring among patients, which in turn resulted in the patients’ selfobjectification; that is, patients increasingly regarded themselves as objects
whose thoughts and actions were conceived of and measured against reason, or
the rational perspective promoted by practitioners.152 Patients consequently
internalized the institution’s rules—again, a concept that Foucault would expand
upon in his later works. Tuke encouraged this mindset so that patients would
adopt obedient, self-monitoring personas that were dependent upon practitioners
for guidance and approval.
Tuke’s method of treatment, in short, was to use discard physical
constraints and punishments—“the keeper intervenes, without weapons and
without instruments of constraint”—by, instead, relying on “observation and
151
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language only” in order to mold patients into self-monitoring, self-objectifying,
guilty and dependent individuals.153 Rather than implementing physical force or
constraints to carry out this treatment, Tuke relied on the abstract distinction
between madness and reason. Practitioners in the Retreat held madness to be
an erroneous and infantile perspective, while reason was the mature, truthful
perspective; “madness does not represent the absolute form of contradiction, but
instead a minority status, an aspect of itself that does not have the right to
autonomy, and can live only grafted onto the world of reason. Madness is
childhood.”154 In the Retreat’s familial structure, patients occupied the role of
children, and were therefore subservient to their all-knowing parents, the
practitioners. In this regard, the religious, moral and rational elements outlined
above assert their influence by portraying the practitioner’s authority as intrinsic
and preordained; “it is not as a concrete person that he confronts madness, but
as a reasonable being, invested by that very fact, and before any combat takes
place, with the authority that is his for not being mad.”155 To Foucault, distinction
between madness and reason is based on self-serving logic; the sane man
occupies a position of perpetual infallibility due to the fact that society classifies
him as sane, while society classifies the madman as not sane, and thus forever
in error. As to the outcome of this confrontation between reason and unreason,
“the combat was always decided beforehand, unreason’s defeat inscribed in
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advance in the concrete situation where madman and man of reason meet.”156
Tuke’s authority over his patients derived from this inequality between madness
and reason, which was made possible only through linguistic distinctions
employed within an enclosed milieu.
However effective his methods may have been, Tuke’s overall influence
was rather modest; the Retreat’s operation was limited to “religious segregation
for purposes of moral purification.” Owing to its reliance on isolation, this model
could not feasibly be applied to a general, religiously diverse population. Pinel, in
contrast, developed a generalized method of controlling madness. His goal was
“to effect moral synthesis, assuring an ethical continuity between the world of
madness and the world of reason, but by practicing a social segregation that
would guarantee bourgeois morality a universality of fact and permit it to be
imposed as a law upon all forms of insanity.”157 In practice, Pinel’s methodology
did not vary greatly from Tuke’s, at least insofar as both practitioners subjected
madmen to continuous surveillance and moral judgment in order to coerce
patients into docility. Yet Pinel did not employ religion as a means of segregating
patients. Indeed, he viewed religion as a “source of strong emotions and
terrifying images which it arouses through fears of the Beyond, Catholicism
frequently provokes madness.”158 This being said, Pinel understood that
religion’s moral teachings could be secularized and applied uniformly to patients.
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Pinel, therefore, sought to “reduce the iconographic forms, not the moral content
of religion. Once filtered, religion possesses a disalienating power that dissipates
the images, calms the passions, and restores man to what is most immediate
and essential: it can bring him closer to his moral truth.”159 In other words, Pinel
borrowed religious teachings, such as “the values of family and work,” and
enforced these in a thoroughly judicial manner.160 Religion’s moral truths are, for
Pinel, analogous to value judgments that may affirm or denounce a behavior
based on its adherence to commonly accepted social virtues. Foucault, therefore,
calls Pinel’s asylum “a religious domain without religion, a domain of pure
morality, of ethical uniformity.”161
The methods employed at the Bicêtre can be characterized as
secularized, streamlined, and intensified variants of those seen at the Retreat.
Accordingly, Pinel created in the Bicêtre a rigidly structured environment where
madness itself was integrated into a judicial matrix of regulations and moral
standards. In Foucault’s words, the Bicêtre was “a uniform domain of legislation,
a site of moral syntheses where inanities born on the outer limits of society were
eliminated. The entire life of the inmates, the entire conduct of their keepers and
doctors, were organized by Pinel so that these moral syntheses would
function.”162 Pinel utilized three methods in an effort to achieve this regimented
system of universal moral values: “Silence,” or the act of ignoring patients so as
159
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to encourage introspection in them, thus eliciting guilt; “Recognition by Mirror,” or
forcing patients to acknowledge that their madness is an arrogant and juvenile
perspective; and “Perpetual Judgment,” or instilling in patients an understanding
that they are continuously judged and punished for transgressions.163
The similarities between these practices and Tuke’s are unmistakable.
Both practitioners freed madmen from their physical restrains while
simultaneously reducing madness to a meaningless object of continuous
observation, thus denying madmen the transcendental introspective power of
unreason; “the asylum … placed the mirrors in such a way that the madman …
inevitably surprised himself, despite himself, as a madman. Freed from the
chains that made it a purely observed object, madness lost, paradoxically, the
essence of its liberty, which was solitary exaltation.” The combination of continual
surveillance and a judicial environment once again resulted in the madman’s selfobjectification, hence madness “became responsible for what it knew of its truth;
it imprisoned itself in an infinitely self-referring observation; it was finally chained
to the humiliation of being its own object.”164 And, finally, Pinel’s method—
perhaps more so than Tuke’s—involved the “almost arithmetical obviousness of
punishment,” with the intention that patients would internalize the association
between offense and penalty to such an extent that they would judge themselves
without prompting, culminating in “the birth of remorse in the inmate’s mind: it is
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only at this point that the judges agree to stop the punishment, certain that it will
continue indefinitely in the inmate’s conscience.”165
Foucault does not dispute that Tuke and Pinel observed, diagnosed and
even cured patients. Yet to him, their philanthropy masked their practices’s
coercive elements; these practitioners also sought to control and normalize
patients’s behavior using a system of moral judgments applied through the
aforementioned techniques. Foucault summarizes Pinel’s practice:
The asylum of the age of positivism, which it is Pinel’s glory to have
founded, is not a free realm of observation, diagnosis, and therapeutics; it
is a juridical space where one is accused, judges, and condemned, and
from which one is never released except by the version of this trial in
psychological depth—that is, by remorse. Madness will be punished in
the asylum, even if it is innocent outside of it. For a long time now, and
until our own day at least, it is imprisoned in a moral world.166

Tuke and Pinel’s relevance to modern psychiatry stems from the doctor’s
personage and the moral structuring of the asylum. Yet—and here Foucault
demonstrates his typical analytic nuance—these are significant contributions
because psychiatry no longer recognizes them as such. Modern psychiatry exists
in its present form because it retains Tuke and Pinel’s moral structuring of the
asylum and their definition of the doctor’s role while at the same time forgetting
the ascientific nature of these factors.
In casting the doctor as an all-knowing patriarchal figure, Tuke and Pinel
introduced into psychiatry “a personality, whose powers borrowed from science
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only their disguise, or at most their justification.”167 The doctor did not wield
authority over patients simply because he actually possessed a reservoir of
positivistic knowledge, but because of the social status allotted to doctors. That
is, doctors and patients had predefined social roles placing the former in a
position of power over the latter—the doctor-patient relationship was, therefore,
based on an abstract inequality in social standings. The doctor’s powers were “of
a moral and social order; they took root in the madman’s minority status, in the
insanity of his person, not of his mind.”168 Moreover, Foucault conspiratorially
argues that modern psychiatry utilizes positivism’s inherent concreteness to
substantiate Tuke and Pinel’s doctor-patient relationship: “the doctor’s
intervention is not made by virtue of a medical skill or power that he possesses in
himself and that would be justified by a body of objective knowledge. It is not as a
science that homo medicus has authority in the asylum, but as a wise man. If the
medical profession is required, it is as a juridical and moral guarantee, not in the
name of science.”169
As with the doctor’s authority, the asylum’s organization has social and
moral origins. Tuke and Pinel’s asylums operated under “a structure that formed
a kind of microcosm in which were symbolized the massive structures of
bourgeoisie society and its values: Family-Child relations, centered on the theme
of paternal authority; Transgression-Punishment relations, centered on the theme
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of immediate justice; Madness-Disorder relations, centered on the theme of
social and moral order.”170 In other words, the asylum was structured around
borrowed social stratifications and moral values. As we have seen, the doctor’s
“power to cure” derives from these structures.171
Tuke and Pinel acknowledged the moral and social nature of the doctor’s
authority—there was “nothing extraordinary about it.”172 By the early nineteenth
century, however, this awareness gave way to the view that psychology was an
empirical science. As Foucault states, “soon the meaning of this moral practice
escaped the physician, to the very extent that he enclosed his knowledge in the
norms of positivism … the psychiatrist no longer quite knew what was the nature
of the power he had inherited from the great reformers, and whose efficacity
seemed so foreign to his idea of mental illness and to the practice of all other
doctors.”173 As this passage indicates, the modern psychiatrist is unaware of the
specific historical origins behind his or her authority; positivism has displaced this
history with its promise of a purely empirical study of human activity.
Foucault credits Sigmund Freud with integrating Tuke and Pinel’s
contributions into psychiatric practice outside of the asylum. “To the doctor,
Freud transferred all the structures Pinel and Tuke had set up within
confinement. He did deliver the patient from the existence of the asylum within
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which his ‘liberators’ had alienated him.”174 However, what follows is not a cure
for the liberation of the madman, but a more thorough and ingrained silencing of
madness. Just as madness was silenced upon its separation from unreason and
attachment to positivism, and just as asylum patients were silenced within a
repressive moral environment (despite having been freed from physical
restraints), modern patients must contend with the silence imposed by
psychoanalysis, the language of mental illness. Although these points have been
established in the second half of Mental Illness and Psychology, psychoanalysis’
role requires elaboration.
Psychoanalysis comprises a self-referential language; it applies—through
the doctor’s mediation—its own meaning to the patient’s words and actions.
Foucault maintains that Freud “created the psychoanalytical situation where …
alienation becomes disalienating because, in the doctor, it becomes a subject.”175
That is, while the doctor differentiates the patient based on his or her
abnormalities—thus alienating the patient—the self-referential nature of
psychoanalysis entails that the patient’s abnormalities will always correspond
with a predetermined rational meaning. Hence, the patient is disalienated insofar
as his or her abnormalities already exist within psychoanalytic discourse. The
importance of Freud’s work, therefore, lies in his encapsulating madness within
reason. In this view, the rational meaning behind madness is not a new
development, but the unearthing of an existent aspect of human nature: “there is
174
175

Ibid., 278.
Ibid., 278.

73

more than the density of a discovery; there is the sovereign violence of a
return.”176 In redefining madness according to this rational-positivist narrative,
psychoanalysis undermines and overwrites other narratives. For example, while
the Shakespearean view of madness is empirically older than the psychoanalytic
narrative, Freud claims to have discovered in madness certain uniform traits that
predate the former view.
Foucault’s point is that Freud reorganized the language surrounding the
experience of madness. Freud gave this experience a voice; according to
Foucault, Freud “reconstituted one of the essential elements of an experience
reduced to silence by positivism; … he restored, in medical thought, the
possibility of a dialogue with unreason.”177 Yet this dialogue consisted only of
psychoanalysis’s aforementioned self-referential language. Indeed, the fact that
Freud attributes a rational basis to abnormal behavior means that psychoanalysis
cannot perceive that which is intrinsically irrational—unreason: “psychoanalysis
has not been able, will not be able, to hear the voices of unreason, not to
decipher in themselves the signs of the madman.”178 Psychoanalysis can
therefore only function as a language imposed upon madness; it is not an
autonomous science of the mind. This brings us back to Foucault’s lingering
usage of the hermeneutics of suspicion, which is apparent in his argument that “it
is not psychology that is involved in psychoanalysis: but precisely an experience
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of unreason that it has been psychology’s meaning, in the modern world, to
mask.”179 In other words, psychology conceals the free, undefined view of
madness with the psychoanalytic narrative. Foucault summarizes these concepts
in his abridged preface:
In the serene world of mental illness, modern man no longer
communicates with the madman: on one hand, the man of reason
delegates the physician to madness, thereby authorizing a relation only
through the abstract universality of disease; on the other, the man of
madness communicates with society only by the intermediary of an
equally abstract reason which is order, physical and moral constraint, the
anonymous pressure of the group, the requirements of conformity.180

Taking all of the above into consideration, it is difficult to avoid the
following conclusions regarding Foucault’s arguments in Madness and
Civilization: psychiatry conceals the experience of unreason and replaces it with
the language of mental illness; psychiatry fabricates the positivistic basis of this
language; and psychiatry has forgotten the history comprising the previous two
points. Foucault elaborates on his conclusions, making the socially constructed
nature of mental illness abundantly clear:
If we wanted to analyze the profound structures of objectivity in the
knowledge and practice of nineteenth century psychiatry from Pinel to
Freud, we should have to show in fact that such objectivity was from the
start a reification of a magical nature, which could only be accomplished
with the complicity of the patient himself, and beginning from a
transparent and clear moral practice, gradually forgotten as positivism
imposed its myths of scientific objectivity; a practice forgotten in its origins
and its meaning, but always used and always present. What we call
psychiatric practice is a certain moral tactic contemporary with the end of
the eighteenth century, preserved in the rites of asylum life, and overlaid
by the myths of positivism.181
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The question remains: where might one find unreason, if it has been so
effectively silenced by this short yet convoluted history of madness? Foucault
argues that unreason can still be seen in the art and works of particularly brilliant
individuals: “Since the end of the eighteenth century, the life of unreason no
longer manifests itself except in the lightning-flash of works such as those of
Hölderlin, of Nerval, of Nietzsche, or of Artaud.”182 And herein lies the final
argument in Madness and Civilization: although society attempts to study
madness and justify its existence within a rational narrative, this narrative cannot
explain the unreason that art (and other forms of transcendence) represents.
This failure does not necessarily mean that the rational view of madness is
wrong, but that the orderly society, which produces this view, does not have the
internal capacity to prove its own validity either. Foucault argues as much in his
conclusion: “the world that thought to measure and justify madness through
psychology must justify itself before madness, since in its struggles and agonies
it measures itself by the excess of works like those of Nietzsche, of Van Gogh, of
Artaud. And nothing in itself, especially not what it can know of madness,
assures the world that it is justified by such works of madness.”183 In a relativistic
flourish, Foucault frames the object of his study as a power struggle between
reason and unreason; this conflict manifests itself between ordered society and a
free, unknowable chaos.
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In Mental Illness and Psychology, Foucault maintained a hermeneutic and
phenomenological stance in arguing that societal practices alienate individuals,
and that this alienation causes madness—a position that lends itself to definitive
applications in conquering alienation through phenomenological understanding. It
would not be completely accurate to claim that Madness and Civilization jettisons
this argument, as Foucault still characterizes the madman as being alienated by
society. Yet the experience comprising this alienation is no longer a knowable
object of study. In the 1954 text, Foucault argued that understanding the
experience of madness—that is, the madman’s phenomenological perspective—
would liberate individuals from alienation. This argument implies that the mad
perspective is something that can be studied and cured, but psychology fails to
accomplish this. In contrast, Madness and Civilization recounts how madness
was perceived and experienced at an institutional level—hence Miller’s argument
that “the book is not really about mental illness at all—it is, rather, about the
philosophical value accorded to the lives, utterances, and works of artists and
thinkers conventionally deemed ‘mad.’”184 As such, Foucault is not concerned
with developing a systemic understanding (whether positivistic or
phenomenological) of madness. His relativistic stance also precludes the
possibility and necessity of identifying correct treatments and cures. In “Madness,
The Absence of an Œuvre,” Foucault clarifies this point; “I am contesting
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something that is ordinarily admitted: that medical progress might one day cause
mental illness to disappear, like leprosy or tuberculosis.”185
From these difference it seems clear that Foucault has sacrificed the
definitive (however flawed) position afforded to him by hermeneutics and
phenomenology, and he partially embraced a relativistic objectivity without clearly
discernable real-world applications. Yet Foucault still draws the aforementioned
hermeneutic conclusion that social institutions conceal the true nature of
madness. Moreover, the relationship between society and madness’s truth is
unchanging and will, therefore, continue to exist even if the means of perceiving
and giving meaning to this relationship should vanish. Thus, if psychology and
psychiatry could cure mental illness, Foucault argues that madness would
manifest itself as an origin-less depression. As Foucault argues in “Madness,
The Absence of an Œuvre,” without mental illness:
… one thing will remain, which is the relationship between man and his
fantasies, his impossible, his non-corporeal pain, his carcass of night; that
once the pathological is nullified, the obscure belonging of man to
madness will be the ageless memory of an ill whose form as sickness has
been effaced, but which lives on obstinately as unhappiness. Truth be
told, such an idea supposes that that which is most precarious, far more
precarious than the constancies of the pathological, is in fact unalterable:
the relationship of a culture to the very thing that it excludes, and more
precisely the relationship between our own culture and that truth about
itself which, distant and inverted, it uncovers and covers up in
madness.186

Foucault does not reveal society’s concealed truth about itself, opting
instead to let the relationship between madness and society remain ambiguous.
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Being unalterable, the relationship could reflect the absence of human nature, or
the causality between societal practices and madness—both arguments that
Foucault employed in Mental Illness and Psychology and which adhere to the
hermeneutics of suspicion. It is also possible that madness is an inherent aspect
of human nature, or the truth behind madness is necessarily unknowable, as to
know its truth in the modern era would be tantamount to silencing madness
completely under its new, positive language. Clearly, Foucault does not take the
same conclusive position in Madness and Civilization as he did in his previous
book; he vacillates, for the first and last time, between relativism and
hermeneutic grounding.

The Birth of the Clinic
Foucault’s thesis in The Birth of the Clinic can be summarized as follows:
modern medicine does not reflect objective truth so much as one of several
possible “forms of visibility.”187 The term “visibility” here refers to how disease is
perceived and conceptualized. Because modern medicine views disease as
being inseparable from the body, doctors study the body an object. Accordingly,
modern medicine conceptualizes disease as “a set of forms and deformations,
figures, and accidents and of displaced, destroyed, or modified elements bound
together in sequence according to a geography that can be followed step by
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step. It is no longer a pathological species inserting itself into the body wherever
possible; it is the body itself that has become ill.”188 Foucault argues that in
reducing the body to the status of an object, modern medicine has, paradoxically,
altered medical discourse in such a way as to favor a codified set of general
observations over pure empiricism. These observations of the body collectively
form a “corpus of knowledge” that can be applied to the individual.189 Foucault
describes this process in the following passage:
In assigning to disease silent paths in the enclosed world of bodies,
pathological anatomy reduces the importance of clinical symptoms and
substitutes for a methodology of the visible a more complex experience in
which truth emerges from its inaccessible reserve only in the passage to
the inert, to the violence of the dissected corpse, and hence to forms in
which living significance withdraws in favor of a massive geometry.190

Rather than being a set of empirical observations, modern medicine
instead encompasses a network of terminology—a “geometry” in the above
passage, and a discursive formation in archaeological terms—that describes
observations. Foucault refers to this network of terminology as the clinical gaze
throughout The Birth of the Clinic. The clinical gaze adheres to linguistic rules in
its descriptions, which leads Foucault to define the gaze as “a perceptual act
sustained by a logic of operations.”191 Thus, the clinical gaze consists of two
complementary elements; empirical observation and codification. The clinical
gaze objectively observes clinical studies; it “refrains from all possible
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intervention, and from all experimental decision.”192 At the same time, the clinical
gaze describes the results of experimental studies, and therefore codifies truth.
And in response to this alleged truth, Foucault offers a curious paradox; the
clinical gaze describes truth, yet in doing so simultaneously produces truth. The
statement, “the gaze is not faithful to truth, nor subject to it, without asserting, at
the same time, a supreme mastery,” highlights this reciprocal relationship
between the clinical gaze and the truth it purports. Foucault concludes that the
“logic of operations” governing medical discourse can, either through individual
volition or independent of it, influence the language and thus the perspective
presented by clinical studies. Hence, “the gaze that sees is a gaze that
dominates; and although it also knows how to subject itself, it dominates its
masters.”193
In order to grasp the depth of these arguments, it is necessary to
elaborate on the process by which truth is produced. To begin, the clinical gaze
must, if it is to be regarded as truth, consist of objective observations of events. It
is for this reason that Foucault emphasizes the concept of genesis—or the initial
result observed in an experiment—as a source of both objectivity and truth
production. The initial result should remain uninfluenced by external factors, and
the observation and description of this result should, therefore, only reflect
objective truth. This is what Foucault means when he states that “the gaze will be
fulfilled in its own truth and will have access to the truth of things if it rests on
192
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them in silence, if everything keeps silent around what it sees.” Yet this supposed
objectivity does not account for the process by which the description of the initial
result is made. The description—which comes into being simultaneously with the
initial result and its observation—is a series of logical and syntactical
machinations, or the discursive practices comprising the clinical gaze. Thus,
discursive practices govern the language describing empirically observed events,
meaning descriptions are subject to discursive rules outside of the empirical
event. The language used to describe the first occurrence of an event may,
therefore, influence how the event is perceived in the first and in each
subsequent observation. Hence, “the clinical gaze has the paradoxical ability to
hear a language as soon as it perceives a spectacle. In the clinic, what is
manifested is originally what is spoken. The opposition between clinic and
experiment overlays exactly the difference between the language we hear, and
consequently recognize, and the question we pose, or, rather, impose.”194
The language used in the first observation becomes manifested as truth
through replication. Foucault states: “Medical knowledge will gain in certainty
only in relation to the number of cases examined. … Medical certainty is based
not on the completely observed individuality but on the completely scanned
multiplicity of individual facts.”195 That is, clinical study makes the claim to truth
when numerous replications of the initial observation establish the result as being
certain. Moreover, the initial result serves as a blueprint to be referenced in all
194
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replications; experimenters adhere to the same steps and employ the same
language as was used in the initial description. “The gaze … must reproduce in
its own operations what has been given in the very movement of composition.”196
It is through this process that the aforementioned discursive formations influence
replications, and the resultant uniformity of these replications reinforces the
perception of the initial observation as being true. Foucault elaborates on this
circularity: “By showing itself in a repetitive form, the truth indicates the way by
which it may be acquired. It offers itself to knowledge by offering itself to
recognition. … The genesis of the manifestation of truth is also the genesis of the
knowledge of truth.”197
Facilitating the production and perpetuation of truth is the dissociation
between empirical observation and abstract knowledge. This dissociation
appears alongside the notion that replications increase medicine’s certitude
regarding the outcome of an experiment. Certainty, then, is based on a numeric
abstraction; “it is a question of a calculus, which … is valid within the domain of
ideas, being both the principle of their analysis into constituent elements and a
method of induction from frequencies; it is offered … as a logical and arithmetical
distortion of approximation.”198 Once a significant number of replications render a
result as certain, empirical observation becomes unnecessary: “As soon as
medical knowledge is defined in terms of frequency, one no longer needs a
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natural environment.”199 At this point, medical knowledge exists as a numeric
abstraction that conveys the probability of an event’s future occurrence, rather
than material truth. In order to fulfill this function as a probability while retaining
its objective status, medical knowledge must be perceived as universally true.
This is why Foucault emphasizes the uniformity of medical knowledge; medical
data preexists the subject as “a body of neutralized knowledge.”200 For example,
regardless of whether the subject is learning or teaching medicine, the
knowledge remains static: “In its structure and in its two aspects as manifestation
and acquisition, medical experience now has a collective subject; … it is made
up, as one entity, of those who unmask and those before whom one unmasks.
The statement is the same; the disease speaks the same language to both.”201
The issue with a corpus of objective medical knowledge, beyond those
outlined above, is its relationship to the individual. Medical knowledge does not
apply in individual circumstances; rather, knowledge of the individual creates
objective medical knowledge. “Only individual illnesses exist: not because the
individual reacts upon his own illness, but because the action of the illness rightly
unfolds in the form of individuality.”202 This individualization of disease is,
paradoxically, a product of objective research; modern medicine’s ability to study
corpses allowed for the cultivation of objective, empirical knowledge of the
human body, or the individual. The novelty of individualized knowledge leads
199
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Foucault to argue that the individual is, conceptually speaking, a recent
development in modernity:
The individual is not the initial, most acute form in life which is presented.
It was given at last to knowledge only at the end of a long movement of
spatialization whose decisive instruments were a certain use of language
and a difficult conceptualization of death. … The old Aristotelian law,
which prohibited the application of scientific discourse to the individual,
was lifted when, in language, death found the locus of its concept: space
then opened up to the gaze the differentiated form of the individual.203

In this passage, the term “death” refers to the body’s objectification when
studied post-mortem and converted into abstract medical knowledge. The
individual is incorporated into medical discourses as an object of study, and is
therefore both subject and contributor to the aforementioned hidden external and
subjective influences. Foucault states, “the gaze … establishes the individual in
his irreducible quality. And thus it becomes possible to organize a rational
language around it. The object of discourse may equally well be a subject,
without the figures of objectivity being in any way altered. It is this formal
reorganization, in depth … that made clinical experience possible.”204 In other
words, despite being reduced to an object of study, the individual influences his
or her own corpus of knowledge via the discursive practices governing the
discourses surrounding the human body.
In synthesizing this analysis of The Birth of the Clinic’s central arguments,
it becomes clear that medical knowledge has dissociated itself from its object of
203
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study. Medical discourse reflects its own intricate formative processes, rather
than disease itself. For this reason, Foucault describes the formation of medical
language as “[a question] of opening words to a certain qualitative, ever more
concrete, more individualized, more modeled refinement.”205 The complexity of
this discourse conceals the discursive practices that shape the language and
processes by which empirical observations are made. Medical science, then, is
one possible perspective, or form of visibility, insofar as it is constrained and
formed by its own language. It follows that medical science is not universally true
or objective. Foucault offers this summary:
The sign no longer speaks the natural language of disease; it assumes
shape and value only within the questions posed by medical investigation.
There is nothing, therefore, to prevent it being solicited and almost
fabricated by medical investigation. It is no longer that which is
spontaneously stated by the disease itself; it is the meeting point of the
gestures of research and the sick organism.206

The arguments outlined above regarding medical science can also be
applied to mental illness. Granted, mental illnesses do not have lesions. Because
lesions serve as the empirical basis for organic medicine, the absence thereof
should exclude mental illness from incorporation into the corpus of medical
knowledge. Yet this is not the case. For instance, Foucault argues that in the
nineteenth century nosologists classified lesion-less disease according to
qualitative descriptions of symptoms. The lack of a lesion became yet another
characteristic with which to describe disease: “Its species—and not its seat or its
cause—determined the nature of a disease; and the very fact of having or not
205
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having a localizable site was prescribed by the prior forms of this determination.
The lesion was not the disease, but merely the first of the manifestations by
which this generic character appeared, which opposed it to the affections
possessing no support.”207
Furthering this reclassification of lesion-less diseases was Pinel, to whom
Foucault returns in The Birth of the Clinic. Pinel classified these diseases by
observing symptoms, interpreting “essences,” and relying on pathological
anatomy to confirm his nosology. Owing to Pinel’s use of preexisting medical
structures, Foucault argues that the nineteenth-century doctor’s method “only
secondarily requires the clinic or the anatomy of lesions; basically, it is the
organization, in accordance with a real, but abstract, coherence, of the temporary
structures by which the clinical gaze or the anatomo-pathological perception
sought their support of momentary equilibrium in already existent nosology.”208
Thus, medical language describes and produces mental illness (and other
aliments with discernable symptoms, but without lesions) in the same way as
physical illnesses. The conceptual separation of symptoms from the disease,
coupled with this “syntactic reorganization,” allows for the abstraction of physical
illness into an individualized corpus of knowledge. In the same way, this same
separation and reorganization allows for the inclusion of mental illness, already
abstract in nature, in these medical discourses. Hence Foucault’s remark: “At the
end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries, neuroses, and
207
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essential fevers were fairly generally regarded as diseases without organic
lesion.”209
In The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault treats mental illness as being the
product of discourses that are mediated by discursive formations. This is in
contrast to his earlier archaeology of mental illness, Madness and Civilization,
where Foucault analyzed the experience of madness on an institutional level—
though he regards mental illness as a social construct in both works. Also
omitted is the hermeneutic of suspicion, which Foucault employed in his previous
two works in an effort to structure his narratives around the pursuit of hidden
meaning in social practices. In place of hermeneutics, Foucault attempts to
establish an objective and autonomous method of discursive analysis in
archaeology. Toward this end, the archaeological method brackets out all
reference to truth and the subject. Yet archaeology, as previously established, is
unstable insofar as it does not possess the positive grounding offered by
structural rules or the transcendental support provided by the meaning-giving
subject. Moreover, Foucault refrains from taking a definitive position with regard
to the concrete status of mental illness and the study thereof in both Madness
and Civilization and The Birth of the Clinic. This relativistic approach is apparent
from the following disclaimer in Foucault’s preface to The Birth of the Clinic: “this
book has not been written in favour of one kind of medicine as against another
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kind of medicine, or against medicine and in favour of an absence of
medicine.”210
The three works we have just analyzed reflect Foucault’s continuing effort
to dissect supposedly objective narratives. In the case of mental illness, Foucault
demonstrates how other morals and arbitrary social factors influence discourse
pertaining to normal and abnormal behavior. Foucault arrives at a similar
conclusion with regard to medical science. The external factors that influence
objective discourses represent the dominant social narrative. In modernity, this
would be the rationalist, utilitarian and bourgeois narrative. Hence, Foucault’s
first three texts offer a relativistic critique of this narrative.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE PROMISE OF ARCHAEOLOGY

Structuralism versus Archaeology
Archaeology marks the midpoint of Foucault’s intellectual development.
Foucault has banished from his new method the experience-based and
hermeneutic modes of analysis found in his 1954 and 1961 works. In their place,
Foucault attempts to create an ordered analysis of discourses based on the
material outcome of contextual relationships between statements.
Foucault’s archaeological method shares certain characteristics with
structuralism, a contemporary method to archaeology. The Birth of the Clinic, for
instance, is “a structural study that sets out to disentangle the conditions of its
history from the density of discourse.”211 In order to understand archaeology, we
must first examine structuralism. When The Birth of the Clinic was published in
1963, Foucault had already been strongly influenced by structuralist thought.
Miller states that “Foucault placed himself squarely within the intellectual
movement, founded on Saussure’s linguistics, then gathering steam in Paris.”212
Structuralism is a method of analysis premised on the assumption that certain
interconnected components of human society obey laws that operate
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independently from interpretive meaning. Dreyfus and Rabinow define these
rules as, collectively, “a structure which underlines the theories, discourse,
practices, and sensibility of an age, insofar as they contribute to a ‘scientific’
understanding of what it is to be human.”213 These rules should be autonomous
insofar as they remain constant in any social and historical context. In this
regard, structuralism seeks ahistorical and universal rules; it “attempts to
dispense with both meaning and the subject by finding objective laws which
govern all human activity.”214
Structuralists also adopt a holistic perspective. That is, structuralism treats
the rules governing discourses as elements that determine the overall
manifestation of the field of discourse to which they refer. As Dreyfus and
Rabinow argue, structuralism “identifies and individuates elements in isolation
and then asserts that the system determines which of the complete set of
possible elements will be individuated as actual. In this case, one might say that
the actual whole is less than the sum of its possible parts.”215 Like its counterpart
in the behavioral sciences—behaviorism—structural analysis treats discourses
surrounding human activity as mere descriptions without internal signification.
Structuralism is, therefore, opposed to hermeneutics and phenomenology;
structuralists do not seek a constant thread of meaning linking societal practices;
nor do they attribute any transcendental meaning-giving quality to the subject.

213

Dreyfus and Rabinow, 12.
Ibid., xix.
215
Ibid., 55.
214

91

Instead, structuralism approaches Kant’s subject/object division by identifying
constant rules governing scientific discourses. Dreyfus and Rabinow accurately
describe structuralism as an “attempt to treat human activity scientifically by
finding basic elements (concepts, actions, classes of words) and the rules or
laws by which they are combined.”216
In response to critics suggesting that he employed the structuralist
method, Foucault argued the following in his foreword to The Order of Things: “I
have used none of the methods, concepts, or key terms that characterize
structural analysis,” while admitting “there may well be certain similarities
between the works of structuralists and my own work.”217 Archaeology and
structuralism share characteristics to such an extent that the aforementioned
critics would be forgiven for mislabeling the archaeological method as an
application of structuralist ideas. Indeed, both methods attempt to conceptually
organize scientific discourses pertaining to human activity by uncovering rules
that govern said discourses. In his methodological treatise, The Archaeology of
Knowledge, Foucault describes discourses as “practices that systematically form
the objects of which they speak.”218 With regard to their mutual object of study,
then, structuralism and archaeology both rely on Kant’s transcendental idealism
when describing the link between subjects and objects. Further, the two methods
turn to linguistics in an effort to identify rules governing the relationship between
216
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discursive elements. Toward the end of his archaeological phase—when he
began to reassess the stability of this method in the early seventies—Dreyfus
and Rabinow argue that Foucault acknowledged his work’s structuralist
underpinnings: “[Foucault] will see that the method of The Archaeology of
Knowledge was itself heavily influenced by the seeming success of structuralism
in the human sciences.”219
Despite their structuralist underpinnings, The Birth of the Clinic and The
Order of Things are not, strictly speaking, structuralist works. This distinction is
due to the fact that structuralism and archaeology differ in terms of the role
allotted to meaning and historical context. In contrast to structuralism, Foucault’s
new methodology does not remove meaning from its analysis; rather,
archaeology distances itself from meaning, yet subordinates discursive rules to
meaning. This seemingly contradictory feat is accomplished by identifying
statements—Dreyfus and Rabinow rechristen these as “serious speech acts” for
purposes of clarity—that are held to be true in that statement’s specific social and
historical context: “Any speech act can be serious if one sets up the necessary
validation procedures, community of experts, and so on.”220 The archaeologist
isolates and ignores a statement’s meaning by taking an impartial stance as to a
statement’s truth-value—or the statement’s seriousness—and by disregarding
the notion that a statement’s meaning will remain constant or true in any context.
“[The archaeologist] not only must remain neutral as to whether what a statement
219
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asserts as true is in fact true, he must remain neutral as to whether each specific
truth claim even makes sense, and more generally, whether the notion of a
context-free truth claim is coherent.”221 This dual-distanciation (or “double
reduction,” to use Dreyfus and Rabinow’s terminology) from truth and meaning
allows the archaeologist to analyze the relationship between statements without
recourse to meta-analysis or transcendental elements in discourse.222 Foucault
refers to these relationships as discursive formations, or “the general enunciative
system that governs a group of verbal performances.”223
As previously established, stucturalism does not consider historical
context in its analysis of discursive rules. Dreyfus and Rabinow explain how this
differentiates structuralism from archaeology: “While the structuralist claims to
find cross-cultural, ahistorical, abstract laws defining the total space of possible
permutations of meaningless elements, the archaeologist only claims to be able
to find the local, changing rules which at a given period in a particular discursive
formation define what counts as an identical meaningful statement.”224 In other
words, archaeology contextualizes its analysis in a historical narrative—the rules
it uncovers reflect only the historical circumstances in which they were made. As
Foucault consistently grounds his analyses using historical context, he obviously
did not fully commit to structural analysis even in The Birth of the Clinic, which
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Dreyfus and Rabinow describe as “Foucault’s extreme swing toward
structuralism.”225

Invisibly Ordered Discourse
Archaeologists organize discursive formations according to contextual
meaning. It is based on this point that we can fully differentiate structuralism from
archaeology, as the former method takes the opposite approach: structuralism
subordinates discourses to the unchanging and context-independent rules of
which they are comprised, and therefore utilizes bottom-up organization, while
archaeology is organized in a semi-top-down fashion. That is, archaeology
subordinates discursive elements to social, historical and meaning-based
context. It follows that the context surrounding statements makes possible the
identification of individual discursive formations. This conforms to Dreyfus and
Rabinow’s interpretation: “Archaeological holism asserts that the whole
determines what can count even as a possible element. The whole verbal
context is more fundamental than its elements and thus is more than the sum of
its parts. Indeed, there are no parts except within the field which identifies and
individuates them.”226 Archaeology identifies discursive formations based on
shared context and meaning between statements based, that is, on whether the
statements are perceived as true and have a constant meaning in specific
225
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circumstances. At the same time, the objective meaning and validity behind a
statement is not a subject of interest for the archaeologist. To clarify, I am
paraphrasing and agreeing with Dreyfus and Rabinow’s interpretation of
archaeology:
The archaeologist finds that his elements (statements) are not only
individuated by the whole system of statements, but that they can be
identified as elements only in the specific system in which they make
sense. … whether or not two speech acts mean the same thing (that is,
determine the same truth conditions) depends not merely upon the words
that determine their information content but upon the context in which
they appear.227

This approach enables archaeology to objectively study discourse while
simultaneously accounting for discourse’s internal context. Hence Dreyfus and
Rabinow’s argument that “what Foucault claims to have discovered is a new
domain of serious statements which, although experienced as dependent on
nondiscursive practices by those within them, can be described and explained by
the archaeologist as an autonomous realm.”228
The reciprocal influence between context and elements of discourse
denies archaeology the objective basis afforded by structural analysis’
universalized elements. Without an empirical or metaphysical foundation, context
serves as a mere qualitative tool for formulating a priori descriptions linking
discursive elements. This is why Dreyfus and Rabinow argue that archaeology,
“having no grounding in lowest level isolable elements, is not an analysis, and
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having no highest principles of ordering, is not transcendental.”229 Lacking these
qualities, archaeology cannot make objective predictions and is, therefore, not an
ampliative (or positive) method of analysis, but “a purely descriptive
enterprise.”230 They conclude that “following Kant, [archaeology] could … be
called an analytic, since it seeks to discover the a priori conditions that make
possible the analysis practiced in each specific discipline including
structuralism.”231 These analytic properties are most apparent in Foucault’s early
archaeological phase—that is, in Madness and Civilization and The Birth of the
Clinic—when he adheres to the structuralist assumption that discourse merely
describes its object of study. Early archaeology treats its objects (madness and
medical science, respectively) as static and uninfluenced by discourses. Hence
Dreyfus and Rabinow’s argument:
Just as Foucault thought, mistakenly, in Madness an Civilization that he
could individuate a field of discourse by locating its fixed objects, so in
preparing The Birth of the Clinic he at first thought that he could isolate
fixed, homogeneous stages of medical science by discovering certain
constant styles of statements, certain basic ways subjects spoke.232

In the interest of transforming archaeology from a clarificatory method into
an autonomous, ampliative one, Foucault elaborates on the relationship between
discourse and object in The Archaeology of Knowledge. Dreyfus and Rabinow
list four contextual elements—or “descriptive categories”—that Foucault uses to
identify commonalities between statements: “objects, subjects, concepts, and
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strategies.”233 Even with these new tools, however, it is not possible to objectively
identify meaningful and serious statements. Statements can only be considered
serious in their own subjective context—thus archaeology remains an analytic.
Dreyfus and Rabinow expound upon this argument:
Seen from the inside, statements seem to make serious sense only
against a background of scientific and nonscientific practices, but seen
from the outside, this shared background of practices turns out to play no
essential role in determining which speech acts will, at any time, be taken
to make serious sense. What gives speech acts seriousness and thus
makes them statements is their place in the network of other serious
speech acts and nothing more.234

Foucault revaluates the passive role of discourses in his 1969
methodological treatise so as to avoid these issues. Discourses now influence
the object they are describing. Archaeology no longer describes existent links
between discourses, but discovers discourse’s effects. Dreyfus and Rabinow
contrast this development with Foucault’s approach in Madness and Civilization:
“by the time of the Archaeology he realizes that, far from being differentiated by
their objects, discursive formations produce the object about which they speak.
Madness was not, as he had earlier assumed, an object or limit experience
outside of discourse which each age had attempted to capture in its own
terms.”235 Archaeology has therefore undergone an odd reversal of priorities;
discourse now has priority over non-discursive—that is, contextual—factors.
While context continues to be used by archaeologists to identify discursive
formations, discursive rules influence which statements are perceived as true, or
233
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serious, within their field of discourse. For this reason, Foucault has “restricted
his analysis to the structure of discursive practices, and even more specifically, to
the rules governing serious speech acts.”236
The rules governing discourse in the social and medical sciences are
autonomous, and thus operate without conscious human input. By influencing
humans at a subconscious level (or remaining “unknown to practitioners”),
discursive formations determine what can be conceptualized in any given era.237
As to how this determination occurs, Dreyfus and Rabinow argue that “discourse
‘uses’ the various social, medical, technical, institutional, and economic factors
which determine medical practice by taking them up and giving them ‘unity.’
Thus, although what gets said depends on something other than itself, discourse,
so to speak, dictates the terms of this dependence.”238 Discourse’s influence is
simultaneously autonomous and subordinate to its object, or non-discursive
factors. It follows that discursive and non-discursive factors serve as subject and
object to each other. Based on these postulates, the archaeologist seeks to
discover the rules by which discursive formations influence non-discursive
factors. These rules allow the archaeologist to predict which statements will be
deemed serious and subsequently incorporated into discursive formations.
Taking the above points into account, it is clear that archaeology is an
elaborate method for discovering the reciprocal influence between subject and
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object. We now turn to Foucault’s 1966 analysis of the social sciences, The
Order of Things, for further analysis of archaeological concepts. The Order of
Things examines the subject/object division as it relates to the organization of
representations posited by discourses within three nineteenth-century fields:
linguistics, zoology, and economics. In the preface to this work, Foucault frames
the subject/object interaction in the social sciences as taking place between two
related regions of thought regarding human activity. The first region
encompasses an “already ‘encoded’ eye,” or laws whose influence over the
subject are already established, even as the subject seeks to discover them.239
These are “the fundamental codes of a culture—those governing its language, its
schemas of perception, its exchanges, its techniques, its values, the hierarchy of
its practices—establish for every man, from the very first, the empirical orders
with which he will be dealing and within which he will be at home.”240 The second
region is a meta-analysis of the first; it encompasses a “reflexive knowledge” of
the narrative constructed by the social sciences, or “the scientific theories or the
philosophical interpretations which explain why order exists in general, what
universal law it obeys, what principle can account for it, and why this particular
order has been established and not some other.”241 In short, the first region
encompasses the representation of objective phenomena, while the second
region involves the description thereof. Between these two regions exists “a
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middle region.”242 One imagines that Foucault employs the term “middle” in order
to emphasize the ambiguous space this region of thought occupies; the middle
region represents an unprocessed form of order to which the social sciences
have not applied a formal narrative and which operates subconsciously. Hence,
the middle region is the “experience of order in its pure primary state.”243
Discursive rules originate from this middle region of thought. For this
reason, the middle region’s characteristics are analogous to those of discursive
formations; the middle region is subordinate to context insofar as it varies
“according to the culture and the age in question,” yet preexists the modes of
order surrounding context.244 This anteriority lies, as we have seen, in the rules
that comprise discursive formations and which influence non-discursive factors.
Discursive rules do not adhere to knowable systems of ordering. Thus—and not
unlike Foucault’s account of classical madness—discursive rules are indefinable.
Foucault describes the middle region as being “continuous and graduated or
discontinuous and piecemeal, linked to space or constituted anew at each instant
by the driving force of time, related to a series of variables or defined by separate
systems of coherences, composed of resemblances which are either successive
or corresponding, organized around increasing differences, etc.”245 Despite its
unordered nature, the middle region is significant in that it makes ordering
possible. Foucault describes these concepts as follows:
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This middle region, then, in so far as it makes manifest the modes of
being of order, can be posited as the most fundamental of all: anterior to
words, perceptions, and gestures, which are then taken to be more or
less exact, more or less happy, expressions of it (which is why this
experience of order in its pure primary state always plays a critical role);
more solid, more archaic, less dubious, always more ‘true’ than the
theories that attempt to give those expressions explicit form, exhaustive
application, or philosophical foundation.246

Foucault uses the term “episteme” in reference to the middle region of
thought.247 First introduced in The Order of Things, the episteme can be
characterized as an amalgamation of established archaeological concepts and
their material effects; it refers to the collection of rules governing discursive
formations and to the cognitive limitations this governance creates. In The
Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault describes the episteme as “the total set of
relations that unites, at a given period, the discursive practices that give rise to
epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly formalized systems.”248 Foucault
states that the episteme does not represent a system of objective knowledge that
applies uniformly to subjects; rather, “it is the totality of relations that can be
discovered, for a given period, between the sciences when one analyses them at
the level of discursive regularities.”249 The episteme, therefore, comprises the
relations between the discursive formations, which in turn form the rules
governing discourse. Thus, the archaeologist pieces together the rules governing
discursive formations in order to uncover an episteme, or the network of
discursive rules with shared characteristics. While discourse serves as the
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conceptual foundation for scientific knowledge, the episteme determines what
form and direction discourses may take. In this way, the episteme reflects the a
priori and contextual limits of knowledge. Foucault alludes to these points in his
preface to The Order of Things:
What I am attempting to bring to light is the epistemological field, the
episteme in which knowledge, envisaged apart from all criteria having
reference to its rational value or to its objective forms, grounds its
positivity and thereby manifests a history which is not that of its growing
perfection, but rather of its conditions of possibility; in this account, what
should appear are those configurations within the space of knowledge
which have given rise to the diverse forms of empirical science.250

Here Foucault states that archaeology’s aim is to discover the reciprocal
influence between representations of objective phenomena and the analysis of
those representations. This discovery—culminating in the episteme—serves an
analytic purpose in demonstrating how, historically, the unconscious relationship
between these two regions of thought establishes the prerequisite conditions (the
conditions of possibility) under which knowledge is arranged. Archaeology should
consequently produce a historical understanding of the formation of knowledge in
the form of the episteme—hence Foucault’s claim that he intends to uncover “a
positive unconscious of knowledge.”251 Thus, archaeology studies empirical
discourse in order to determine the unconscious limits of what can and cannot be
conceptualized in a given era.
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The Death of Man and the Impasse of Humanism
Miller accurately summarizes the implications surrounding this conclusion
in stating that Foucault posits a region of thought, “beneath the level of conscious
meaning explored by Sartre and the phenomenologists” that is, “unconscious and
unthought, anonymous and impersonal, that regulate[s] the play of meaning in
advance. The human being is therefore not absolutely free (or absolutely
responsible), as Sartre supposed, but always restrained, pinioned, snared in a
web of language and practices beyond its control.”252 In other words, Foucault
subordinates the knowing subject to language and the unconscious formation
thereof. In this regard, archaeology is unapologetically relativistic and
deterministic, making it opposed to subject-centered humanistic narratives. Miller
explains the significance of Foucault’s stance:
—Language alone makes possible order and reasoned knowledge
of the world.
—At the same time, language makes thinkable the unreal and
unreasonable.
—Language therefore calls into question the world and ultimately
itself in a dizzying spiral of possibilities and impossibilities, realities
and unrealities, that may well climax … in a mad and lyrical
embrace of the void, oblivion and death.253

Humans, then, are the product of their own language and representations.
This position leads to Foucault’s declaration that, conceptually speaking, man
came into being during the modern era and is a product of the modern
humanistic episteme. That is, man’s understanding of himself is constructed by
the manner in which knowledge is arranged. Foucault advances this argument in
252
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his conclusion to The Order of Things: “As the archaeology of our thought easily
shows, man is an invention of recent date.”254 With this insight comes the notion
that the knowledge comprising our present conceptualization of man will
inevitably reorder itself over time. When this reordering occurs, the modern
understanding of man will be replaced by a new episteme: “If those
arrangements were to disappear as they appeared, if some event of which we
can at the moment do no more than sense the possibility—were to cause them to
crumble … then one can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face
drawn in sand at the edge of the sea.”255
Foucault arrives at this conclusion based on his assessment of modern
reflexive thought. Modern thought adheres to Kant’s transcendentalism idealism,
or the notion that humans cannot possess objective knowledge. This limitation
requires the subject to actively think about empirical observations, thus making
cognition possible. According to Foucault, empirical knowledge “provides a
foundation for the limited character of knowledge as their negative correlation;
and, inversely, the limits of knowledge provide a positive foundation for the
possibility of knowing, though in an experience that is always limited.”256 As
previously established, transcendental idealism places humans at the center of
the subject/object division. Within the social sciences, humans act as both the
observer and the observed: “man appears in his ambiguous position as an object
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of knowledge and as a subject that knows: enslaved sovereign, observed
spectator.”257 In other words, humans simultaneously organize and seek to
understand the empirical reality which surrounds and comprises them. Dreyfus
and Rabinow offer this succinct explanation of modern thought: “Modernity
begins with the incredible and ultimately unworkable idea of a being who is
sovereign precisely by virtue of being enslaved, a being whose very finitude
allows him to take the place of God.”258
While Foucault agrees with the Kantian proposal that humans function as
both object and subject, he rejects the notion that man’s cognitive limitations
grant him access to some form of endless cognitive freedom in representing
objects. Foucault breaks with Kant by maintaining that man’s ability to represent
himself as empirical knowledge renders the process of representation itself
unrepresentable. What this entails is that man, as sovereign subject, observes
and represents empirical truth regarding himself through discourses—the social
sciences—yet he cannot know how the subject/object interaction created or
influenced the circumstances which made the production of this knowledge
possible. On these points, Dreyfus and Rabinow offer the elucidation that “man is
totally involved with, and his understanding is obscured by, the very objects he
seeks to know.”259 Foucault holds that humanistic thought has yet to demonstrate
how the cognitive limitations proposed by transcendental idealism allow for the
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possibility of knowledge. Without this foundation, humanistic thought cannot
claim that man is able to accurately represent empirical reality. Foucault refers to
this impasse as the analytic of finitude. Dreyfus and Rabinow summarize these
points:
[Foucault] seeks to show that with man’s attempt to fully affirm his finitude
and at the same time to completely deny it, discourse sets up a space in
which the analytic of finitude, doomed from the start, twists through a
series of futile strategies. Each new attempt will have to claim an identity
and a difference between finitude as limitation and finitude as source of
all facts, between the positive and the fundamental.260

The analytic of finitude describes humanistic thought’s unsuccessful
efforts to make transcendental idealism workable as the modern
conceptualization of man. Dreyfus and Rabinow explain these efforts as three
strategies for “uniting the positive and the fundamental.”261 Foucault argues that
the analytic of finitude demonstrates—through a sequence of epistemological
dichotomies, or doubles—the irreconcilability between man’s limited empirical
knowledge and knowledge’s conditions of possibility. Knowledge’s conditions of
possibility are the linguistic frameworks that determine what can be represented
in a given era. The doubles describe strategies for representing empirical reality
through language. Language attempts to represent the empirical by seeking its
transcendental origins. This effort ultimately fails when language becomes
caught in a self-referential impasse. As Dreyfus and Rabinow argue, the doubles
arise “when language loses its transparency, and so loses touch with its
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beginnings.”262 The doubles include: the empirical and the transcendental, the
cogito and unthought, and the retreat and return of the origin.
As one might infer from its title, the empirical/transcendental double refers
to the conflicting view of human nature as posited by the subject/object division.
This and each subsequent double revolve around the following central paradox:
that the idea of man as a transcendental subject (defined as such by his
possession of free will that operates outside of the empirical laws that surround
him) contradicts the idea of man as an object acting in accordance with those
empirical laws. The first double, then, explores humanistic thought’s accounts of
how man can have objective knowledge while existing in this unstable state.
Foucault argues that these accounts are marred by circular reasoning. Man’s
limited empirical knowledge functions as a prerequisite for the existence of
knowledge in itself—hence Foucault’s description of man:
If man is indeed, in the world, the locus of an empirico-transcendental
doublet, if he is that paradoxical figure in which the empirical contents of
knowledge necessarily release, of themselves, the conditions that have
made them possible, then man cannot posit himself in the immediate and
sovereign transparency of a cogito; nor, on the other hand, can he inhabit
the objective inertia of something that, by rights, does not and never can
lead to self-consciousness.263

In Foucault’s narrative, humanistic thought has attempted to resolve the
above contradiction by grounding knowledge in the objective truth in itself
promised by transcendental and empirical viewpoints. Both of these reductionist
positions suffer from epistemological limitations and consequently fail to bypass
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the empirical/transcendental double. Accordingly, humanistic thought searches
for a “locus of a discourse,” or an objective, unified social theory “whose tension
would keep separate the empirical and the transcendental, while being directed
at both.”264 This unified discourse must avoid subordinating the transcendental to
the empirical or visa-versa. In Foucault’s words, a unified discourse would “make
it possible to analyze man as a subject, that is, as a locus of knowledge which
has been empirically acquired but referred back as closely as possible to what
make it possible, as a pure form immediately present to those contents.”265
Modern humanistic thought has not produced this unified discourse, thus the
empirical/transcendental double remains unresolved.
The cogito/unthought double outlines the limitations of humanistic
thought’s next strategy: reflexive knowledge. Reflexive knowledge—exemplified
by Descartes’ cogito—holds that truth in itself and morality can be ascertained
through empirical observation and reflection. The modern cogito (or reflexive
knowledge) must account for the interaction between subject and object,
however, meaning that it cannot yield truth in itself. It follows that under the
modern cogito, explanations regarding human behavior and resultant systems of
morality lack transcendental grounding. This is what Foucault means when he
argues “the question is no longer: How can experience of nature give rise to
necessary judgments?”266 The modern cogito can only clarify the positive factors
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comprising man, which should yield some degree of truth regarding man’s being.
Foucault accordingly attributes a new question to the modern cogito: “How can
man think what he does not think, inhabit as though by a mute occupation
something that eludes him, animate with a kind of frozen movement that figure of
himself that takes the form of a stubborn exteriority?”267 That is, how can man
reflect on an objective truth that determines him, yet he does not know?
As we have seen, the interaction between subject and object entails that
man is continuously influencing reality through the possession of his knowledge
thereof. The inverse is also true; reality influences and determines man. Foucault
observes that thought “should be both knowledge and a modification of what it
knows, reflection and a transformation of the mode of being of that on which it
reflects.”268 The very act of knowing influences man and consequently the reality
his knowledge represents: “Whatever [knowledge] touches it immediately causes
to move.”269 This logic can be applied to the known and unknown—to conscious
and unconscious thought. The modern cogito’s task, therefore, involves clarifying
unthought, or the empirical factors that determine man, yet remain unknown to
him. In Foucault’s words, the modern cogito seeks “a clear philosophical
awareness of that whole realm of unaccounted-for experiences in which man
does not recognize himself.”270
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The modern cogito attempts to salvage man’s status as a transcendental,
meaning-giving subject through the positive limitations associated with
unthought. By representing the unconscious positive factors surrounding man,
the unthought constitutes man’s positive limitations—the same limitations posited
by transcendental idealism. Because unthought is a limitation, it is also the object
of empirical observation and resultant objective thought. Man operates as a
subject by empirically observing himself as an object. Once observed and
interpreted, unthought becomes objective knowledge. Unthought should reveal
some liberating aspect of man’s being that is transcendental in that it operates
outside of the laws determining empirical reality. Thus, man’s transcendental
nature originates from unthought (as opposed to the truth in itself promised by
the classical cogito). In this way, unthought makes thought and meaningful action
possible. Yet Foucault argues that the modern cogito achieves the opposite: the
modern cogito inadvertently denies the transcendental nature of man’s thought
and actions.
It seems obvious enough that, from the moment when man first
constituted himself as a positive figure in the field of knowledge, the old
privilege of reflexive knowledge, of thought thinking itself, could not but
disappear; but that it became possible, by this very fact, an objective form
of thought to investigate man in his entirety—at the risk of discovering
what could never be reached by his refection or even by his
consciousness: dim mechanisms, faceless determinations, a whole
landscape of shadow that has been termed, directly or indirectly, the
unconscious.271

As this passage states, thought—in the context of the modern cogito—is
dangerous. The act of thinking influences knowledge, thus thought will inevitably
271
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alter itself in unknown ways as it produces reflexive knowledge. In other words,
thought constantly creates its own blind spot, or unthought, by revealing what
man does not know about himself—the unconscious empirical factors that
determine him as an object. This is what Foucault means when he claims that
the modern cogito “is the constantly renewed interrogation as to how thought can
reside elsewhere than here, and yet so very close to itself; how can it be in the
forms of non-thinking. The modern cogito does not reduce the whole being of
things to thought without ramifying the being of thought right down to the inert
network of what does not think.”272
We are now in a position to describe to dilemma comprising the
cogito/unthought double. Unthought determines man, thus contradicting his
status as a sovereign subject. Clarifying the unconscious factors surrounding
man would objectify all actions. To objectively know why one acts as one does—
to know the positive machinations that drive an action—is tantamount to denying
that the choices preceding one’s actions operate outside of empirical laws.
Hence, the quest for self-understanding is fated to undermine itself when one
discovers that one’s conscious choices are determined and therefore
meaningless. This is to paraphrase Dreyfus and Rabinow’s astute interpretation:
“As Sartre recognized, whoever achieves total clarity about himself and society
would, indeed, be a sovereign chooser, but a sovereign that no longer had any
reasons for his choice. According to the logic of this view we are either objects
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driven by unclear compulsions or lucid subjects who can only act arbitrarily.”273 In
order to avoid this nihilistic conclusion, man must further interpret the unthought
surrounding himself in the hope of finding some form of transcendental liberation
that has yet to be conceptualized. As we have seen, this effort will only reveal
more unthought. Dreyfus and Rabinow accurately describe Foucault’s version of
the modern cogito as “the Sisyphus-like task of clarifying the background as an
infinite set of beliefs each of which itself only makes sense against a further
background.”274
Unsurprisingly, Foucault rejects the modern cogito as a means to achieve
self-understanding within the logic put forth by transcendental idealism. In
Foucault’s words, if one accepts man’s being as it is described by the
empirical/transcendental double, then “man cannot posit himself in the immediate
and sovereign transparency of a cogito; nor, on the other hand, can he inhabit
the objective inertia of something that, by rights, does not and never can lead to
self-consciousness.”275 Thus, the modern cogito cannot reconcile the
transcendental with the empirical.
The retreat and return of the origin double involves the hermeneutic
analysis of man’s history. Humanistic thought makes yet another attempt to
merge the empirical with the transcendental by tracing the history of
representations in order to uncover the origin of knowledge. Here (and in the
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previous doubles) man’s positive limitations manifest themselves in language.
The retreat and return of the origin double describes humanistic thought’s
analysis of language through history. Foucault describes this strategy as follows:
“to return to the origin was to place oneself once more as near as possible to the
mere duplication of representation. Finally, the origin of knowledge was sought
within this pure sequence of representations.”276 In other words, a historical study
of language should reveal the origin of representations, or the point at which
language most closely represents empirical reality.
As with the previous strategies, the historical study of language
encounters a tautological impasse; namely, man constructs a historical narrative
regarding himself, yet he is also a product of history. Man preexists his
knowledge, but he can only seek the origin of his knowledge within the
conceptual limits of his present knowledge. There is always a disconnect, then,
between the origin that preexists man’s knowledge thereof and the knowledge
and social practices that determine man in any given era. In the context of
language, the origin “must be sought for in that fold where man … composes into
sentences which have never before been spoken (even though generation after
generation has repeated them) words that are older than all memory.”277 Clearly,
this strategy is caught in its own circular reasoning: man must conceptualize his
origin using knowledge determined by that origin. This is what Foucault means
when he states: “It is always against a background of the already begun that man
276
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is able to reflect on what may serve for him as origin.”278 Foucault argues that this
circularity prevents man from having an identifiable origin:
Paradoxically, the original, in man, does not herald the time of his birth, or
the most ancient kernel of his experience: it links him to that which does
not have the same time as himself; it links him to that which does not
have the same time as himself; and it sets free in him everything that is
not contemporaneous with him; it indicates ceaselessly, and in an everrenewed proliferation, that things began long before him, and that for this
very reason, and since his experience is wholly constituted and limited by
things, no one can ever assign him an origin.279

Man cannot conceptualize his origin without reference to present
knowledge that is determined by that origin. At this juncture, the origin of
knowledge must be found at an earlier point in time—one where the origin has
not been influenced by man’s representations thereof. As we have seen, it is
impossible to objectively identify the origin of knowledge. Foucault argues that
this impossibility “signifies that the origin of things is always pushed further back,
since it goes back to a calendar upon which man does not figure.”280
Efforts to find the source of knowledge in the future are similarly doomed.
Man can conceptualize the future much in the same way as he conceptualizes
the past, yet in both cases this act can only replicate man’s representations of a
hypothetical point in time in which he does not empirically exist. Moreover, man
is the source of knowledge (and, it follows, of time) but he must represent a
temporal point where he has yet to formulate representations. Of this temporal
instability, Foucault concludes “man is cut off from the origin that would make him
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contemporaneous with his own existence: amid all the things that are born in
time and no doubt die in time, he, cut off from all origin, is already there.”281
The three doubles outline modern thought’s empirical and linguistic
limitations. These limitations result in an inability to situate man’s transcendental
nature with his empirical knowledge of himself. In Foucault’s words: “All these
contents that his knowledge reveals to him as exterior to himself, and older than
his own birth, anticipate him, overhang him with all their solidity, and traverse him
as though he were merely an object of nature. … Man’s finitude is heralded—and
imperiously so—in the positivity of knowledge.”282 The archaeological method
identifies and is intended to bypass the doubles. If successful, the archaeological
method would uncover what the subject/object division obscures; the
unconscious rules governing language and, consequently, knowledge’s
conditions of possibility. As one might surmise from Foucault’s distancing himself
from archaeology later in his career, the method is does not achieve this.
According to Dreyfus and Rabinow, to the archaeologist, “all serious
discourse is subject to rules which determine the production of objects, subjects,
and so forth—rules which archaeological discourse claims to discover and
describe. The archeologist, indeed, aspires to contribute to a general theory of
such production.” As previously mentioned, the archaeological method
accomplishes this by distancing itself from truth and meaning. Both the subject
and the object are, to the archaeologist, variables to be described only in
281
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themselves and as positive existences—that is, archaeology does not attribute
any external meaning to objects, nor does it assume its observations are true.
Dreyfus and Rabinow offer this elaboration:
By bracketing truth and seriousness the archeologist claims to operate on
a level that is free of the influences of both the theories and practices he
studies. Whatever intelligibility he finds, he finds among objects with
which he is in no way involved. Unlike the theories he studies, his theory
slips free of institutional, theoretical, and even epistemological bonds.283

Archaeology’s objectivity also proves to be one of its weaknesses,
however. As we have seen, the distanciation from truth and meaning allows the
archaeologist to assume an objective, detached position in examining discursive
formations. Yet the archaeologist exists within and was produced by his or her
own object of study: society. Archaeology, therefore, relies on the same
circularity between subject and object as it identifies in the analytic of finitude.
This obviously problematizes the method’s ability to simultaneously remain
objective and make claims to truth. For instance, in adhering to the
archaeological method, Foucault must acknowledge that he is a product of the
society to which discursive formations apply, and is therefore not exempt from
their influence. Taking these issues into account, Dreyfus and Rabinow render
this (doubtlessly accurate) final verdict:
It is no surprise that archaeology, by thus affirming and denying the
finitude of its own discourse, turns out to be as unstable as its precursors.
In this light the promised post-modern science of human beings, far from
being free of the intrinsic instabilities of modern thought, shows itself to be
a new variation on an old Kantian theme.284
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The archaeological method is Foucault’s attempt to provide an objective
and relativistic method of analysis. However, this method fails to escape the
circularity posed by Kant’s subject/object division. Foucault’s next method,
genealogy, reflects his resigning himself to the fact that our present thought
cannot escape this circularity. The subject/object division is, conceptually
speaking, an unbreakable circle. Thus, Foucault develops genealogy to be a
viable method of analysis that can operate within the subject/object division.
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CHAPTER FOUR
GENEALOGY

Nietzsche and the Genealogical Method
Foucault concludes the first chapter of Discipline and Punish, titled “The
Body of the Condemned,” with the claim that he is writing “a history of the
present.”285 This statement reflects Foucault’s intent to analyze elements of
contemporary Western society by detailing their historical origins. It is also the
purpose, however abridged, behind Foucault’s genealogical method. Like
archaeology, genealogy is a method for analyzing human activity. Dreyfus and
Rabinow accurately describe genealogy as “a method of diagnosing and
grasping the significance of social practices from within them.”286 Genealogy
differentiates itself from archaeology by contextualizing its objects using a
multilayered system of power relations, rather than through discursive rules.
Further, genealogy analyzes the network of power relations that comprise the
subject while by bracketing out the subject itself, as well as truth, objectivity and
meaning. Above all, Foucault’s new method is a positivistic and unbridled form of
historical relativism; for the genealogist, the only truth is the material outcome
resulting from individuals and groups imposing their will on others. And even this
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does not reflect objective truth. Rather, it is a general assumption driving what
the genealogist must acknowledge to be a narrative of his or her own production,
and of which he or she is most certainly also a product.
Before defining genealogy itself, we must first examine this new method’s
relation to archaeology. Foucault has not replaced the archaeological method
with genealogy; rather, as Dreyfus and Rabinow note, “Foucault straightforwardly
reverses the priority of genealogy and archaeology. Genealogy now takes
precedence over archaeology.”287 That is, Foucault retains aspects of the
archaeological method alongside the genealogical. Hence Dreyfus and
Rabinow’s argument that, with regard to archaeology’s presence within
genealogy, “Foucault abandons only the attempt to work out a theory of rulegoverned systems of discursive practices.” Foucault discards archaeology’s
objective to construct a general theory of discourse-production. Instead,
archaeology serves genealogy primarily as a “method of isolating discourse
objects.”288 Both methods assume that the theories held by their common object
of study, the social sciences, are meaningless in themselves. Yet genealogy
seeks intelligibility for these theories not in a system of rules governing discursive
practices—as was the case with archaeology—but in the context of “a larger set
of organized and organizing practices in whose spread the human sciences play
a crucial role.”289 There is little reason to doubt Dreyfus and Rabinow’s
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interpretation—though it might be amended that rather than a matter of
subordination, archaeology’s bracketing out meaning and truth has been carried
over to genealogy.
For the genealogist, archaeology remains a means to distance subject
from object—or “a relative degree of detachment from the practices and theories
of the human sciences”—as Foucault continues to regard his object of study as
having no intrinsic truth or meaning.290 Taken to its logical conclusion, this
archaeological distanciation from truth and meaning leads to the assumption that
history itself has no intelligibility. As Dreyfus and Rabinow argue, “the
archaeologist no longer takes the teleology of history seriously, and thus no
longer presupposes historical continuity.”291 This opposition to traditional history
resurfaces as a core assumption in the genealogical method, as evidenced by
Foucault’s statement in the introduction to his essay, “Nietzsche, Genealogy,
History”: “Genealogy does not oppose itself to history as the lofty and profound
gaze of the philosopher might compare to the molelike perspective of the scholar;
on the contrary, it rejects the metahistorical deployment of ideal significations and
indefinite teleologies. It opposes itself to the search for ‘origins.’”292
First published in 1971, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” contextualizes
Foucault’s genealogical method alongside his reading of Friedrich Nietzsche’s
works. It bears mention that Foucault was greatly influenced by Nietzsche, such
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that, as Dreyfus and Rabinow argue, “all of the seeds of Foucault’s work of the
1970s can be found in this discussion of Nietzsche.”293 Furthermore, Miller refers
to Nietzsche as “[Foucault’s] avowed model and precursor.”294 Nietzsche’s sway
over Foucault is apparent even in genealogy itself, as this method traces it
origins back to Nietzsche’s iconic text, On the Genealogy of Morals: “[Foucault]
uses Nietzsche’s genealogy as a starting point for developing a method that
would allow him to thematize the relationship between truth, theory, and values
and the social institutions and practices in which they emerge.”295 In adopting the
genealogical method, Foucault also borrows Nietzsche’s views on history and
power relations.
Foucault and Nietzsche’s genealogy emphasizes contextual relationships
between social elements in history. The method, therefore, requires a broad,
flexible view of history in order to accommodate a multitude of contexts. It is for
this reason that Foucault so fervently rejects the aforementioned traditional
history, or the suprahistorical perspective. This perspective, in short, is what
genealogy attempts to dismantle. In this regard, genealogy is anti-Hegelian, as
the suprahistorical perspective is analogous to Absolute Idealism, a worldview
developed by the German philosopher, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (17701831). The suprahistorical perspective assumes itself to be an objective view
capable of identifying in history a logical progression of events whose alignment
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renders the present as inevitable. In Foucault’s words, the suprahistorical
perspective is “a history whose function is to compose the finally reduced
diversity of time into a totality fully closed upon itself; a history that always
encourages subjective recognitions and attributes a form of reconciliation to all
the displacements of the past; a history whose perspective on all that precedes it
implies the end of time, a completed development.”296 The complexity of this
definition necessitates further elaboration.
To begin, the suprahistorical perspective relies on metaphysics—or
causality—to justify its narrative; some unseen force must drive history forward
toward a specific and presumably desirable conclusion. It follows that past,
present and future events occur for the purpose of fulfilling this outcome.
Traditional historians must, therefore, “confirm our belief that the present rests
upon profound intentions and immutable necessities.”297 Thus, the suprahistorical
perspective posits predetermined origins for all things, and it is the traditional
historian’s task to uncover these origins. Foucault criticizes this search for origins
for its need for metaphysical backing. In this regard, the search for origins
constitutes “an attempt to capture the exact essence of things, their purest
possibilities, and their carefully protected identities; because this search assumes
the existence of immobile forms that precede the external world of accident and
succession.”298 The term “immobile forms” refers to the unseen metaphysical
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force driving history. Hence, the search for origins involves uncovering absolute
metaphysical truths in history. Taking Foucault’s definition into account, the
suprahistorical perspective is a narrow and inflexible view, and is therefore the
methodological opposite of genealogy.
In its adherence to causal assumptions, the suprahistorical perspective
makes a claim to truth. Here Foucault adheres to his tradition of doubting such
claims, stating, “once the historical sense is mastered by a suprahistorical
perspective, metaphysics can bend it to its own purpose, and, by aligning it to the
demands of objective science, it can impose its own ‘Egyptianism.’”299 The term
“Egyptianism” first appears in Nietzsche’s Twilight of the Idols to denote the
death and mummification of an ahistorical subject in philosophy. Nietzsche
argues that to “de-historicize” a subject is not to view it objectively, but rather to
make it into a “concept-mumm[y],” or a fragment of immortalized data that no
longer represents the subject as it exists in reality. Foucault borrows this term in
order to emphasize how, by virtue of its objectivism, its causal assumptions, and
its pursuit of origins, the suprahistorical perspective comprises a predestined,
inaccurate, and dead history. In this regard, Nietzsche’s description of
metaphysical analysis—“when these honorable idolators of concepts worship
something, they kill it and stuff it”—is apt, as it conjures an image of a
taxidermist’s specimen, neatly displayed on a mantel.300 In viewing this

299

Ibid., 87.
Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, Cited in The Portable Nietzsche, eds. and trans.
Walter Kaufmann (New York: Penguin Books, 1982), 479.

300

124

specimen, one sees an animal posed in some life-like fashion, yet the scene
reflects only the taxidermist’s efforts and intentions; one cannot gain an
understanding of how the animal lived from its preserved corpse. Likewise,
Foucault argues that one cannot gain an understanding of history by adhering to
the suprahistorical perspective, as this view presupposes a system of
metaphysics that attributes a causal meaning to events. This meaning is neither
timeless nor universal; rather, it comprises the values and biases of the historian
and his or her society, yet the historian’s claim to objectivity obscures this
subjectivity. Thus, in the same way that the taxidermist positions and displays a
specimen, and in the same way that medicine’s discursive practices influence its
supposedly objective discourses, the traditional historian imposes subjective
meaning onto his object of study.
This explains why Foucault concludes his 1969 essay, “What Is an
Author?” with the bold question: “What difference does it make who is
speaking?”301 While Foucault’s interpretation of the suprahistorical perspective
can be considered a critique of the notion of pure objectivity, Foucault’s
genealogical method is also a critique of the subject. In “What Is an Author?”
Foucault argues that the knowing subject and producer of knowledge (as
exemplified by the author) becomes nothing in itself after producing knowledge.
That is, society quietly displaces the meaning and intent embodied by the subject
with its own meaning and intent: “it is a matter of depriving the subject (or its
301
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substitute) of its role as originator, and of analyzing the subject as a variable and
complex function of discourse.”302 In this way, society produces its own subject.
This artificial subject varies according to a multitude of contextual factors. The
genealogist brackets out—or does not consider—the original subject from its
analysis so as to examine these factors that make up the artificial subject.
Continuing with the taxidermy metaphor, the original subject is a corpse.
Foucault describes the subject’s role in genealogy in the interview, “Truth and
Power”:
One has to dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject
itself, that’s to say, to arrive at an analysis which can account for the
constitution of the subject within a historical framework. And this is what I
would call genealogy, that is, a form of history which can account for the
constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects, etc., without
having to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in
relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout
the course of history.303

As previously mentioned, subjective analysis emerges, strangely enough,
from the traditional historian’s attempts to remain objective. In this effort “[the
historian] is divided against himself: forced to silence his preferences and
overcome his distaste, to blur his own perspective and replace it with the fiction
of a universal geometry, to mimic death in order to enter the kingdom of the
dead, to adopt a faceless anonymity.”304 That is, adopting an objective
perspective and ignoring one’s own biases is tantamount to restating a common
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consensus, or citing information from a historical corpus of knowledge. However,
and for reasons outlined above, this corpus of knowledge is subjective. This
subjectivity can be attributed to the fact that a multitude of inconstant factors—
Foucault cites “eating habits or moral law” as examples—form and influence the
historian’s biases, rendering an objective viewpoint unattainable.305 Thus,
subjective factors lead the historian to venerate and vilify individuals or countries,
and to locate in their origins a narrative that reinforces the historian’s biases. This
masked subjectivity serves one purpose: to establish historically rooted,
predetermined identities for the historian and his or her readers. The motivation
behind the suprahistorical perspective, then, is the desire for the self to be
grounded in inevitability: “The historian offers this confused and anonymous
European, who no longer knows himself or what name he should adopt, the
possibility of alternate identities, more individualized and substantial than his
own.”306 In contrast, the genealogist seeks to confront these subjective
motivations and avoid the grounding offered by traditional history.
The reasons Foucault gives for rejecting the suprahistorical perspective
can be viewed as foundations for constructing an explanation of Foucault’s
genealogical method. As a genealogist, Foucault writes effective history, or
wirkliche Historie. Effective history is the genealogical method’s alternative to
traditional history. Where traditional history presents a static, romanticized
narrative that depicts the present and the self as necessities, effective history
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“deprives the self of the reassuring stability of life and nature, and it will not
permit itself to be transported by a voiceless obstinacy toward a millennial
ending.”307 Effective history therefore discards the comforting teleological notion
that history is an intricate progression toward some desirable end. Indeed,
Foucault tasks the effective historian with actively destroying the beliefs
surrounding traditional history: “The traditional devices for constructing a
comprehensive view of history and for retracing the past as a patient and
continuous development must be systematically dismantled.”308 Thus, the
genealogist writes the history of “disparity,” rather than continuity.309 Events are
not connected by the fulfillment of meaning or values, and they do not reflect a
progression toward some end that can be uncovered through interpretation.
Dreyfus and Rabinow make the compelling point that Foucault’s distrust of
interpretation derives from the endless circularity and constructed nature of the
act: “The more one interprets the more one finds not the fixed meaning of a text,
or of the world, but only other interpretations. These interpretations have been
created and imposed by other people, not by the nature of things. In this
discovery of groundlessness the inherent arbitrariness of interpretation is
revealed.”310 Foucault’s reason for distrusting interpretations is analogous to his
critique of hermeneutics.
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Yet genealogy is not hostile toward interpretation. On the contrary, the
genealogist operates under the assumption that all claims are interpretations.
This is due to the fact that genealogy rejects claims to transcendental truth,
meaning, and their supporting metaphysical frameworks. Foucault writes: “if the
genealogist refuses to extend his faith in metaphysics, if he listens to history, he
finds that there is … not a timeless and essential secret [behind things], but the
secret that they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a
piecemeal fashion from alien forms.”311 The genealogist, therefore, regards
history as a series of accidents. Consequently, Foucault argues that the
genealogist’s task is as follows:
To follow the complex course of descent is to maintain passing events in
their proper dispersion; it is to identify the accidents, the minute
deviations—or conversely, the complete reversals—the errors, the false
appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that
continue to exist and have value for us; it is to discover that truth or being
does not lie at the root of what we know and what we are, but the
exteriority of accidents.312

Thus, the effective historian searches for meaningless disparities, and
must therefore acknowledge “the singular randomness of events.”313 In referring
to events as random, Foucault does not mean that history progresses as it does
due to chance or probability; rather, events occur in the context of conflicting
wills: “Chance is not simply the drawing of lots, but raising the stakes in every
attempt to master chance through the will to power, and giving rise to the risk of
an even greater chance. The world we know is … a profusion of entangled
311

Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 78.
Ibid., 81.
313
Ibid., 88.
312

129

events.”314 Here Foucault portrays the randomness of events as the
amalgamation of interconnected wills, each trying to subjugate others. Thus,
while effective history is “without constants,” it assumes that events are the
manifestations of the human desire for domination.315 To clarify, this desire is not
an abstract force, but an observable phenomenon. Foucault offers this
description of power relations in history:
This relationship of domination is no more a “relationship” than the place
where it occurs is a place; and, precisely for this reason, it is fixed,
throughout its history, in rituals, in meticulous procedures that impose
rights and obligations. It establishes marks of its power and engraves
memories on things and even bodies. It makes itself accountable for
debts and gives rise to the universe of rules, which is by no means
designed to temper violence, but rather to satisfy it.316

Herein lies the broad flexibility of the genealogical method: it regards all
human activity as a haphazard sequence of disparate power struggles, thus
freeing the effective historian from the endless task of finding a common thread
of meaning in events—indeed, the meaning behind laws is power. For instance,
the rules governing human society owe their existence to this struggle for
domination. Echoing Nietzsche’s thesis in On the Genealogy of Morals, Foucault
argues that rules—however righteous their stated intentions may be—do not
possess any intrinsic value; rules are only power struggles acted upon in a legal
context. Rules and laws are the result of powerful groups imposing their will upon
weaker groups: “The successes of history belong to those who are capable of
seizing these rules, to replace those who had used them, to disguise themselves
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so as to pervert them, invert their meaning, and redirect them against those who
had initially imposed them.”317 While power struggles play a primary role in
driving historical events, the genealogist refuses to attribute value to these
events. Moreover, genealogy avoids any claims to truth. Owing to this relativist
element, Dreyfus and Rabinow argue against the seriousness of genealogy,
stating: “It finds recurrences and play where others found progress and
seriousness. … genealogy avoids the search for depth. Instead, it seeks the
surfaces of events, small details, minor shifts, and subtle contours.”318 This
playful distanciation from truth allows the genealogist to avoid the archaeological
method’s impasse of claiming to be objective while simultaneously being
produced by one’s object of study: “Foucault’s account of his own position with
regard to the human sciences also undergoes a radical transformation. The
investigator is no longer the detached spectator of mute-discourse monuments.
Foucault realizes and thematizes the fact that he himself—like any other
investigator—is involved in, and to a large extent produced by, the social
practices he is studying.”319 In this regard, the genealogist admits to being both
subject and object in his or her analysis.
While this interaction between subject and object could be construed as a
regression to subjectivism, Dreyfus and Rabinow argue that Foucault is “writing
the genealogy of the modern subject.”320 That is, the genealogical method
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focuses on power’s influence over the modern individual, even in the context of a
historical analysis—hence Foucault’s assertion that he is writing the history of the
present. Dreyfus and Rabinow offer this cogent explanation of genealogy’s
historiography as it pertains to the present:
[Genealogy] explicitly and self-reflectively begins with a diagnosis of the
current situation. There is an unequivocal and unabashed contemporary
orientation. The historian locates the acute manifestations of a particular
“meticulous ritual of power” or “political technologies of the body” to see
where it arose, took shape, gained importance, and so on. … [The
historian] is isolating the central components of political technology today
and tracing them back in time.321

To summarize, the genealogical method revolves around searching for the
positive manifestations of conceptual shifts in history. In Foucault’s words: “The
role of genealogy is to record … the history of morals, ideals, and metaphysical
concepts, the history of the concept of liberty or of the ascetic life; as they stand
for the emergence of different interpretations, they must be made to appear as
events on the stage of historical process.”322 The genealogist avoids claims to
truth and does not assume there to be an underlying meaning behind concepts
beyond their manifestations through events. During his archaeological phase,
Foucault attempted to overcome Kant’s subject/object division by objectively
analyzing discursive rules. As we have seen, this method was built on internal
contradictions. Foucault no longer pursues objectivity in his analysis; the analyst
is simply another component in the cycle between object and subject in the

321

Ibid., 119. Dreyfus and Rabinow are describing genealogy as it is used in The History of
Sexuality: Volume 1.
322
Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 86.

132

production of truth. While genealogy analyzes power’s relationship to the modern
subject, it discards all claims to truth and validity.

Power and the Soul
In Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison, Foucault explores
European and American penal reforms and their societal consequences from the
mid-eighteenth century through the present. He finds that, over time, the reforms
supplanted chaotic public displays of torture and executions with a regimented
system of incarceration. Although Discipline and Punish presents itself as a
history of the modern prison system, it also encompasses an analysis of power
relations between society and the individual. Furthermore, Foucault provides a
genealogical analysis of the individualization of knowledge. In Discipline and
Punish, Foucault develops many of the concepts introduced in his earlier works.
It is not surprising that the 1975 text is widely considered—even by Foucault
himself—to be his seminal work. As Miller argues, “in the author’s own eyes, it
was the capstone of his career.”323
To summarize the key theories put forth in Discipline and Punish: the term
disciplinary power refers to the strategies and technologies employed by power
in order to mold humans into useful, obedient and docile individuals. In spite of
the negative connotations surrounding the terms discipline and power, Foucault
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maintains that power does not exist solely to constrain the individual. Similarly,
discipline is not simply the implied threat and implementation of punishment.
Rather, power produces the individual through discipline. Toward this end,
disciplinary power functions by regimenting individuals’ lives through normalizing
judgment, examination, and hierarchical observation. These disciplinary
technologies collect data on populations for purposes of individuating all
instances of deviancy, thus creating a corpus of knowledge surrounding the
individual and, consequently, creating the individual. Moreover, power develops
new technologies in order to ensure the development of docile bodies based on
this corpus of knowledge. In this regard, power simultaneously produces and is
controlled by knowledge of the individual—the two forces share a reciprocal
relationship. Foucault concludes that this individualized knowledge forms the
modern individual’s soul, or the visible effect of power’s influence on individuals
as manifested through their behavior. Thus, power is exercised over the soul,
rather than the body.
Foucault outlines his definition of power and its relationship to the
individual in his introductory chapter, “The Body of the Condemned.” Power, to
Foucault, should be conceptualized “not as a property, but as a strategy.” That is,
power is not a commodity that can be harnessed and whose focal point is easily
identifiable; rather, power is a product of human agency. Power is, therefore, an
abstract operation that “is exercised rather than possessed.” To rephrase these
points: power is nothing in itself—it has no nature or essence which one might
134

understand or harness—yet power is real insofar as it is the positive
consequence of power struggles. Hence Foucault’s statement: “[power] is not the
‘privilege’, acquired or preserved, of the dominant class, but the overall effect of
its strategic positions.”324
Power’s influence can be defined as the cumulative effect of disparate,
multidirectional, and acephalous operations in society. Given this definition, it is
hardly surprising that one sees in Foucault’s analysis of power an
unapologetically genealogical perspective—a view that posits an unstable
network of conflict-based relationships as its only constant. Foucault elaborates:
“[Power’s] effects of domination are attributed not to ‘appropriation’, but to
dispositions, manoeuvres, tactics, techniques, functionings; that one should
decipher in it a network of relations, constantly in tension, in activity, rather than a
privilege that one might possess.”325 Accordingly, in his 1976 examination of
sexuality, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction, Foucault argues
that power should be analyzed, “as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in
the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization.”326
Thus, an analysis of power entails the cataloguing of unequal force relations in a
society. Further, power has no centralized point of operation. In contrast with his
earlier works, Foucault now de-emphasizes the importance of state and social
institutions in exerting power’s influence, opting instead to examine power
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without recourse to localization or levels of society. Foucault argues that, “power
cannot be localized in a particular type of institution or state apparatus.”
Certainly, states and institutions may wield or apply power, yet “in its
mechanisms and its effects, [power] is situated at a quite different level.”327
Foucault argues for the “omnipresence of power” in The History of
Sexuality, Volume 1, “not because it has the privilege of consolidating everything
under its invincible unity, but because it is produced from one moment to the
next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another. Power is
everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from
everywhere.” In this view, power, being an effect of force relations, is produced in
every instance of conflict in a society. Given the genealogical emphasis on power
struggles as the driving factor behind events, it follows that power is continually
produced at, interconnected with, and inseparable from every level of a given
society. “‘Power,’ insofar as it is permanent, repetitious, inert, and selfreproducing, is simply the over-all effect that emerges from all these
mobilities.”328 Although power relations between groups are by definition
unequal, power does not operate exclusively in a top-down fashion; groups with
limited influence still wield power over groups with greater influence. Thus, power
is multidirectional in its operations: “there is no binary and all-encompassing
opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of power relations, and serving as
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a general matrix—no such duality extending from the top down and reacting on
more and more limited groups to the very depths of the social body.”329
A final point on Foucault’s view of power: while power results from human
action and deliberation, it is not a cohesive strategy with a singular driving will or
goal, and its consequences are not always intentional. That is, power is
headless, yet, when dissected into the numerous interconnected force relations
of which it is composed, reveals an equal number of disparate objectives.
Foucault provides this elaboration:
Power relations are both intentional and nonsubjective. If in fact they are
intelligible, this is not because they are the effect of one instance that
“explains” them, but rather because they are imbued, through and
through, with calculation: there is no power that is exercised without a
series of aims and objectives. But this does not mean that it results from
the choice or decision of an individual subject; let us not look for the
headquarters that presides over its rationality. … the rationality of power
is characterized by tactics that are often quite explicit at the restricted
level where they are inscribed … tactics which, becoming connected to
one another, but finding their base of support and their condition
elsewhere, end by forming comprehensive systems: the logic is perfectly
clear, the aims decipherable, and yet it is often the case that no one is
there to have invented them.330

Perplexingly, Foucault credits this decentralized amalgamation of
conflicting power relations with the formation of the modern subject. More
accurately, power, operating through social institutions and scientific discourses,
constructs a corpus of individualized knowledge that defines the individual.
Foucault has already provided an archaeological account of individualized
knowledge in the context of medicine in The Birth of the Clinic. Discipline and
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Punish’s version of individualized knowledge expands upon its predecessor’s in
exploring the material relationship between knowledge and power. Toward this
end, Foucault invokes eighteenth-century French philosopher Gabriel Bonnot de
Mably’s use of the term soul. Mably’s soul is not an ethereal and eternal essence
inherent in an individual’s being, nor is it “an ideological effect.”331 Moreover,
Foucault insists that this soul is “real,” yet “non-corporal.”332 In order to
deconstruct this apparent contradiction, gravity provides a suitable analogy.
Gravity is a corporeal abstraction; it has no physical form, yet its effects can be
observed and quantified. Similarly, the soul is an abstraction with physical
consequences. Foucault argues that the soul “has a reality, it is produced
permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is
exercised on those punished—and, in a more general way, on those one
supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school,
the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest
of their lives.”333 The soul is real insofar as it is the observable effect of power’s
influence. Power creates the soul through “methods of punishment, supervision
and constraint.”334 The soul can be considered an identity that power constructs
through its machinations, codifies in a corpus of knowledge, and imposes upon
individuals. The effect of the soul, then, manifests in the behavior of individuals
who internalize this identity. Foucault describes the soul as follows:
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[The soul] is the element in which are articulated the effects of a certain
type of power and the reference of a certain type of knowledge, the
machinery by which the power relations give rise to a possible corpus of
knowledge, and knowledge extends and reinforces the effects of power.
On this reality-reference, various concepts have been constructed and
domains of analysis carved out: psyche, subjectivity, personality,
consciousness, etc.; on it have been built scientific techniques and
discourses, and the moral claims of humanism.335

Foucault regards the soul as being the product of matrices of power. As
the name implies, matrices of power constitute power’s multidirectional pull and
influence over the individual—not unlike interlocking and tangled strands of a
spider’s web all leading to and exerting pressure on a central point. Power
inscribes, through these matrices, a corpus of knowledge that defines the soul.
Thus defined, the soul assumes the aforementioned role of an identity—or a
subjective perspective: a self. Power, therefore, creates the modern subject by
imposing a perspective upon the individual. In this regard, the knowledge of the
subject precedes the individual to whom it is applied. That is, power produces,
rather than constrains, the truth surrounding the individual, and thus the
individual itself: “[Power] produces reality; it produces domains of objects and
rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him
belong to this production.”336 It bears mention that for the inverse of this proposal
to be true—that is, for the individual to precede power and all subsequent
constraints—the individual must have an origin (or a pure, essential element) for
power to act upon. In keeping with the genealogical method’s avoidance of
claims to truth and meaning, however, Foucault does not assume the individual
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to possess a hidden origin or transcendental essence for power’s artificial soul to
constrain, displace or obscure. Foucault concludes that power produces the
individual, as to argue otherwise would necessitate a claim to truth. From this it
follows that there is no “real man,” or a transcendental subject, that the analyst
might free from power’s grasp.337 Foucault puts forth this argument in the
following passage:
It is not that a real man, the object of knowledge, philosophical reflection
of technical intervention, has been substituted for the soul, the illusion of
the theologians. The man described for us, whom we are invited to free,
is already himself the effect of a subjugation much more profound than
himself. A ‘soul’ inhabits him and brings him to existence, which is itself a
factor in the mastery that power exercises over the body. The soul is the
effect and instrument of a political anatomy; the soul is the prison of the
body.338

As a point of clarification, it should be noted that Foucault does not regard
the individual—or its positive manifestations, which Foucault refers to as the
“body” in the above passage—as an exclusively passive agent. That is, human
behavior cannot be reduced to a causal reaction to external influences.
Foucault’s argument that power produces the individual, however, implies a
degree of behavioristic determinism with regard to power’s influence over the
body. “Foucault remains illusive about how malleable the human body really is,”
concede Dreyfus and Rabinow, stating that while Foucault seems to prioritize
power’s influence over the body—which precludes Sartre’s view regarding the
primacy of free will—he also “rejects the naturalistic view that the body has a
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fixed structure and fixed needs.”339 Thus, Foucault affirms neither the behaviorist
position nor any view promoting a transcendental will, presumably owing to the
fact that these positions assume the body possesses a constant element—which
constitutes a claim to truth. Having ruled out these two epistemological extremes,
Foucault instead argues that a multitude of inconstant factors form and influence
the body. Foucault expresses this view in “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”: “The
body is molded by a great many distinct regimes … Nothing in man—not even
his body—is sufficiently stable to serve as a basis for self-recognition or for
understanding other men.”340 In adhering to this view, Foucault limits his analysis
to a pragmatic examination of the strategies and mechanisms which power
employs to form and influence the individual.

The Power/Knowledge Interaction
The relationship between power and the soul coincides with their
respective definitions. In short, power forms the soul through knowledge of the
body’s functioning, and by exercising numerous disjointed pressures upon the
body based on this knowledge. Given Foucault’s definition of power, we should
not regard its influence over the soul as a conspiracy or conscious act of
repression. Instead, we should view the interaction between knowledge and
power through a genealogical lens. That is, the soul is the product of a head-less
339
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yet interconnected network of conflicting strategies. Foucault elaborates on these
points in this passage from Discipline and Punish:
This knowledge and this mastery constitute what might be called the
political technology of the body. Of course, this technology is diffuse,
rarely formulated in continuous, systematic discourse; it is often made up
of bits and pieces; it implements a disparate set of tools or methods. In
spite of the coherence of its results, it is generally no more than a
multiform instrumentation.341

Foucault is not dismissing the modern subject as the product of a random
sequence of power relations. Rather, the historical construction of the subject is
driven by the fields of discourse seeking to gain an objective understanding of
the individual. “The individual is the effect and object of a certain crossing of
power and knowledge,” argue Dreyfus and Rabinow, “his is the product of the
complex strategic developments in the field of power and the multiple
developments in the human sciences.”342 Moreover, the mutually generative
relationship between power and knowledge makes the construction of the
individual possible. Foucault articulates these points as follows:
Power produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging it because it
serves power or by applying it because it is useful); that power and
knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation
without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any
knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time
power relations.343

The relationship between knowledge and power raises the logical
implication that science, being a source of knowledge, must concordantly share a
reciprocal connection with power. According to Dreyfus and Rabinow’s
341
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interpretation of Foucault, Nietzsche and Heidegger, science’s enmeshment in
power relations means that “at any given time cultural practices determine what
will count as an object for serious investigation.” In all likelihood, Foucault would
argue that no branch of science is able to exist outside of power’s influence. Yet
Foucault tends to neglect the empirical sciences in his analyses, presumably due
to the fact that these are concerned with “relatively stable practices and objects,”
and are able to distance themselves, to an extent, from power interests.344 In
contrast, the social sciences—or their subject-oriented fields, at any rate—study
“unstable” objects, and consequently “have in fact remained intimately involved
with the micropractices of power.”345 It is for this reason that Foucault persistently
centers his analyses on the social sciences—which Dreyfus and Rabinow refer to
as “those doubtful sciences.”346 Foucault argues that the social sciences “have
their technical matrix in the petty, malicious minutiae of the disciplines and their
investigations.”347 In other words, the social sciences fashion their methodologies
based on the interests of disciplinary practices. Moreover, Foucault remains
skeptical as to the social sciences’ ability to develop a systemic and objective
methodology, as these sciences have not removed themselves from the
influence of disciplinary practices. Foucault explains the rationale underlying his
argument:
What Great Observer will produce the methodology of examination for the
human sciences? Unless, of course, such a thing is not possible. For …
344
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the examination has remained extremely close to the disciplinary power
that shaped it. It has always been and still is an intrinsic element of the
disciplines. Of course it seems to have undergone a speculative
purification by integrating itself with such sciences as psychology and
psychiatry. And, in effect, its appearance in the form of tests, interviews,
interrogations and consultations is apparently in order to rectify the
mechanisms of discipline: educational psychology is supposed to correct
the rigours of the school, just as the medical or psychiatry interview is
supposed to rectify the effects of the discipline of work. But we must not
be misled; these techniques merely refer individuals from one disciplinary
authority to another, and they reproduce, in a concentrated or formalized
form, the schema of power-knowledge proper to each discipline. … the
examination … is still caught up in disciplinary technology.348

Here Foucault also raises the critical point that the social sciences
perpetuate via self-reference the operations established in the relationship
between power and knowledge. In this regard, the social sciences illustrate the
self-replicating nature of power. Summarizing the abovementioned points, the
relationship between power and knowledge is self-perpetuating and without a
centralized strategy. Both power (in the form of discipline) and knowledge
(compiled by the social sciences) produce and are influenced by their own
corpus of knowledge, which is not an autonomous accumulation of objective
data, nor is it directly influence by the subject; rather, it is the product of power
relations. Foucault states, “it is not the activity of the subject of knowledge that
produces a corpus of knowledge, useful or resistant to power, but powerknowledge, the processes and struggles that traverse it and of which it is made
up, that determines the forms and possible domains of knowledge.”349 Thus, the
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social sciences’ claim to objectivity masks the subjective processes ingrained in
their methodology—an almost identical conclusion to the one presented in The
Birth of the Clinic, sans structural underpinnings.
Despite the subjective and decentralized nature of power, Foucault
proposes that disciplinary power is an essential development of power and
knowledge. “The categorizing and individualizing of prisoners was an essential
component for the operation of this field of power,” Dreyfus and Rabinow argue;
“this disciplinary technology could not have taken the form it had, achieved the
spread it did, or produced delinquents in the way it did, if power and knowledge
were merely external to one another.”350
In The History of Sexuality, Volume 1, Foucault pinpoints the hermeutics
of suspicion, or the search for a deep truth, as the unifying force behind this
essentiality. With regard to the study of sexuality, Foucault argues that
researchers “constructed around and apropos of sex an immense apparatus for
producing truth, even if this truth was to be masked at the last moment.”351 That
is, the scientific study of sex assumed that sex held some truth to be uncovered.
The search for objective truth pertaining to the individual results in the uniform
development of discourses, which facilitates the correlation between knowledge
and power. In Dreyfus and Rabinow’s words:
Part of the power of these interpretive [social and behavioral] sciences is
that they claim to be able to reveal the truth about our psyches, our
culture, our society—truths that can only be understood by expert
interpreters. … As long as the interpretive sciences continue to search for
350
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a deep truth, that is, to practice a hermeneutics of suspicion, as long as
they proceed on the assumption that it is the Great Interpreter who has
privileged access to meaning, while insisting that the truths they uncover
lie outside the sphere of power, these sciences seem fated to contribute
to the strategies of power. They claim a privileged externality, but they
actually are part of the deployment of power.352

Discipline and Punish
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault applies the abovementioned theories
regarding power and knowledge in order to examine the concrete “mechanism of
technology through which power is actually articulated on the body.”353
Disciplinary power is one such mechanism. Foucault defines disciplinary power
as “a type of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of
institutions, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets; it is a ‘physics’
or an ‘anatomy’ of power, a technology.”354 Rephrased slightly, discipline power
is a set of strategies, or applications of power. As discipline is a type of power,
the concepts that Foucault associates with power can also be applied to
discipline. For instance, “‘discipline’ may be identified neither with an institution
nor with an apparatus.”355 It follows that disciplinary power is also
multidirectional, self-perpetuating, and without a strategist.
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In its operations, disciplinary power produces “subjected and practised
bodies, ‘docile’ bodies.”356 It should be noted that given the relationship between
discipline and power, it would be reasonable to assume that the production of
docile bodies is not a specific objective on the part of disciplinary power, but an
effect of its operations. However, the individual methods that comprise
disciplinary power, or disciplines, adhere to their own objectives. In this regard,
discipline is purposeful and employs multiple strategies. Disciplinary power can
be considered the apparatus through which power grafts the soul onto the body;
the docile body, then, is the type of soul that discipline produces. Docile bodies
are malleable, obedient, and possess skills that are beneficial to society.
Moreover, Foucault argues that, historically, discipline has separated the body’s
abilities from its authority, thus ensuring that as the body’s utility increases, its
political influence decreases. In Foucault’s words:
A ‘political anatomy’, which was also a ‘mechanics of power’, was being
born; it defined how one may have a hold over others’ bodies, not only so
that they may do what one wishes, but so that they may operate as one
wishes, with the techniques, the speed and the efficiency that one
determines. … Discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic
terms of utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of
obedience). In short, it disassociates power from the body; on the one
hand, it turns it into an ‘aptitude’, a ‘capacity’, which it seeks to increase;
on the other hand, it reverses the course of energy, the power that might
result from it, and turns it into a relation of strict subjection. If economic
exploitation separates the force and the product of labour, let us say that
disciplinary coercion establishes in the body the constricting link between
an increased aptitude and an increased domination.357
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During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the disciplines began to
subject the body to “a calculated manipulation of its elements, its gestures, its
behaviour. The human body was entering a machinery of power that explores it,
breaks it down and rearranges it.”358 This “machinery of power” encompassed
three methods, or disciplines, which resulted in the production of docile bodies.
These disciplines employed a novel micro-managerial approach to controlling the
body. For instance, one discipline altered “the scale of control,” which Foucault
describes as “exercising upon [the body] a subtle coercion, of obtaining holds
upon it at the level of the mechanism itself—movements, gestures, attitudes,
rapidity: an infinitesimal power of the active body.”359 Further, the disciplines
redirected their “object of control,” away from “the signifying elements of
behaviour or the language of the body,” and toward “[the body’s] economy, the
efficiency of movements, their internal organization”—that is, discipline’s
emphasis shifted from determining the body’s truth to constructing a truth about
the body that served power’s purpose.360 A third disciplinary method altered its
modality in an effort to create “an uninterrupted, constant coercion, supervising
the processes of the activity rather than its result and it is exercised according to
a codification that partitions as closely as possible time, space, movement.”361
These three disciplines served as the conceptual basis for producing docile
bodies during the classical age.
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Foucault also outlines three corresponding institutional applications for
these disciplines, the first being “the art of distributions.”362 This method involved
controlling the body by spatially partitioning the body’s functions, or controlling
the body’s location based on the body’s skills, the location’s designated function,
and the hierarchical ranking of other bodies in that location. In its most basic
form, this method entailed confining the body to specific places—indeed,
Foucault argues that this was the rationale behind the Great Confinement. “In
organizing ‘cells,’ ‘places’ and ‘ranks,’” Foucault writes, “the disciplines create
complex spaces that are at once architectural, functional and hierarchical. It is
spaces that provide fixed positions and permit circulation; they carve out
individual segments and establish operational links; they mark places and
indicate values; they guarantee the obedience of individuals, but also a better
economy of time and gesture.”363 In short, this method served to maximize the
body’s utility through efficient spatial organization.
Complementing this spatial emphasis was the second method’s interest in
“the control of activity.”364 In order to cultivate docile bodies, the second method
emphasized controlling the body’s utility, or productive behavior, over
understanding the significance of that behavior. This method involved
deconstructing and regimenting the body’s activities. For instance, disciplinary
institutions regulated the body’s activities using the strict timetables, and dictated
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the body’s actions at the level of individual body parts, as well as the manner in
which the body may interact with objects. In keeping with the goal of maximizing
the body’s utility while minimizing its influence, this method served the dual
purpose of subjecting the body to “specified operations” while determining
through these operations the body’s innate limits and functions; “the body is
offered up to new forms of knowledge. It is … a body of useful training and not of
rational mechanics, but one in which, by virtue of that very fact, a number of
natural requirements and functional constraints are beginning to emerge.”365 In
this incarnation, disciplinary power did not constrain the body according to an
established set of societal rules or physiological limitations; rather, discipline
produced and synthesized the body’s activities; it functioned “as of coercive link
with the apparatus of production.”366
Foucault identifies a third discipline as “the organization of geneses.”367
Building off the previous two methods, this organization involved controlling time,
or “the ‘seriation’ of successive activities.” Specifically, institutions divided time
into cumulative segments according to the body’s proficiency; upon completing a
task or after a set duration, one would advance to a the next task. Discipline
structured the body’s activities according to “a linear time whose moments are
integrated, one upon another, and which is orientated towards a terminal, stable
point; in short, an ‘evolutive’ time,” as well as “a social time of a serial, orientated,
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cumulative type: the discovery of an evolution in terms of ‘progress.’”368 In this
way, discipline placed the body inside a perpetual hierarchy of timetables, each
with its own beginning and ending, and within which power could measure,
intervene and invest. Institutions such as monasteries, schools, asylums, prisons
and militaries combined these methods in order to regulate every aspect of
individuals’ lives.
In the modern age, power has, in a haphazard yet discernable manner,
refined the disciplines.369 The disciplines are now more than techniques intended
to constrain and ensure obedience; they are autonomous mechanisms that
organize and observe their object of control in order to expand and replicate
power’s influence over the body; they are the apparatus that connects power to
the body, thus producing the individual. Foucault elaborates on discipline’s
function:
The chief function of the disciplinary power is to ‘train’, rather than to
select and levy; or, no doubt, to train in order to levy and select all the
more. It does not link forces together in order to reduce them; it seeks to
bind them together in such a way as to multiply and use them. It ‘trains’
the moving, confused multitudes of bodies and forces into a multiplicity of
individual elements—small, separate cells, organics autonomies, generic
identities and continuities, combinatory segments. Discipline ‘makes’
individuals; it is the specific technique of a power that regards individuals
as both objects and as instruments of its exercise.370

Foucault identifies discipline’s refinements as hierarchical observation,
normalizing judgment, and the examination. Hierarchical observation is the
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continual observation of low-ranking members of a hierarchy by higher members.
In an institutional setting, this observation is intended to regulate behavior
through the implied threat of punishment for behavioral transgressions. Foucault
cites the military camp as an example of hierarchical observation during the
classical age. In order to refine the surveillance of soldiers, the military camp
employed the aforementioned methods of training docile bodies, such as
spatially partitioning officers’ tents according to rank. This practice ensured that
higher-ranked officers continually observed lower-ranked officers simply through
their respective positioning: “The geometry of the paths, the number and
distribution of files and ranks were exactly defined; the network of gazes that
supervised one another was laid down.”371
Other institutions—such as hospitals, schools, prisons and factories—
implemented this model with various refinements. Among these refinements was
the further division of observation. For instance, Jacques Batencour, a
seventeenth century French pedagogue, required his “best pupils” to observe
other students and report behavioral transgressions, establishing a network of
“reciprocal, hierarchized observation.”372 This pyramidal form of supervision
served to automate and expand the range of observation discipline might have
by increasing its relay points and ensuring that peers and instructors continually
supervised students. Foucault therefore argues that hierarchical observation,
both in this instance and in general, “has to be broken down into smaller
371
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elements, but in order to increase its productive function: specify the surveillance
and make it functional.”373 Further, hierarchical observation functioned alongside
and reinforced other pedagogical activities, establishing an “uninterrupted
network” of observation whose function was intertwined with other disciplinary
mechanisms.374 Foucault elaborates: “By means of such surveillance, disciplinary
power became an ‘integrated’ system, linked from the inside to the economy and
to the aims of the mechanism in which it was practised.”375
Hierarchical observation, in short, demonstrates the multidirectional,
acephalous and self-perpetuating nature of power; it is “a multiple, automatic and
anonymous power.”376 These characteristics allow discipline to subjugate the
body “without recourse, in principle at least, to excess, force or violence. It is a
power that seems all the less ‘corporal’ in that it is more subtly ‘physical’.”377 As
Foucault argues in the following summary, hierarchical observation is discipline’s
application of the Foucauldian microphysics of power:
Although surveillance rests upon individual, its functioning is that of a
network of relations from top to bottom, but also to a certain extent from
bottom to top and laterally; this network ‘holds’ the whole together and
traverses it in its entirety with effects of power that derive from one
another: supervisors, perpetually supervised. The power in the
hierarchized surveillance of the disciplines is not possessed as a thing, or
transferred as a property; it functions like a piece of machinery. And,
although it is true that its pyramidal organization gives it a ‘head’, it is the
apparatus as a whole that produces ‘power’ and distributes individuals in
this permanent and continuous field. This enables the disciplinary power
to be both absolutely indiscreet, since it is everywhere and always on
alert, since by its very principles it leaves no zone of shade and
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constantly supervises the very individuals who are entrusted with the task
of supervising; and absolutely ‘discreet’, for it functions permanently and
largely in silence. Discipline makes possible the operation of a relational
power that sustains itself by its own mechanism and which, for the
spectacle of public events, substitutes the uninterrupted play of calculated
gazes.378

Complementing hierarchical observation was normalizing judgment, a
system of corrective punishments and rewards intended to normalize behavior.
During the classical age, institutions employed normalizing judgment by
implementing internal sets of rules in addition to those formally employed at the
state and local levels. Thus, normalizing judgment “enjoys a kind of judicial
privilege with its own laws, its specific offences, its particular forms of judgment.
The disciplines established an ‘infra-penalty’; … they defined and repressed a
mass of behaviour that the relative indifference of the great systems of
punishments had allowed to escape.”379 The aim of these rules was to
differentiate, measure and reduce differences between individuals within an
institution. “Disciplinary punishment has the function of reducing gaps. It must
therefore be essentially corrective.”380
To support this argument, Foucault returns to the example of the military
and schools. In both instances, discipline weighed the individual’s actions and
abilities against the discipline’s established norm. Discipline punished nonconformity and rewarded conformity: “the soldier commits an ‘offence’ whenever
he does not reach the level required; a pupil’s ‘offence’ is not only a minor
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infraction, but also the inability to carry out his tasks.”381 However, Foucault also
emphasizes the arbitrary nature of punishment, stating: “if necessary, everything
might serve to punish the slightest thing; each subject finds himself caught in a
punishable, punishing universality.”382 And as to the punitive methods
themselves, discipline consistently attributed positive and negative values to
quantifiable elements—such as rank or academic performance—that could be
modified as rewards or punishments. This valuation, or “micro-economy,” also
“operates a differentiation … of individuals themselves, of their nature, their
potentialities, their level or their value. By assessing acts with precision,
discipline judges individuals ‘in truth’; the penalty that it implements is integrated
into the cycle of knowledge of individuals.”383 Hence, the power to punish
coincided with the power to assign a measurable value to the individual’s traits
and abilities and to place aspects of the individual within a hierarchy.
The normalizing aspect of normalizing judgment derived from its
comparisons and the corresponding threat of punishment for deviations. Foucault
uses École Militaire as an example of this phenomenon. École Militaire punished
students through the demotion of rank to the extent that the lowest-ranking
students were ostracized by their peers and denied privileges granted to higherranking students. In order to avoid this loss of status, students inevitably
normalized their behavior in accordance with the academy’s standards: “This
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hierarchizing penalty … exercised over [students] a constant pressure to conform
to the same model … So that they might all be like one another.”384 Further, the
quantification and valuation of the individual established a finite hierarchy of
normal and abnormal statuses. For instance, École Militaire clearly differentiated
the statuses of each ranking from all others, with the lowest being the most
individuated and therefore abnormal. Hence, “[normalizing judgment] traces the
limit that will define difference in relation to all other differences, the external
frontier of the abnormal.”385 Foucault offers this summary of normalizing
judgment:
The power of normalization imposes homogeneity; but it individualizes by
making it possible to measure gaps, to determine levels, to fix specialties
and to render differences useful by fitting them one to another. It is easy
to understand how the power of the norm functions within a system of
formal equality, since within a homogeneity that is the rule, the norm
introduces, as a useful imperative and as a result of measurement, all the
shading of individual differences.386

The examination was discipline’s culminating technique, as it “combines
the techniques of an observing hierarchy and those of a normalizing judgment. It
is a normalizing gaze, a surveillance that makes it possible to qualify, to classify
and to punish. It establishes over individuals a visibility through which one
differentiates them and judges them.”387 Discipline used the examination to
assess individuals. The examination was not, however, a simple technique for
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gathering data; rather, it was the driving mechanism by which the social sciences
produced, and continues to produce knowledge, the soul, and the individual.
As previously mentioned, Foucault maintains that scientific discourses
construct the conceptual boundaries that define the soul. The examination was
the foundation of these discourses, as it was based on the objectification of the
individual as a source of knowledge. This process of objectification began with
awareness of observation. In order for the examination to be an effective
disciplinary technique, the individual must be aware of the possibility that he or
she is being observed: “It is the fact of being constantly seen, of being able to
always be seen, that maintains the disciplined individual in his subjection. And
the examination is the technique by which power, instead of imposing its mark on
its subjects, holds them in a mechanism of objectification.”388 The observation of
the individual and the individual’s awareness of their being observed were
corresponding elements in the same mechanism—the mechanism by which
knowledge produces and was produced by the object.
To contextualize, Foucault argues that the objectification of the individual
can be seen in late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century European penal
reforms. These reforms classified the criminal as “the enemy of all,” who
“disqualifies himself as a citizen and emerges, bearing within him as it were, a
fragment of nature; he appears as a villain, a monster, a madman, perhaps sick
and, before long, ‘abnormal’ individual. It is such that, one day, he will belong to a
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scientific objectification and to the ‘treatment’ that is correlative to it.”389 In short,
criminality became an erroneous and immoral state comparable to madness
during the same time period, as Foucault argued in Madness and Civilization.
And, as with the madman, the criminal was reduced to an abstract and
quantifiable object of study: “The classical age discovered the body as object and
target of power.”390
In observing, measuring and differentiating deviant and normal behavior,
the examination established a corpus of knowledge that individualizes deviancy.
This corpus of knowledge objectified individuals by using biographical accounts,
or cases: “[A case] is the individual as he may be described, judged, measured,
compared with others, in his very individuality; and it is also the individual who
has to be trained or corrected, classified, normalized, excluded, etc.”391 The
social sciences—which, as previously established, remain entrenched with
disciplinary power—served as the objective methodology for creating these
accounts. Biographical accounts allowed the examination to catalogue deviant
behavior, establishing this corpus of knowledge. In Foucault’s words, the
examination regarded “the individual as a describable, analyzable object … in
order to maintain him in his individual features, in his particular evolution, in his
own aptitudes or abilities, under the gaze of a permanent corpus of
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knowledge.”392 Foucault argues that the social sciences’ role in the examination,
“(from psychiatry to pedagogy, from the diagnosis of disease to the hiring of
labor)” gathers, produces and spreads knowledge “not simply at the level of
consciousness, of representations and in what one thinks one knows, but at the
level of what makes possible the knowledge that is transformed into political
investment.”393 That is, the examination operates on a subconscious level,
creating the docile body and soul by defining the boundaries of the individual’s
knowledge of itself.
To Foucault, the individual is a collection of data—an amalgamation of
case studies in the social sciences. The individual, in Foucault’s view, is a social
construct: “The individual is no doubt the fictitious atom of an ‘ideological’
representation of society; but he is also a reality fabricated by this specific
technology of power that I have called ‘discipline.’”394 For this reason,
individuality exists on a spectrum of deviancy and normalcy. Bodies on the
normal end of this spectrum are of less interest to objective study and, therefore,
remain less differentiated, less measured, and less individualized than deviant
bodies. Deviant bodies, in contrast, are both the object and product of objective
study, and are therefore more individualized. Foucault clearly holds a negative
view of the individual insofar as disciplinary power differentiates people in order
to identify and correct deviant characteristics. Hence, the most distinct individual
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is also the most watched and corrected. This is what Foucault is arguing in the
following passage:
In a system of discipline, the child is more individualized than the adult,
the patient more than the healthy man, the madman and the delinquent
more than the normal and the non-delinquent. In each case, it is towards
the first of these pairs that all the individualizing mechanisms are turned
in our civilization; and when one wishes to individualize the healthy,
normal and law-abiding adult, it is always by asking him how much of the
child he has in him, what secret madness lies within him, what
fundamental crime he has dreamt of committing.395

If Foucault stopped here, one might assume that disciplinary power exists
only in institutionalized settings. This is not, of course, what Foucault is arguing.
As previously established, Foucault regards power (and its expression in the
form of discipline) as having a pervasive influence at every level of society. In
order to explain how disciplinary power’s influence permeates throughout society,
Foucault provides his famous example of Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon. The
Panopticon was a prison structure that exemplified all of the qualities attributable
to disciplinary power. Bentham designed the Panopticon in such a way as to
allow prison guards to see into every cell while simultaneously blocking the
guards from each prisoner’s view. This design ensured that prisoners were
always aware that they could be observed, yet never knew when the observation
was actually taking place. Clearly, this is an implementation of hierarchical
observation and the examination. The Panopticon employed disciplinary
techniques in order to maximize power’s influence and minimize its need for
physical implementation.
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While the Panopticon was never built, Foucault argues that it represents
how disciplinary power functions in modern Western society. “The Panopticon …
must be understood as a generalizable model of functioning; a way of defining
power relations in terms of the everyday life of men,” argues Foucault. “It is the
diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form; its functioning,
abstracted from any obstacle, resistance of friction, must be represented as a
pure architectural and optical system: it is in fact a figure of political technology
that may and must be detached from any specific use.”396 In other words, the
Panopticon’s application of disciplinary techniques can be viewed as a
microcosm of how power operates in society at large. Foucault refers to this
generalized application of the Panopticon’s functions as panopticism.
Panopticism disperses power’s influence by connecting multiple disciplinary
functions together: “[The panoptic schema] arranges things in such a way that
the exercise of power is not added from the outside, like a rigid, heavy constraint,
to the functions it invests, but is so subtly present in them as to increase their
efficiency by itself increasing its own points of contact.”397 Rather than producing
power, panopticism augments and directs it in accordance with contextual
factors.
Dreyfus and Rabinow argue that panopticism emerged when disciplinary
power “gradually overflowed its institutional bounds” during the modern era.398
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“The techniques of the Panopticon were applied, in admittedly less fully
articulated form, in numerous kinds of institutions, and these institutions in turn
kept close surveillance not only on the individuals within their walls but on those
outside as well.”399 Panopticism is essentially the dilution of disciplinary
techniques throughout society. This dilution produces docile bodies on an
individual scale through the aforementioned disciplinary methods: “The
technology of discipline linked the production of useful and docile individuals with
the production of controlled and efficient populations.”400 Foucault summarizes
panopticism as follows:
One can speak of the formation of a disciplinary society in this movement
that stretches from the enclosed disciplines, a sort of social ‘quarantine’,
to an indefinitely generalizable mechanism of ‘panopticism’. Not because
the disciplinary modality of power has replaced all the others; but
because it has infiltrated the others, sometimes undermining them, but
serving as an intermediary between them, linking them together,
extending them and above all making it possible to bring the effects of
power to the most minute and distant elements. It assures an infinitesimal
distribution of the power relations.401

In short, panopticism represents the dilution of disciplinary power at every
level of society. Although disciplinary power is comprised of strategies, it adheres
to Foucault’s model of power as an acephalous, autonomous and multidirectional
force that constructs and observes individuals. This genealogical view posits a
form of generalized coercion that is at once strategic and without a strategist; a
society that observes, judges, and normalizes its population through the microphysics of its disciplinary functions, which are integrated into and interconnected
399
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with all other functions. Hence, all individuals in a society play a role in the
perpetuation of power. This conclusion is apparent in Foucault’s the following
passage from the final chapter of Discipline and Punish, titled “The Carcel.”
The judges of normality are present everywhere. We are in the society of
the teacher-judge, the doctor-judge, the educator-judge, the ‘social
worker’-judge; it is on them that the universal reign of the normative is
based; and each individual, wherever he may find himself, subjects to it
his body, his gesture, his behaviour, his aptitudes, his achievements. The
carceral network, in its compact or disseminated forms, with its systems
of insertion, distribution, surveillance, observation, has been the greatest
support, in modern society, of the normalizing power.402

The normalized, docile bodies that power produces inevitably subscribe to
a self-concept that favors a dominant social narrative. In the modern era, the
dominant social narrative coincides with bourgeois morals and interests. Hence,
Foucault’s theories in Discipline and Punish can still be considered a critique of
bourgeois society.
Foucault’s genealogical embraces the circularity between object and
subject, and therefore cannot make claims to objective truth. While he
inadvertently encountered this issue during his archaeological phase, Foucault
now intentionally fashions genealogy as an analytic. Foucault, as a subject,
produces theories regarding his object—power and society—yet this object
produces Foucault. Consequently, any genealogical analysis is a narrative
produced within the context of another narrative. Despite this lack of objectivity,
genealogy is a viable method of analysis in that it allows us to conceptualize
complex social phenomena by breaking them down into a binary sequence of
402
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interconnected power relations. The validity of these power relations lies in the
fact that they reflect a material outcome, and therefore have an empirical basis.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
CONCLUSION

Conclusion
My purpose in this study has been to determine whether or not Foucault
provides a viable critical social theory of bourgeois society. I maintain that
Foucault provides a viable para-Marxist critical social theory in the form of the
genealogical method. I support this conclusion by outlining how Foucault’s
theories are consistently critical of the power inequalities associated with
bourgeois society. Foucault’s early methodologies constitute a critique of the
narrative upon which bourgeois society is based. In Mental Illness and
Psychology and Madness and Civilization, Foucault demonstrates how this
narrative has historically defined normal and abnormal behavior in accordance
with its interests. The Birth of the Clinic and The Order of Things similarly
deconstruct how contextual factors (which, in the case of modernity, are
analogous to the bourgeois narrative) subtly influence medical and social
discourses through language. Moreover, Foucault weaves together a compelling
account of the how the bourgeois narrative is autonomously enforced in
Discipline and Punish. While Foucault’s portrayal of the bourgeois narrative
varies according to his subject matter and methodology—the narrative appears in
the form of state authority, discursive formations, and the power/knowledge
interaction in the aforementioned texts—what remains constant is the analysis of
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how the bourgeois narrative creates power inequalities. Foucault does not
expressly oppose the bourgeois narrative, yet his theories can still be considered
a critique of bourgeois society insofar as he seeks to show how power
inequalities manifest themselves as a result of the narrative.
Foucault attempts to overcome Kant’s subject/object division during his
pre-archaeological and archaeological stages. As we have seen, Foucault
employs an unstable combination of hermeneutics and phenomenology in his
pre-archaeological stage. Foucault rejects hermeneutics and phenomenology on
the grounds that these methods fail to offer a coherent resolution to the
subject/object division. Archaeology attempts to overcome the subject/object
division by establishing a relative yet objective method for analyzing discourses.
This method ultimately falls into an epistemological impasse and consequently
suffers from internal contradictions. Foucault’s attempts to resolve the
subject/object division are significant when viewed as a continual effort to provide
an objective method for analyzing the societal forces that hold a privileged status
in producing knowledge. In other words, Foucault’s early methodologies were
intended to function as critiques of bourgeois society.
While genealogy abandons the attempt to overcome the subject/object
division, it still functions as a critique of bourgeois society. Genealogy functions in
this way by examining the material outcomes of the interaction between power
and knowledge. In doing so, genealogy facilitates the analysis of the social
inequalities that emerge as a result of power and knowledge’s interaction. The
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power/knowledge interaction involves the autonomous implementation of
disciplinary power, which is an expression of the bourgeois narrative. While
genealogy is not an objective method of analysis, it provides a means of
conceptualizing how the reciprocal relationship between knowledge and power
manifests itself through the individual. Consequently, genealogy is a viable
method for analyzing power inequalities in bourgeois society.
Foucault assumes a relativistic perspective during his archaeological and
genealogical stages. Despite this neutral position, his theories consistently
expose how the narrative put forth by bourgeois society perpetuates social
inequalities. Foucault acknowledges that, at present, man cannot reconcile his
understanding of himself with objective truth, meaning that we are trapped in an
intellectual impasse and cannot conceive of a society where man is not an object
of power’s influence. Yet Foucault maintains that man can test the limits of his
conceptualization of himself, thus allowing for the possibility of meaningful social
change within the narrative of man’s own construction. Based on these findings, I
conclude that Foucault is a para-Marxist.
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